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Abstract 
 
This study is about refugee integration: how refugees become citizens, and more 
generally how outsiders become insiders. More specifically, it is about an 
appropriate conceptual framework for studying and understanding refugee 
integration processes. I propose that refugee integration be understood as local 
politics, and that, therefore, refugees and hosts negotiate their relationships with 
each other based on their respective interests and using a series of material and 
symbolic exchanges. While this conceptual approach to integration seems self-
evident, this empirical, process-oriented, and spatially and temporally specific 
approach radically departs from the predominant normative assumptions in the 
policy and academic literature. The thesis sets out and develops how this simple 
framework, consistently applied, carries analytical correlates which stand in marked 
contrast to most analyses of refugee integration processes. 
 
My argument is supported empirically with a detailed case study of villages in a 
rural border area of South Africa where many (former) Mozambican refugees are 
settled since the 1980s. I spent four years (2002-2006) living and conducting field 
work in this area. The thesis by published (and publishable) works includes five 
articles covering different aspects of refugee integration as political negotiation. 
These include:  
1) analysing the conceptual dangers and empirical fallacies of approaches to local 
integration which frame it as a ‘solution’ within the international refugee 
assistance and protection regime;  
2) illustrating how common conceptual and methodological approaches to 
studying refugees tend to hide the presence of integrated refugees;  
3) applying the political negotiation approach across time periods by comparing 
the integration processes of two ‘waves’ of Mozambicans fleeing conflict into 
South Africa in the mid-1800s and the 1980s;  
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4) showing how integration processes, including those related to legal status, 
often function according to very different logics than intended by national or 
international legal frameworks and policies targeting refugees; and  
5) looking at processes of negotiated integration at the level of the village and 
how they are spatialised. 
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 Foreword and Acknowledgements 
 
I started working in Bushbuckridge District, South Africa in March 2002 as the 
Programme Coordinator of the Refugee Research Programme (RRP) of the 
University of the Witwatersrand (Wits) and became its Acting Director from 2003 
and its Director from 2004-2006. After starting this PhD in September 2003 and 
spending three months in London, I returned to Bushbuckridge and lived, worked 
and researched there full time for the next three years, spending a total of four 
years in the area. In 2006, the RRP merged with the Forced Migration Studies 
Programme (FMSP) at the Wits main campus and I moved to Johannesburg as a 
Senior Researcher and Coordinator of the Citizenship and Boundaries research 
initiative, where I continued to work on migration issues but in different parts of 
South Africa and the region, and where I continued to publish from my 
Bushbuckridge research. Since 2010, the FMSP has become the African Centre for 
Migration & Society (ACMS), still within the University of the Witwatersrand, where 
I remain a Senior Researcher and lecturer. 
 
Before being integrated into the FMSP, the RRP was a semi-independent research 
unit of the University of the Witwatersrand. The RRP was established in the small 
town of Acornhoek in 1992 with the aim of documenting the situation of 
Mozambican refugees in the area in a time of great uncertainty. The civil war in 
Mozambique had just ended, but without a clear sense of the nature of the 
resulting peace; South Africa’s Apartheid regime was crumbling, but the 
negotiations towards a majority-rule dispensation were far from concluded and 
violence was a constant possibility. In this time of regional upheaval, Mozambican 
refugees in the eastern border areas of South Africa were caught between nations 
fundamentally reconfiguring themselves. From 1992, the Refugee Research Project 
was the only institution consistently occupying itself with their concerns. The RRP’s 
approach combined research (being part of a University) with NGO-style work, 
including direct service provision (such as monitoring of the 1999 Exemption for 
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 Introduction: Negotiating Belonging 
 
I had the feeling that I belonged 
I had the feeling I could be someone,  
could be someone,  
could be someone 
   
    Tracy Chapman, Fast Car, Tracy Chapman 
 
 
You know what, that name [Mozambican] it doesn’t make them feel comfortable. 
Ja, it is the same as if someone is saying you are a foreigner. 
 
Willis Ngobeni, Chair of the Community Development 
Forum, Clare Village, Bushbuckridge 1 
 
1. Prelude 
Nelson Ubisi is a successful pastor and a prophet. His congregation now has twelve 
churches in Bushbuckridge district. He is also the Chairman of the Community 
Development Forum in Thangine village, the elected leader of the community. His 
church and his large, grey, brick and plaster house with a tin roof – with space for 
the twenty-two children he is looking after, some his own from a series of partners 
during his earlier life as a migrant worker in Johannesburg and some his deceased 
brother’s – are located at the bottom of the hill in the part of the village closest to 
the meagre maize fields and the sloping football pitch. It is the part of the village 
where most of the Mozambican households have their stands. Nelson’s 
Mozambican father and his South African mother were both traditional healers and 
Nelson broke with them when he became a Christian. This was when Nelson 
returned to his birthplace in South Africa as a young man after spending several 
years growing up with his father’s family in Mozambique. According to Nelson’s 
identity document he is a citizen of South Africa, but the name on the ID is not the 
name he usually uses – it is his maternal uncle’s surname, since he could not get an 
ID in his father’s name. He returned to South Africa in order to find work in the 
1970s, before the civil war deepened in southern Mozambique, and ended up 
1 Interviewed 6 April 2004 
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hosting many members of his father’s family when they fled into South Africa in 
1985.  
 
His young wife Eunice was among the refugees who arrived in Bushbuckridge 
District in the 1980s. Now, in spite of her youth, she is recognised as a respected 
matron of the church and the community and she cares for all of Nelson’s children, 
including three to which she gave birth. She was born in Mozambique and grew up 
there, but her paternal grandparents and her father lived in Sophiatown, 
Johannesburg, the iconic centre of urban black culture in Apartheid South Africa. In 
1955, when Sophiatown was famously razed to the ground, Eunice’s grandparents 
were forcibly removed to the newly built township of Meadowlands along with all 
their neighbours: an experience which became part of (black) South Africa’s and the 
global anti-Apartheid movement’s collective consciousness, reflected through the 
song ‘Meadowlands’ performed by Miriam Makeba and others.  
 
Eunice’s father and his siblings were born in Sophiatown, and her grandfather and 
‘big father’ (older paternal uncle) are still living in Meadowlands today. Eunice’s 
father went back to Mozambique to find a wife. When Eunice and her parents came 
to South Africa and Thangine village during the Mozambican civil war she 
experienced it as humiliating to be reduced to absolute poverty and to be called 
derogatory names like ‘mapoti’ (short for Portuguese) by other school children. But 
she did well in school, got a South African ID (although also not with her actual 
surname), and is now planning to take computer classes and continue her 
education, perhaps as a social worker. She regularly takes in abandoned children, 
putting them through school along with all the other children in the household. In 
terms of the couple’s plans for the future, Nelson says he would like to live in 
Mozambique, if he could find someone to buy his house in Thangine since he 
invested so much in it, or perhaps he could have houses in both Thangine and 
Mozambique. Eunice is not so excited about the idea of moving to Mozambique, 
but she would like to find her grandparent’s graves in Mozambique and erect a 
tombstone to honour them. In 2006 she had not been back to Mozambique since 
fleeing the war in 1985. 
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 Just a few houses up the dirt road lives twenty-four-year-old Noel Machele. He 
always wears nice clothes and recently bought a second-hand BMW. He was 
introduced to me in 2003 as a potential research assistant because his English is 
good. When we first met, and after I had told him I was studying the relationship 
between South Africans and Mozambicans in the village, he tells me that his 
parents – a teacher and a bank employee, making them one of the most well-to-do 
families in the village – were both born in South Africa and that he would normally 
also say he was born in Tzaneen, a South African town c. 200 km north of Thangine. 
That is what people in the village and even his siblings think and what his ID says. 
But his grandmother recently told him, he explains, that he was actually born in 
Mozambique during the war, when his father took his mother to visit distant 
relatives and they got stuck there because of the fighting. Noel says he feels a 
strong emotional connection to Mozambique and would like to visit.  
 
Two years later, after working with Noel on and off for some time, other people in 
the village tell me that Noel is not related to the teacher in whose large brick house 
he lives in the middle of the village, but is actually the son of a poor refugee family 
whose thatched round mud hut is at the bottom of the hill. The families share a 
surname, but are not otherwise related, although the teacher’s mother knew Noel’s 
paternal uncle when he had worked in South Africa before the war. Noel went to 
live with the teacher’s family for several years as a small child when they first 
arrived in the village and they helped him through school. In 2000, he moved from 
his parents’ small hut back into the teacher’s house when he grew too old to share 
a room with his grandmother and younger siblings. Eunice knows both families well 
and thinks that Noel should move back to his aging parents’ place, now that the 
South African government has built them a small brick house. Noel’s war-crippled 
father received permanent residence documents when these were granted to 
former Mozambican refugees in 1999 and has been receiving a government 
disability grant which supports the family, but in Eunice’s opinion Noel should be 
using his salary to help his birth family, rather than his adopted family who already 
have enough money.   
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 When I ask Noel about ‘the other Machele family’ in the village, he apologises for 
‘lying’ to me but says that he hates it when people mention his Mozambican 
ancestry. He says he gets on well with the other Mozambicans in the village and 
recognises them as ‘his people’ but that he would beat up anyone in the village who 
calls him a Mozambican to his face (even though he acknowledges that most of the 
people in the village know his family story). He tells me that he once got a colleague 
at the wholesalers where he works fired for calling him a ‘mapoti.’ Just after the 
2004 elections in Mozambique, I visited Noel at the teacher’s house. Noel 
introduced me to an old school friend of his, but made it clear that I should not 
mention his Mozambican connection in front of his friend. Later that day I said that 
Mozambican citizens living in South Africa had been granted the right to vote in the 
Mozambican elections. This interested Noel greatly. When his friend went outside 
briefly, he said “Here they call me Mozambican and when I go there they call me 
South African and tell me that I don’t belong.” 
 
Such stories are not unusual in Bushbuckridge District, South Africa. They are 
stories of the complexity of belonging and integration and they illustrate many of 
the questions which pertain to social relations anywhere. On what basis are you 
respected by your neighbours: as a pastor, a faith healer, a patriarch, a 
Mozambican, an effective elected administrator? A mother, a good Samaritan, a 
refugee, a grandchild of Sophiatown and Meadowlands? An educated and 
employed young man, someone who supports his family, a South African? What 
does the state know about you and what do your documents mean: your name, 
your place of birth, your ancestry, your right to government housing and social 
welfare grants? What is important to you: what people know or what they say or 
do, your pride or your shame, your family history or your children’s futures? To 
which collective do you feel you belong, and on what basis do people in that 
collective accept that you belong?  
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2. Introducing Essays on Negotiating Belonging 
 
This study is about refugee integration: how refugees become citizens (both 
vertically in relation to the state and horizontally in relation to other residents 
(Neveu 2000)), and more generally how outsiders become insiders and are 
perceived and feel themselves to be so. More specifically, it is about an appropriate 
conceptual framework (and therefore methodological strategies) for studying and 
understanding refugee integration processes.  
 
The simple framework I propose is that refugee integration is part of local politics, 
and that, as part of local politics (who gets what, when and how (Lasswell 1958)), 
refugees and hosts negotiate their relationships with each other based on their 
respective interests and using a series of material and symbolic exchanges. “I define 
local integration as a process of negotiating access to local legitimacy and 
entitlement on the basis of a variety of value systems determined by local power 
holders in dialogue with refugees.” (Polzer 2009:93). As with any political process, 
the strategies used and the outcomes achieved are highly contextual and bound to 
the interest and resource constellations of a particular time and place. This means, I 
argue, that a conceptual approach to integration should be process-oriented, tied 
to specific spatial and temporal reference points, and empirical. This approach is 
part of a broader perspective which “understands conflict and forced migration 
[and their consequences] as products of and continuous with ‘normal’ social 
relations in the sense that they are generated by social and political relations that 
are amenable to understanding and analysis.”(Kaiser 2008:377) (see also Davis 
1992; Benoist and Voutira 1994; Richards 2004) While this may seem so self-
evident as to be hardly worth mentioning – much less structuring a PhD around – 
this simple framework, consistently applied, carries analytical correlates which 
stand in marked contrast to most analyses of refugee integration processes.  
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Some of these counter-assumptions include that:  
1. local integration is a form of local politics rather than an institutionalizable 
intervention for an exceptional category of people (e.g. refugees);  
2. local integration is negotiated by refugees, and these negotiations are based 
on a range of legitimacy claims and forms of exchange rather than primarily 
based on “refugee rights”-related claims;  
3. local integration is enabled by hosts for a variety of reasons rather than 
mainly for reasons related to the idea of “refugee protection”; 
4. local integration needs to be understood as an ongoing and shifting process 
rather than a linear process or a final state of being; 
5. today’s processes of refugee integration should be analysed using a 
framework that allows for comparisons and links across historical periods, 
rather than taking the current international legal and institutional refugee 
protection regime for granted as a primary influence on integration 
processes and outcomes; 
6. refugee integration processes can only be understood by abandoning rather 
than reifying the category of ‘refugee’ as an a priori conceptual and 
methodological construct; and 
7. local integration, fundamentally, is an empirical process. Normative claims 
about the desirability of different forms of society (communitarian, 
cosmopolitan, etc.) may be endogenous to the political negotiations of the 
process but should not be taken as an analytical starting point for describing 
and understanding the process. 
 
I will return to these counter-assumptions in my review of the literature in this 
introduction and in the articles which make up this thesis. I establish and support 
my argument empirically with a detailed case study of villages in a rural border area 
of South Africa where many (former) Mozambican refugees are settled since the 
1980s. I spent four years (2002-2006) living and conducting field work in this area. 
The general argument, however, extends to situations of refugee integration in 
developing countries, specifically in Africa, and indeed is applicable to thinking 
about refugee integration generally, no matter the context.  
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 This Introduction frames five articles, of which three are published in and two have 
been submitted to peer-reviewed journals. 2 The articles are:  
? “Negotiating Rights: The Politics of Local Integration” (2009, Refuge, 26(2), 
91-105) – hereafter referred to as Negotiating Rights.   
? “Invisible Integration: How Bureaucratic, Academic and Social Categories 
Obscure Integrated Refugees” (2008, Journal of Refugee Studies, 21(4), 476-
497) – hereafter referred to as Invisible Integration. 
? “Histories of Integration; The local politics of Mozambican Refugees in South 
Africa, 1830-2006” (submitted to Journal of Refugee Studies) – hereafter 
referred to as Histories.   
? "Adapting to Changing Legal Frameworks: Mozambican Refugees in South 
Africa - an Historical Overview." (2007, International Journal of Refugee Law 
19(1), 22-50) – hereafter referred to as Changing Legal Frameworks. 
? “Together Apart: Migration, Integration and the Social Meanings of Space in 
South African Border Villages” (accepted for publication in Geoforum in 
2012) – hereafter referred to as Space. 
 
Each article presents refugee integration as political negotiation from a different 
angle. Negotiating Rights and Invisible Integration lay the broad conceptual ground 
work by engaging with dominant practitioner tropes and common problems of 
categorisation and method respectively, while Histories, Changing Legal 
Frameworks and Space delve deeper into my case study material.  
 
Negotiating Rights outlines the conceptual dangers and empirical fallacies of 
approaches to local integration which frame it as a ‘solution’ within the 
international refugee assistance and protection regime, including by campaigners 
and academics who see integration as normatively preferable to refugee 
2 The articles making up the body of the thesis were written at different times: Law was first presented at the 
Workshop on Law and Society: ‘Constituting Democracy’ at the University of the Witwatersrand in September 
2004. The first drafts of Negotiating Rights and Histories were prepared for presentation at the International 
Association for the Study of Forced Migration (IASFM) conference in January 2005 and were respectively 
revised substantially in 2009 and 2011. Invisible Integration was prepared as part of a panel on Invisibility which 
I organised for the 2006 IASFM conference. Space was first drafted in 2009 and revised in 2010. 
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encampment. The paper then sets out the reasons for and implications of thinking 
of integration as a process of local political negotiation. Invisible Integration takes 
this argument further by illustrating how common conceptual and methodological 
approaches to studying refugees tend to hide rather than reveal the presence of 
integrated refugees, thereby making it difficult to study dynamic integration 
processes. Histories applies the political negotiation approach across time periods 
with very different political and policy contexts, comparing and linking the 
integration processes of two ‘waves’ of Mozambicans fleeing conflict into the South 
African lowveld in the mid-1800s and the 1980s. Changing Legal Frameworks looks 
in greater detail at the 1980s refugees and illustrates how actual integration 
processes, including those related to legal status, often function according to very 
different logics than intended by national or international legal frameworks and 
policies targeting refugees. Finally, Space looks at processes of negotiated 
integration at the level of the village and how they are spatialised. 
 
Seeing interactions between refugees and others as one example (among many) of 
local political interaction and negotiation, without a priori specificity for refugees 
over other groups of people, also means that a case study of refugee integration 
can contribute to broader debates in the social sciences. In this I follow Bakewell’s 
injunction that academics should apply “broader social scientific theories of social 
[and political] transformation” to the study of refugees (Bakewell 2008:432), and 
conversely that studies of refugees can speak back to these theories. Some of the 
debates I engage with in this set of articles and in the conclusion chapter are:  
(1) how fields of social-scientific study with direct policy and intervention 
relevance, such as refugee studies or development studies more broadly, 
can and should engage with conceptual categories and relationships (see 
next section, as well as Negotiating Rights and Invisible Integration); 
(2) how marginal, rural populations engage with different expressions and 
iterations of the state and non-state forms of power (see Changing Legal 
Frameworks and Histories); and  
(3) how group identity formation is negotiated over time as a shifting, 
relational process (see Histories and Space). 
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 I start by outlining the relevance of refugee integration as an object of study, 
including a discussion of the relationship between academic and policy fields. This 
includes notes on my use of some key terms, notably ‘refugee’. Then I summarise 
dominant approaches to refugee integration in the literature, noting where my 
approach links or differs. This is followed by an introduction to my case study, and 
finally a discussion of some methodological issues.  
 
 
3. Policy and Academia: Conceptual Blinkers & Labels  
 
The dependence of the ‘refugee studies’ field on policy categories and concepts has 
been extensively critiqued (Scalettaris 2007; Bakewell 2008), but remains a central 
feature of the field. Any researcher writing in relation to this field, and indeed 
anyone writing about people who could be categorised as ‘refugees’, therefore 
needs to engage actively with the question of how her own categories and terms 
are constructed. After some notes on the effect of policy categories in general, I 
reflect on uses of the category ‘refugee’, followed by my use of other labels such as 
‘Mozambican’ and ‘South African.’ 
 
I follow Bakewell in emphasising the danger of allowing “the search for policy 
relevance [to encourage] researchers to take the categories, concepts and priorities 
of policy makers and practitioners as their initial frame of reference” (Bakewell 
2008:432). Key characteristics of the concept ‘refugee’ as a policy category include 
that it privileges the experience and (legal) position of being a forced migrant as the 
primary explanatory factor for what ‘refugees’ do, and that it suggests a clear 
distinction between and homogeneity within ‘refugees’ and ‘hosts’ (ibid). If the aim 
is to understand empirical social processes, however, “empirical research shows 
that the refugee label does not define a sociologically relevant group.” (Scalettaris 
2007:36) Policy categories make large numbers of forced migrants, and specifically 
integrated forced migrants and integration processes, “invisible in both research 
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and policy” (Bakewell 2008:432) (see also Invisible Integration and (Polzer and 
Hammond 2008)). Compared to research on refugees in camps or in formal 
resettlement programmes, studies of self-settled refugees are rare (Jacobsen 2001; 
Kaiser 2006). Some exceptions in the African context are Hansen (1979; 1990), 
Malkki (1995), Van Damme (1999), Bakewell (2000), Andrews (2003), Hovil (2002; 
2007), and Okello et al (2005). 
 
A focus on policy categories also makes many aspects of refugee experiences 
invisible. As Kaiser puts it, “refugee groups have no choice but to assert themselves 
and respond to their new environments. Such a response is made not only in terms 
of their legal, material and subsistence statuses, but also in relation to their 
individual and collective subjectivities, identities and all aspects of their existential 
experience. In ‘refugee studies’, as well as in broader interdisciplinary studies of 
refugees, the analysis of the former has been largely privileged in comparison to 
the latter.” I share her “conviction that both elements are crucial and should be 
understood in relation to each other” (Kaiser 2008:376) and that categories which 
obscure an understanding of the varieties of collective subjectivity are therefore 
problematic. 
 
The reliance on policy categories, furthermore, contributes to the de-historicisation 
and false de-politicization and universalization of the refugee studies field (Malkki 
1997). Policy frameworks which are artefacts of particular geo-temporal politics are 
reified as objective descriptors of actual social processes rather than being 
recognised as the normative and instrumental tools of control and power which 
they often are (Harrell-Bond 1986; Malkki 1995; Scalettaris 2007). Chimni goes so 
far as to link ‘forced migration studies’, through the categories it uses and imposes, 
with the “geopolitics of hegemonic states” and the historical (colonial) project of 
“‘civilising’ the Other”. He therefore calls for “a greater degree of disciplinary 
reflexivity”, not least through reflecting on the relationship between refugee 
studies and other ‘disciplines.’ (Chimni 2009:11)  
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I address the issue of categorisation in several of the articles which make up this 
thesis. Invisible Integration is entirely about the ways in which conceptual 
categories and categorisation processes impact on who and what we can and 
cannot ‘see’, whether these categories are constructed and applied by states, 
communities or academics. In Negotiating Rights, I further discuss how policy-
focused approaches to integration obscure many elements of actual lives and 
experiences. Histories and Changing Legal Frameworks trace how policies, and the 
labels and categories that go with them, change dramatically over time, sometimes 
within quite short periods of time, and that people, including refugees and 
everyone else, often resist or ignore these categorisations.  
 
Labels and social categories are unavoidable. As I note in Invisible Integration, “we 
cannot think or act socially without social groups, and institutions cannot function 
without them… [but] a key aspect of social scientific enquiry is a critical awareness 
of the constructedness of categories.” (Polzer 2008:477) Rather than taking policy 
labels for granted, the shaping of labels should be an object of study in itself 
(Scalettaris 2007:36). Some authors, such as Hathaway (2003; 2007), value and 
reaffirm the power of the ‘refugee’ label and therefore research the proliferation of 
different labels for forced migrants in order to uphold the original label’s 
(supposed) protective power. Others, such as Zetter, question whether labels such 
as ‘refugee’ are mostly protective or benign. Zetter has documented how labels are 
continually shaped and resisted through interactions between institutions and 
people at the global and local levels, thereby fundamentally shaping access to rights 
and material resources as well as identity formation (1988; 1991; 2007).  
 
What are the implications of this discussion for the study of refugee integration 
generally, and my study of refugee integration in a rural borderland specifically? A 
simple short-hand for describing my case study might be ‘a study of integration 
processes between Mozambican refugees and South African hosts in village 
communities in a South African border area.’ However, the terms ‘Mozambican’ 
and ‘South African’, ‘refugee’ and ‘host’, and ‘community’ are already laden with 
implicit meanings which prefigure some of what I argue needs to be empirically 
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established rather than assumed. To what extent do people in these border villages 
use place of birth or nationality at birth as a means of grouping people? To what 
extent and in what contexts is it relevant today that a person or a group of people 
crossed an international border because they were fleeing civil war twenty years 
ago? As the stories in the Prelude suggest, the answers to these questions are not 
simple.  
 
Colleagues who have written about the same communities of ‘Mozambican 
refugees’ in Bushbuckridge District have made different choices in the use of 
terminology. Golooba-Mutebi implies a continued ‘lived’ relevance of the ‘refugee 
experience’ by stating that: “whilst I am mindful of the need not to ‘over-produce 
refugees conceptually, nor preserve them as dedicated refugees after they have, in 
effect moved on’ (Loizos 1999:245), I also concur with the contention that one can 
continue to be a refugee ‘even after one receives asylum in a new place among new 
people’ (Daniel and Knudsen 1995:1). I have therefore opted to use the term 
refugee for these Mozambicans [including those who have acquired citizenship 
status since their arrival].” (Golooba-Mutebi 2004:footnote on page 2). He then 
analyses the social dynamics among the “refugees [who] are concentrated in their 
own settlement” and between them and South African village residents in relation 
to witchcraft beliefs, but without any particular engagement with how refugeeness 
(rather than, say, Mozambicanness) is a relevant group identifier.  
 
Rodgers, whose thesis constitutes an earlier study of virtually the same 
communities and the reasons for their continued ‘separate settlement’, hardly uses 
the term refugee. When he does, it is only “to refer to Mozambicans living in 
refugee settlements in South Africa, to distinguish them from those living at home 
in Mozambique.” (2002:viii) He continues: “As the focus of the thesis is on the 
changing dynamics of relationships, rather than on the characteristics of fixed 
categories, I have refrained from devoting much effort to refining the 
categorisation of Mozambicans in South Africa.” (ibid). What is notable here is that 
he has naturalised notions of ‘home’ (and therefore ‘exile’) in his use of 
terminology, and has also internalised the assumption that a label such as ‘refugee’ 
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is necessarily a “fixed category” and not a part of the construction and negotiation 
of “changing dynamics of relationships.” 
 
I attempt to be clearer in my own use of the term ‘refugee’. I use it as a short-hand 
for identifying persons who fled Mozambique into South Africa due to violent 
conflict. In this, they conform with the definition of a refugee according to the 
Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa of 1969 which states that “The term “refugee” shall also apply to 
every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or 
events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of 
origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to 
seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.” (OAU 
1969) This usage serves the instrumental function of enabling a conversation with 
the field of ‘refugee studies.’ This is most obvious in the article Histories where I 
explicitly use the term in a seemingly anachronistic way – applying it to people who 
moved from the eastern seaboard of Southern Africa (now part of Mozambique) 
into the flatlands below the escarpment (now my case study region of South Africa) 
due to political conflicts in the 1830s-90s, e.g. well before the ‘modern refugee 
regime’ came into effect in the early 1900s. My purpose in using the term in this 
way is to “point out a comparison and continuity over time…[between people who] 
moved along almost exactly the same path [and for similar reasons] as their later 
compatriots”, since I argue that ‘refugee studies’ generally does too little of this 
kind of temporal comparison. I use the ‘refugee’ term in similar ways, e.g. to 
describe persons based on a one-time experience of border crossing motivated by 
war, in Changing Legal Frameworks and Negotiating Rights without delving into the 
labelling process itself. “The goal is clearly not to reify or impose the ‘refugee’ label 
even as individuals integrate, but to be able, as academics, to trace individuals as 
they transition from the status of ‘refugee’ to other statuses, such as ‘citizen’ or 
‘local’.” (Polzer 2008:477) 
 
In none of the articles making up this thesis do I, however, take for granted that the 
‘refugee’ label means anything to most or even any of the people with this specific 
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migration history (at any of the epochs discussed), nor do I assume that this label 
structures any significant interactions or rights in practice. The reason I do not focus 
on analysing the ways in which the label ‘refugee’ is used and understood locally is 
because I did not find it to be part of the dominant discourse in my case study 
villages (vis Zetter 1991; Feldman 2008 for cases where the label is highly relevant 
in everyday life). In Changing Legal Frameworks, I mention the relative lack of 
(intended) impacts of the brief period during which Mozambicans were granted 
formal refugee status in South Africa (from 1993-1996), including the lack of a 
strongly sedimented ‘refugee’ identity.  
 
The terms ‘Mozambican’ and ‘South African’, however, are socially and politically 
important labels in the local context. Neither Golooba-Mutebi nor Rodgers 
problematise these categories sufficiently, in my view. Deciding on how to 
approach these categorisations is not easy, however. Even (or especially) 
researchers who work with a constructionist conception of group identities along 
the ‘imagined communities’ model (Barth 1969; Anderson 1991; Eriksen 1993; 
Gupta and Ferguson 1997; Cohen 2000), and who therefore focus on the ways in 
which group labels are actively created and maintained, may be tempted by the 
logic which “spontaneously organizes, or seeks to organize, collectivities in terms of 
‘imagined communities’, and individuals according to their ‘identities’.” (Robins and 
Aksoy 2001: 687).  
 
This is a temptation to which other researchers in the area and at times I myself 
have succumbed (Rodgers 2002; Golooba-Mutebi 2004; Polzer 2004). Both 
Bakewell’s (2008) and Robins and Aksoy’s response to a similar challenge is to resist 
an external allocation of ‘identity’ (for example, based on putatively objective 
criteria such as place of birth or place of parents’ birth) by rather focusing on the 
real actions and perceptions of ‘empirical people’ (2001:688). I follow their lead in 
basing my analysis of integration on things experienced and constructed by 
‘empirical people’ from both Mozambique and South Africa within the village 
context. Where group identification is claimed or allocated in the description of 
people or spaces – such as calling an area the ‘Mozambican’ neighborhood – this 
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labeling process is part of the social interaction to be studied, rather than an 
objective social reality to be taken at face value (see also discussion in Space). I 
return to some of the practical challenges in implementing such an approach in my 
discussion of methodology (and sampling) at the end of this introduction. 
 
4. Review of the Literature on Refugee Integration  
 
If integration is to be understood as a two-way process, rather than a kind of 
medication that refugees take in order to ‘fit in’ [with a dominant and assumed to 
be homogeneous host society], then they should contribute to the processes in 
which integration is defined. (Korac 2003:53) 
 
 
Why is it important to be able to describe empirically the integration process, e.g. 
the construction, negotiation and maintenance of belonging (Korac 2003)? Is there 
a particular need to do this today? There have always been insiders and outsiders 
throughout history; migrants seeking entry and acceptance into new societies; 
multi-cultural, multi-lingual polities. The current globalised world and the ‘age of 
migration’ (Castles and Miller 2003) are therefore certainly not unique or new in 
terms of the continual contestation and negotiation of the form and substance of 
belonging, although the ubiquity of global processes is relatively recent. The change 
in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries is perhaps more a discursive 
one than an empirical one: a shift from the (relatively brief) ‘age of nations’ and 
powerful claims of territorialised belonging (Castles and Miller 2003; Neveu 
2005:199) (back?) to a less certain or less hegemonic cacophony of overlapping and 
shifting forms of belonging (Gupta and Ferguson 2001; Vertovec 2001), including, in 
many cases, a defensive hardening of territorial boundaries and essentialised 
nationalisms (Merkl and Weinberg 2003). The challenge for academics in such a 
time of change from one model to another, especially where the new model is as 
yet unknown, is to develop tools for describing social processes which do not 
internalise a particular normative construction. How do we observe and become 
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conscious of identity group membership as an ‘object of knowledge’ without 
imposing a priori value judgements?  
 
I discuss definitions of integration and some of the assumptions behind common 
definitions in the article Negotiating Rights, but will reiterate and expand on the 
salient issues here. In Negotiating Rights, as noted above, “I define local integration 
as a process of negotiating access to local legitimacy and entitlement on the basis 
of a variety of value systems determined by local power holders in dialogue with 
refugees.” (Polzer 2009:93). My focus is therefore entirely on integration as a 
process rather than on particular outcomes, as even legitimacy and entitlement are 
essentially relationships of exchange and mutual recognition rather than conditions 
of being. As noted in the introductory section above, processes of negotiating 
access to local legitimacy and entitlement are essentially what all local politics is 
about – who gets what when and how (and where) (Lasswell 1958). My definition 
includes commentary on who is negotiating (refugees and locally relevant actors 
with access to material and symbolic power) and on what basis (a situationally 
defined set of material and symbolic values rather than any absolute and presumed 
instrumental or normative base). As with any political process, the strategies used 
and the outcomes achieved are highly contextual and bound to the interest and 
resource constellations of a particular time and place. This point is developed 
particularly in Histories.  
 
How does my definition relate to various trends in the literature on integration? 
Debates on integration tend to differ according to the theoretical traditions about 
identity and community within which they are couched, i.e. assumptions about 
where and on what basis refugees and/or hosts want to or ‘naturally’ belong. Key 
(stylised) positions in this wider debate include: universalist law and refugee rights; 
communitarian ‘rooted’ identities and cohesive communities; and cosmopolitan 
identities and multi-cultural communities. 
 
In contrast to my focus on empirical description, most discussions of integration 
have fundamentally normative starting points (Ager and Strang 2008:167), including 
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the three areas of debate I have identified (law, communitarianism and 
cosmopolitanism). International refugee law is based on a normative claim that 
refugees should be protected, independently of whether this is in the material or 
strategic interest of the host state or host community (or indeed of the refugee, as I 
argue in Negotiating Rights and Invisible Integration. See also (Polzer and 
Hammond 2008)). Perspectives ranged along the continuum between the 
communitarian and cosmopolitan positions, naturalising or rejecting exclusive 
territorialised forms of (usually national) belonging, place a value judgement on the 
interactions between ‘newcomers’ and others based on their respective 
conceptions of the ‘good community’. Related to this normative approach is the 
policy and intervention focus – what institutions can and should do to bring about a 
(or our) desired outcome – discussed above, which all three of these perspectives 
share (although less so for cosmopolitanism). After outlining each position I discuss 
why I do not find them useful in relation to my case study and in terms of 
understanding processes of integration more broadly. 
 
Legal refugee rights perspectives on refugee integration are based on universal 
criteria, codified in international instruments such as the 1951 United Nations 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. These make no distinction between refugees who are related to 
hosts by kinship, ethnicity, religion, etc. or who create/use such linkages, versus 
those who are and do not. In fact, different treatment along these lines is expressly 
prohibited. So refugee rights, according to the law, are not negotiable. This 
perspective harbours a tension between its universalist norms and its reliance on 
(and to a large extent unquestioned acceptance of) the inter-national (Westphalian) 
system of sovereign states, as many proponents of legal refugee protection see the 
provision of this protection as the express responsibility of states (Hathaway 1984; 
1991; Mathew, Hathaway et al. 2002). Indeed, the legal definition of a refugee as a 
person who crosses an international border seeking protection from a state other 
than her ‘own’ because she has lost the protection of the state where she is a 
citizen, depends fundamentally on the Westphalian construction of mutually 
exclusive sovereign states with exclusive authority over but also obligations to the 
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people in their territory (Keely 1996). A refugee is a person in need of special 
protection because he no longer has the protection due to a citizen, where 
everyone is assumed to be citizen somewhere. Given this expectation of state 
protection, many authors define the final indicator of refugee integration in the 
host country – e.g. what makes a person no longer be a refugee because they have 
regained full state protection, albeit from a different state – as the granting of some 
form of legal permanent residence or citizenship status (Jacobsen 2001; Crisp 2004)  
 
‘Local integration’ is not formally defined in refugee law (Crisp 2004) even though it 
is considered one of the three ‘durable solutions’ within the framework of the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), along with 
repatriation and third country resettlement (Harrell-Bond 1995; UNHCR Standing 
Committee 2002; Chimni 2004; Crisp 2004:1). ‘Local integration’ is therefore often 
compared with other ‘solutions’, notably the ‘temporary’ solution of camps, in 
terms of whether basic legal rights are upheld. Crisp, from within UNHCR, defines 
‘local integration’ primarily in contrast to the temporariness inherent in refugee 
camps and repatriation programmes by focusing on the “assumption [in 
integration] that refugees will remain indefinitely in their country of asylum and 
find a solution to their plight in that state” (Crisp 2004:3) and that they "are granted 
a progressively wider range of rights and entitlements by the host state.” Using the 
1951 Refugee Convention as a benchmark, these rights include “the right to seek 
employment, to engage in other income-generating activities, to own and dispose 
of property, to enjoy freedom of movement and to have access to public services 
such as education.” (Crisp 2004:1) The ‘anti-warehousing’ campaign discussed in 
Negotiating Rights is another key example of this form of argumentation for local 
integration as a desirably ‘solution’ based on the precepts of international refugee 
rights law (Smith 2004).   
 
The refugee rights position is a strong position for advocacy, but a weak basis for 
describing and analysing reality, as I argue in Negotiating Rights and Changing Legal 
Frameworks. As I note in Changing Legal Frameworks, there is often a “disjuncture 
between the goals and assumptions of the legal framework and the reality 
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experienced and desired by the refugees” (Polzer 2007:22) which is why it is 
necessary to consider the “interstices between formal policies, the impact of 
changing policies over time, local interpretations of the labels and categories 
imposed by law, and the agency of those affected by law to subvert, oppose and 
evade it” (ibid:23). Laws may not be implemented, or their implementation may 
have effects which contradict the rights they are supposed to protect. The nature of 
their effects depend more on the interactions between the “street level 
bureaucrats” who represent the state (Lipsky 1980), who have their own 
interpretations and interests, and the targets of the laws, including refugees with 
their own means of evasion or instrumentalisation, than on any abstract legal 
principle or intent (Scott 1985; 1990; 1998). Finally, legal frameworks (including 
supposedly ‘universal’ ones like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’) change 
over time and reflect the political and moral sensibilities or a particular time. 
Depending on them for an analytical framework therefore leads to apolitical 
analyses which cut understandings of current refugee experiences and integration 
processes out of history (Malkki 1997; Gemie, Humbert et al. 2009). 
 
The communitarian approach (within which there is significant variation) 
archetypically starts from the assumption that a homogeneous community is the 
only functional (and so normatively better) community. The commitment of people 
to redistributive forms of social justice are seen to depend upon a degree of 
solidarity, shared understanding and mutual trust that could be weakened by a 
large and sudden influx of new members (Black 1996; Meehan 1996; Neveu 
2005:201). From this perspective, communitarians see refugee and migrant 
integration as a threat to the material and democratic rights and institutions of the 
host society (Turton 2002:70) unless the newcomers are from the same cultural 
group. The definition of common culture can be highly strategic. Examples include 
the acceptance and recruitment of people with Jewish roots to Israel (Safran 1997; 
Abdulhadi 2003), with distant German ancestry to Germany (Brubaker 1992; Safran 
1997) and with ‘white’ ethnicities to Apartheid South Africa (Peberdy 1999; Klaaren 
2004), but the definition of fellow ex-Yugoslavs as ‘outsiders’ by newly independent 
states in the region (Stubbs 1995; Vrecer 2010). Who is seen as ‘like us’ can change 
26
radically within relatively short periods of time (see Peberdy 1999; Klaaren 2004 on 
who was and was not included in ‘whiteness’ in different epochs of South African 
immigration law), but such ‘cultural insiders’ are not considered a problem for 
‘integration.’  
 
Furthermore, communitarians assume that the nature and boundaries of any 
community can be clearly identified, and that individuals can and should have only 
one primary identity reference point and loyalty. Race relations or ‘minorities’ 
literature in this mould, uses the term ‘integration’ to describe “the process of 
change that occurs when two [assumed to be distinct] cultures are forced to co-
exist within one [preferred to be homogeneous] society” (Korac 2003:52). 
‘Successful’ integration is therefore equated with assimilation, acculturation or 
adaptation to the ‘dominant host culture’, meaning unidirectional change from the 
side of the migrants without any negotiation or change on the sides of ‘hosts’ 
(Blommaert and Verschueren 1991; Berry 1997; Bauer, Lofstrom et al. 2000; 
SuárezOrozco 2000; Anderson 2001; Hansen and Lofstrom 2003; Alba 2005; 
Hieronymi 2005; Fangen 2006). Finally, instead of integration, an eventual ‘return’ 
‘home’ to an individual’s own ‘roots’ is seen as the ‘naturally’ most desirable 
solution, and as being in both the refugees’ and the hosts’ best interests (Drumtra 
1993; Kibreab 1999).  
 
Communitarian assumptions are often not explicitly stated, but rather implied in 
the kinds of indicators designed to ‘measure’ levels of ‘success’ in refugee and 
migrant integration. Authors with an explicit policy advisory focus, writing out of or 
for institutions such as the Council or Europe (1997), the European Council on 
Refugees and Exiles (Robinson 1998) or the UK Home Office (Ager and Strang 2004; 
Ager and Strang 2008), often adopt a supposedly value neutral catalogue approach 
to indicators of refugee integration. Ager and Strang note that they reviewed past 
attempts at defining integration which had approximately “200 ‘indicators’ of 
integration” (vis Council of Europe 1997). They then continue to identify “49 
discrete definitions of ‘integration’ or related concepts”  themselves (Ager and 
Strang 2008:167). They group these indicators into four dimensions: “achievement 
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and access across the sectors of employment, housing, education and health; 
assumptions and practice regarding citizenship and rights; processes of social 
connection within and between groups within the community; and structural 
barriers to such connection related to language, culture and the local environment” 
(Ager and Strang 2008:166). Frechette similarly lists various dimensions of 
integration, including housing integration, economic integration, political and legal 
integration, socio-cultural integration (which includes religious integration), 
educational integration, health integration and psychological integration (Frechette 
1994). These are all indicators measuring what refugees or migrants have ‘achieved’ 
as compared with a supposed ‘host’ norm, without any consideration of the extent 
to which ‘hosts’ are diverse or have themselves changed in relation to newcomers.  
 
Less explicitly normative, but still implicitly using a ‘host’ standard of comparison 
without looking at changes among hosts, are definitions of integration such as 
Jacobsen’s. She describes what she calls de facto integration as “where the lived, 
everyday experience of refugees is that of being part of the local community.” She 
then adds a list of conditions, which include lack of physical danger; freedom of 
movement in the host country and freedom to return to the home country; access 
to sustainable livelihoods; access to government services like education, health, and 
housing; social inclusion through intermarriage and social interactions with the host 
community; and comparable standards of living in comparison with the host 
community (Jacobsen 2001:9). While the idea of ‘being part of’ (rather than ‘being 
like’) is broadly useful, the conditions set a high presumed standard for host 
communities, almost a social democratic ideal where lack of physical danger, 
sustainable livelihoods, government welfare services and inter-
ethnic/religious/class/other-identity-group social relations are the norm.  
 
Clearly, this is not an accurate portrayal of many of the societies refugees, 
especially in developing contexts, engage with. There is also the assumption, 
common among communitarians, that members of a ‘host community’ interact 
with each other as equals, rather than in relationships of hierarchical dependency, 
exploitation and mutual distrust. Even in a country as supposedly democratic, 
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peaceful and middle-income as South Africa (not to mention the likes of periodically 
or chronically conflicted refugee hosting countries like Kenya or Pakistan), every-
day levels of racial/ethnic/religious tension and social segregation, violence, and 
exclusion from sustainable livelihoods is extreme among citizens. Harrell-Bond’s 
definition of integration as “a situation in which host and refugee communities are 
able to co-exist, sharing the same resources – both economic and social – with no 
greater mutual conflict than that which exists within the host community,” (Harrell-
Bond 1986:7) leaves open the possibility that there may be quite a lot of conflict 
and division among hosts and is therefore more useful in its comparative frame.  
 
Writings on ‘segmented assimilation’ in the USA, while retaining the essentially 
communitarian value-systems of assimilation theories (for a review of assimilation 
theories see Alba and Nee 1997), also usefully disaggregate ‘hosts’ from a putative 
“mainstream, Anglo-Saxon norm” to the idea that “immigrants assimilate into 
different segments of American society” (Altschul, Oyserman et al. 2008:303), 
including into (disadvantaged) racial and ethnic minorities (including naturalised 
former immigrant groups). They also document how such segmentation has 
consequences for the potential social and economic achievements of new arrivals in 
relation to ‘mainstream’ institutions (Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes and Rumbaut 
2001)(see also discussion in Conclusion).  
  
The communitarian position has been extensively critiqued for a variety of reasons 
(Malkki 1992), with which I concur. Firstly, communitarian accounts of a stable and 
unchanging host society are ahistorical and accept the ‘imagined’ myth of that 
society (Anderson 1991) as historical reality, thereby ignoring long histories of 
changing citizenships in those countries. In the USA, for example, Italians, Irish, 
Catholics and Jews were considered ‘racially’ different and culturally undesirable 
immigrants until the 1940s (Brodkin 1994), while today they are considered an 
unquestioned part of the ‘white’ majority (Roediger 1991; Jacobson 1998) which 
has, in turn, felt ‘inundated’ by first ‘Asian’ and then ‘Latino’ immigration. Second, 
such accounts from countries in the global North are often selectively protective of 
‘national identity’, focusing on (often poor, Southern) immigrants and refugees with 
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visible differences by race, language or religion, while ignoring or welcoming 
powerful ‘external’ cultural influences in the media, market, etc. and being 
unperturbed by imposing their own cultural values on other societies. Third, the 
view that immigrants and refugees retain a sense of ‘home’ which is natural, 
immutable and can unproblematically be converted into access to substantive 
rights on ‘return’ has been vigorously challenged (Malkki 1992; Allen and Morsink 
1994; Malkki 1995; Malkki 1995; Allen 1996; Black and Koser 1999; Cornish, Peltzer 
et al. 1999; Koser and Black 1999; Stepputat 1999; Powles 2002; Abdulhadi 2003; 
Pedersen 2003; Van Hear 2003; Chimni 2004; Hovil and Kweka 2008).   
 
In relation to my case study, there are several ways in which a communitarian 
perspective is not useful in understanding relationships in the villages of 
Bushbuckridge. Such a perspective would make the integration of 1980s 
Mozambican refugees seem inevitable due to the ethnic/linguistic/cultural 
similarity between refugees and ‘local’ South Africans. However, as discussed in 
Histories, this would obscure the long and complex history of migrations and 
contested legitimacy claims by Shangaan-speakers in the area (where the claim of 
‘local’ Shangaans to autochthony in relation to the wider South Africa is not 
complete even after 200 years). It would hide the by no means obvious political 
choices made by local leaders at different times in facilitating this integration. 
Furthermore, a communitarian set of assumptions would overlook the complex 
dynamics of status and inequality which are part of the negotiation of integration in 
the area (see Invisible Integration and Space). Finally, while the local context might 
seem to be relatively culturally homogeneous (as expressed and mythologized by 
residents of my case study villages) in the specific space of villages along the 
eastern border of Bushbuckridge district, this is one small and very marginal part of 
a multicultural country, in which questions of cultural dominance and national 
identity are complex and conflictual (see Chipkin 2007, whose book title asks "Do 
South Africans exist?"). In this wider context, with which my case study villages are 
in constant if not always visible contact through media, labour migration, etc. both 
‘South African’ and ‘Mozambican’ residents of Bushbuckridge are ‘outsiders’ as 
Blacks, rural people, poor people and members of a marginal language group.  
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 While there is also much variation in what I am calling the cosmopolitan camp, the 
core is a recognition and positive valuation of social and cultural diversity and a 
view of group identities and boundaries as more fluid and adaptable (Held 1995; 
Bauböck and Rundell 1998; Vertovec and Cohen 2003). More conservative 
proponents of this view may present a relatively minimal and external adaptation 
to civic norms as sufficient for ‘successful’ integration, without requiring any 
emotional identification or changes in cultural practices and beliefs (Niessen, 
Huddleston et al. 2007), while more radical writers may entirely reject the 
legitimacy of bureaucratic administrative boundaries such as state borders, and the 
privileging of certain individuals (citizens) over others (various kinds of non-citizens) 
within these territories (Pecoud and de Guchteneire 2007). Discussions of migrant 
and refugee belonging in diverse and mobile societies tend to revolve around 
concepts like multiculturalism (Taylor 1992; Kukthas 1995; Kymlicka 1995; Dijkstra, 
Geuijen et al. 2001; Parekh 2002)3 and transnationalism (Gupta and Ferguson 2001; 
Vertovec 2001; Al-Ali and Koser 2002; Van Hear 2003; Levitt and Nyberg-Sorensen 
2004; Bommes 2005; Lewis 2010) rather than assimilation or acculturation.  
 
Cosmopolitanism is also often normative in its assumption that multiple cultures 
and flexible boundaries are desirable forms of social organisation (Held 1995; 
Vertovec and Cohen 2003), although it can also be used as an “analytical-empirical 
social science cosmopolitanism, which is no longer contained by thinking in national 
categories” (Beck 2004:131). Cosmopolitanists often write about urban life in 
developed countries (Al-Ali, Black et al. 2001; Riccio 2001; Sennett 2003; Massey 
2004; Lewis 2010) or about deterritorialised forms of identity (Glick Schiller, Basch 
et al. 1992; Blanc, Basch et al. 1995; Basch, Glick-Schiller et al. 1996; Bauböck 2003). 
I will not go into these debates in any detail because they provide even less insight 
into my rural, largely settled, co-ethnic case study than communitarian concepts. 
The main value I drew from many cosmopolitan authors is their focus on the 
3 Note that some authors, such as Vertovec and Cohen (2003) define cosmopolitanism against multiculturalism, 
e.g. ‘embodying middle-path alternatives between ethnocentric nationalism and particularistic 
multiculturalism.’ (2003:1) 
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construction (rather than assumed inherent naturalness) of identities and on the 
“local, informal notions [and everyday practices] of membership, entitlement and 
influence” in “vernacular notions of citizenship” (Rosaldo 1996:252), e.g. how 
people claim rights, representation and cultural autonomy that is different from 
official or unitary models of citizenship. 
 
Studies of Mozambicans (including refugees and labour migrants) in other parts of 
South Africa, apart from the rural border areas, do describe various forms of 
transnational practice and identification (Lubkemann 2000, 2002, 2008; Mather 
2000; McDonald, Zinyama et al. 2000; Connor 2003; Madsen 2004; Kloppers 2006; 
Vidal 2007; Vidal 2008). Indeed, the experience of Mozambican refugees in urban 
areas (Vidal 2007; Vidal 2008) and in non-co-ethnic rural areas such as Kwa-Zulu 
Natal (Kloppers 2006) is completely different than the Bushbuckridge experience, 
notably with more cross-border connections and less attachment to South Africa. 
As noted in Changing Legal Frameworks (Polzer 2007:42) only 14% of Mozambicans 
in South Africa, surveyed in 1997, wanted to become permanent residents and only 
7% wanted to become citizens of South Africa (McDonald, Mashile et al. 1999), in 
contrast to the almost universal desire for permanent legal standing and indeed full 
citizenship in the Bushbuckridge context (see Changing Legal Frameworks). These 
differences are not surprising, given my analytical framework of integration as 
negotiated local politics, since the strategies refugees adopt depend on the context 
and the nature of local power holders (see Negotiated Rights). An explicit 
comparison between the integration strategies of urban-based Mozambican 
refugees and the Bushbuckridge experience was not possible as part of this project 
but would be a valuable future research endeavour. 
 
The debate between communitarian and cosmopolitan positions on refugee and 
migrant integration is predominantly a Northern debate (not least reflecting the 
general Northern bias of knowledge and theory production). Some countries in the 
South have also used communitarian arguments to resist refugee integration, but 
political arguments against refugee integration in Africa (especially since the 1970s) 
tend to be more strategic than ideological. They include concerns about economic 
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and environmental burdens, security concerns, anger at being “abandoned” by 
richer nations, fear of the domestic political ramifications of popular xenophobia, 
and the perceived need to reassert sovereignty over porous borders (Crisp 2004). 
Academic accounts of refugee integration in cases of South-South migration also 
tend to be less ideological, focused more on the local than the national level.  
Whitaker (2002) and Landau (2003) both use the case of Tanzania to look 
empirically at how refugees and a variety of different kinds of hosts interact and 
impact on each other in the integration process, without making normative 
assumptions about a homogeneous or unified host community.  
 
Southern refugee integration studies often describe rural borderland relationships 
(Hansen 1979; Abel and Abel 1987; Bulcha 1988; Gasarasi 1990; Sendker 1990; 
Stein and Clark 1990; Bascom 1993; Daley 1993; Callamard 1994; Whitaker 1999; 
Harrell-Bond 2002; Hovil 2002; Andrews 2003; Chaulia 2003; Dryden-Peterson and 
Hovil 2003; Goetz 2003; Kaiser, Hovil et al. 2005; Campbell 2006). Most of the 
literature from borderlands studies (rather than ‘refugee studies’) which deals with 
(forced) migration as a context factor rather than as the central topic of study 
(Hansen 1979; Asiwaju 1985; Alvarez 1995; Wilson and Donnan 1998; Donnan and 
Wilson 1999; Van Damme 1999; Cohen 2000; Vila 2000; Nugent 2002; Connor 2003; 
Momen 2005), emphasizes the continual reconstruction of identity categories in 
border areas which respond to but also resist simple binary state-based categories 
of nationality (you either belong on one side of the border or the other). While 
some of these studies focus on metaphorical boundary construction (Vila 2000), 
without a detailed analysis of the material resource access implications of belonging 
to one category or another, others emphasize the importance and solidity of 
national borders in determining which individuals can access resources on what 
basis (based on where they ‘belong’ or don’t), even in supposedly porous African 
border contexts (McDermott-Hughes 1999).   
 
A study of immigrants in the African urban context of Johannesburg also notes the 
importance of moving beyond abstract normative philosophies, such as 
communitarianism or cosmopolitanism, and being able to see “the emergence of 
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distinctive ways of negotiating inclusion and belonging that transcend ethnic, 
national or transnational paradigms” and are more “a mishmash of rhetorical and 
organisational tools... conceptualised not as philosophy but as a practice and form 
of experiential culture.” (Landau and Freemantle 2010:375) 
 
Building on this material from developing contexts, I view approaches which focus 
on the process, rather than outcome, of integration, as most useful in that they 
tend to be less normative. Castles et al describe integration as a set of overlapping 
processes that take place in different ways in different sub-sectors and spheres of 
receiving societies and have different outcomes in each sphere (2001). Authors who 
describe the processes and strategic reasoning behind how some groups of 
refugees construct politicised conceptions of ‘home’ (and how this is often part of 
an engagement with the people and politics where they are settled, rather than 
something completely removed from ‘integration’) show that the theoretical 
attention to negotiated and political identity formation can explain the full range of 
outcomes for refugees, rather than implying different analytical frameworks for 
different outcomes (Malkki 1995; Kibreab 1999; Turton 1999; Abdulhadi 2003; Bek-
Pedersen and Montgomery 2006; Feldman 2008; Hovil and Kweka 2008). As 
Malkki’s much quoted study of two groups of (‘camp’ segregated and ‘town’ 
integrated) Burundian refugees in Tanzania shows, there is nothing inevitable and 
everything politically relational about the choice of constructing identities based on 
difference or similarity to ‘locals.’ (Malkki 1995) 
 
The most interesting approach to refugee integration I have found is presented by 
Stubbs (1995). His definition and general approach to integration is explicitly 
political and process oriented, and focuses on “integrative processes” and practices 
among all members of a society rather than on a static ‘state-of-being’ or one-way 
adaptation. He defines integration as follows:  
 
Integration refers to … a sharing of resources—economic and 
social, an equalizing of rights—political and territorial, and the 
development of cultural exchanges and new cultural forms, 
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between forced migrants and all other members of a society. At 
the local level, the process of integration involves all sections of 
the community in minimizing social distance and facilitating 
communication and co-operation through creative negotiations 
which produce new social meanings (Stubbs 1995:36). 
 
Even though he also seeks to inform institutional interventions doing ‘integration 
projects’ in Croatia, he rejects “top down” discourses of integration which “involve 
things being done to people, by people who know best”; that lead to only 
recognizing indicators which conform to the dictates of project cycles and the need 
for fast, visible outcomes; and that artificially and abstractly categorise and thereby 
act on and re-enforce group construction within the society according to external 
(and often ethnicised) criteria (Stubbs 1995:34). In effect, such concepts of 
integration are based on “crude notions of human life” (ibid). His approach is also 
useful in relation to my case study because in his Croatian case, the refugees also 
share a language and political history with ‘hosts’ (all being from former 
Yugoslavia), in contrast to most European studies which assume cultural, language 
and racial differences between newcomers and ‘hosts’. In his case, however, these 
commonalities are not politically validated by local leaders or residents. Finally he 
usefully considers the “issue of territorialisation, of the right to freedom of 
movement, to sharing the same space, and to face only the same degree of social 
control as the rest of the community” (Stubbs 1995:36), which is an important 
element of my own approach to integration in the Space article. 
 
In this review of literature on refugee integration I have focused on how authors 
explicitly or implicitly understand the nature of group identities and inter-group 
relationships, and how this therefore determines their understanding of refugee 
integration. I have not discussed supposed facilitating or hindering factors for 
particular integration outcomes. As I note in Negotiating Rights (Polzer 2009:94), a 
political process-oriented approach to integration is valuable because:  
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? it can be applied across all contexts, including individual asylum seekers, 
mass movements, rural border areas and urban contexts in developing 
countries, and south-to-north movements;   
? it can be applied at all ‘stages’ of forced migration, including immediate 
emergency conditions, medium-term and ‘protracted’ displacement 
situations, and contexts when stability has returned to places of origin but 
return is not necessarily the chosen option; 
? it can explain the full range of outcomes in how refugees and other 
members of a society interact with each other;  
? it allows us to overcome the supposed opposition between absolute and 
relativist perspectives on belonging – belonging is neither entirely strategic 
and instrumental, nor entirely inflexibly immutable (see the debate between 
Kibreab 1999a; 1999b; and others Stepputat 1999; Turton 1999; Warner 
1999). See also my discussion in Space concerning debates on the 
relationship between identity and space and the emergence of “negotiated 
and relational reflexive construction of both identity and space” as a middle 
way between perspectives which either reify spatially rooted identities or 
delink identity from space entirely.  
 
5. Case Study: Bushbuckridge District, South Africa 
 
South Africa is a particularly interesting country for the study of shifting 
relationships between insiders and outsiders generally, and especially the ways in 
which migration flows interact with processes of nation-building as they impact at 
the local level (Turton 2002; Miller 2004; Polzer 2005; Whitaker 2005). If compared 
with European countries, the time frame of nation-building has been telescoped 
together in most post-colonies, especially in Africa, but in South Africa there is the 
opportunity of looking at several distinct community-, nation-, and state-building 
episodes within an even shorter space of recent time (twenty-one years between 
the start of political transformation in 1990 and today), which impact directly on 
processes of identity group formation at the local level. The shift from the 
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repressive minority rule of Apartheid to a social-democratic welfare state with 
enough resources for significant implementation of its welfare rhetoric makes 
South Africa an interesting (if certainly not unique) case study of how residents of a 
territory and state adapt and respond to radical changes in national policy, 
legitimacy and incentives, and how these changes affect local patterns of belonging. 
This is especially the case for residents of a marginal border area, marginal ethnic 
group and previously marginalised racial group, as in my case study. 
 
Of course it is important not to overemphasise or reify discontinuities and changes 
from Apartheid to democracy (Alexander 2002). Identity-formation processes are 
best understood in the longue durée, where discourses of a radical break with the 
past are part of the identity construction process rather than an independent 
context factor (Gillis 1996:7). As a few examples, even under Apartheid the (rural) 
black population was strongly incorporated into the South African state 
infrastructure and certain kinds of welfare transfers like pensions were already 
accessible to a greater extent than in many independent and ‘democratic’ African 
states. Furthermore, in spite of the seemingly very different macro-political 
ideologies – from racialised protectionism to putative continental spokesperson, for 
example – there are important continuities in South Africa’s national migration 
management regime (Crush 1998; Crush 1999; Crush and McDonald 2002; Wa 
Kabwe-Segatti and Landau 2008). While South Africa has one of the world’s most 
progressive refugee protection laws since 1998, its management of international 
migration continues to reflect a fundamentally protectionist approach (Belvedere, 
Pigou et al. 2001; Crush and McDonald 2002; Wa Kabwe-Segatti 2003; Handmaker, 
De la Hunt et al. 2008; Wa Kabwe-Segatti and Landau 2008; Landau and Wa Kabwe-
Segatti 2009).  
 
Since the argument of this study is about the process of refuge integration as a local 
level process, I will not provide much more background about national level policy 
frameworks, practices or debates on refugee and migration issues. Where relevant, 
these are presented in the respective articles. See especially Changing Legal 
Frameworks for a discussion of how national policies on the legal documentation of 
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Mozambican refugees have (and have not) impacted at the local level in 
Bushbuckridge. Suffice to say that there is an extensive literature about refugees 
and refugee issues in South Africa (a recent selection includes Amisi and Ballard 
2005; Landau 2006; Handmaker, De la Hunt et al. 2008; International Federation for 
Human Rights 2008; Amit, Monson et al. 2009; Landau, Amit et al. 2009; Amit 2010) 
but that most of this literature is not relevant to my case study. This is because the 
situation of Mozambican refugees is categorically different from the situation of 
most other more recently arrived refugees in the country. Mozambican refugees 
came as a ‘mass influx’, moving entire families and villages; they were 
predominantly rural peasants and settled largely in co-ethnic rural areas; and when 
they arrived in South Africa in the 1980s there was no legal process to apply for 
asylum or receive refugee status (Dolan 1997). Post-1994, refugees in South Africa 
mostly arrive as individuals or small families (Belvedere, Pigou et al. 2001); are 
often relatively well-educated urbanites and settle mainly in urban areas (Landau 
2004; 2006); and the legal and administrative systems for applying for asylum 
occupy a central position in their lives (Amit, Monson et al. 2009; Amit 2010).4 
Concomitantly, recent literature on refugees in South Africa is often legalistic 
(Handmaker 2002; Handmaker, De la Hunt et al. 2008) or focused on cataloguing 
the discrepancies between (good) policy and (bad) practice (Human Rights Watch 
1998; Human Rights Watch 2005; Amit, Monson et al. 2009; Landau, Amit et al. 
2009; Amit 2010a; Amit 2010b). The more analytical and interpretative analyses 
emphasise the urban nature of the engagement between refugees (and other 
migrants), South Africans and institutions of the South African state (Kihato and 
Landau 2006; Landau 2007; Landau and Monson 2008; Landau and Freemantle 
2010). 
 
4 One exception, to some extent, is Zimbabweans who have been fleeing political and economic collapse in their 
country since 2000. While many Zimbabweans have entered the urban individualized asylum systems in South 
Africa and fit the profile of being urban and well-educated (Polzer 2008b), there are an unknown (but probably 
large) number of Zimbabweans who have settled in rural villages of the extended border region. While they are 
generally seen as ‘migrants’ rather than ‘refugees’ because they have not applied for asylum, this distinction is 
as complex and often arbitrary in these rural areas as it is in the urban context (Polzer 2010). Relatively little is 
known of this group (Wilkin 2010). A comparative study of the experiences of Mozambicans and Zimbabweans 
in these respective border areas would be interesting in future, as there are both parallels and differences 
(ibid), but is beyond the scope of this introduction to conjecture about in more detail. 
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Figure 1 
Location of Bushbuckridge District 5 
 
 
In contrast to the national story, the history and context of Bushbuckridge District is 
central to this study. Bushbuckridge is a spatial and temporal microcosm of the 
integration of (a) peripheral population(s) into a transforming state – the 
construction of substantive membership/ citizenship at all levels. Relevant elements 
of this context include histories of marginalisation, ethnic identity group 
construction, and displacement/migration.  
 
In almost all imaginable ways, Bushbuckridge and its residents are marginal in 
today’s South Africa. Geographically, the district lies next to the Mozambican 
border, separated from it only by a 50km strip of the Kruger National Park. This 
park and the associated Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park, encompassing nature 
5 From Collinson et al (2006:637)  
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conservation areas in Mozambique and Zimbabwe, while opening national borders 
for wildlife and tourists, have historically and currently closed the nearby border for 
trade and the normal movement of local people (Carruthers 1995; Pollard, 
Shackleton et al. 2003). The border area, therefore, is a territorial dead-end rather 
than a location invigorated by being on regular cross-border routes (Nugent and 
Asiwaju 1996).  
 
In addition to being on an international border, the district straddles two of South 
Africa’s more rural and marginal provinces – Limpopo (formerly Northern Province) 
in the north and Mpumalanga in the south – and was divided between them from 
1996-2006 (Ramutsindela and Simon 1999; Niehaus 2002), moving entirely into 
Mpumalanga on 1 June 2006. Politically, the district has no particular strategic, 
historical or numerical significance, and it votes almost 90% for the ruling African 
National Congress (ANC), making it a safe area not worth much campaigning or 
political attention from either the ruling or the major opposition parties. The 
majority of the population is XiTsonga-speaking (a regional version of which I have 
been calling Shangaan in my papers), 6 one of the smallest and most marginal ethnic 
groups in South Africa (at least among those officially recognised as one of the 
eleven national languages). The group has a national reputation for being rural and 
‘backward’ (Jensen and Buur 2004). Economically, the area has no significant 
resources, apart from tourism potential through its proximity to the Kruger National 
Park, although this in practice provides relatively few employment opportunities for 
local residents. The semi-arid climate and dense settlements preclude much 
agriculture (Hunter and Twine 2005). Only 4.8% of households have access to land 
for agriculture, 0,0% of households are recorded as engaging in horticulture or 
livestock farming and only 4,5% of households engage in field crop farming 
6 There is some debate on the appropriate terminology for the dominant ethnic/language group in 
Bushbuckridge. In South African official usage, ethnic groups are usually referred to based on their languages, 
and XiTsonga is one of the eleven official languages of the country. However, rather than referring to 
themselves as XiTsonga-speakers, popular usage by residents of Bushbuckridge to refer to their own language 
and group identity (especially when speaking English) as ‘Shangaan’. As discussed in Histories, XiTsonga was 
constructed out of several related languages in the early 20th Century, and the ‘Shangaan’ dialect used in 
Bushbuckridge is distinct from dialects further north (such as around Giyani). Even though the term ‘Shangaan’ 
is considered derogatory in some circles (illustrating the marginal status of the ethnic group from the 
perspective of urban centres and dominant ethnic groups), I use it in reflection of local usage in Bushbuckridge. 
This also follows Harries’ (1994), Rodgers’ (2002) and Niehaus’ (2002) usage. 
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(Statistics South Africa 2002). Because of its location near the park-closed border, 
the area lies outside all major transport routes. In 2002, official unemployment 
statistics showed 70% of the population without formal work (Statistics South Africa 
2002). More recently, the municipality has categorised 84% of its population as 
‘indigent’ meaning they earn less than R 1300/GBP 102 per month (Mukamba, 
Mayher et al. 2008). Compared with other rural areas identified by the government 
as being particularly poor due to being ‘homelands’ under Apartheid (see more 
below on ‘homelands’), Bushbuckridge’s 2002 unemployment rate was highest by 
over 20% (Statistics South Africa 2002).  The proportion of households with no 
income was 3,9%, which was the highest of all the former ‘homeland’ areas. 76,2% 
of the households spent less than R400 per month and 63% of households 
sometimes, often or always had a problem satisfying their food needs (ibid). These 
statistics make Bushbuckridge by far the poorest former ‘homeland’ area in the 
country. The population is very young, with 44% under 15 years of age (Collinson, 
Tollman et al. 2005:2).   
 
Bushbuckridge’s current social and economic position is partly due to its history – it 
is an amalgamation of parts of two former Apartheid ‘homelands’: Mhala district of 
XiTsonga-speaking Gazankulu and Maruleng district of SeSotho-speaking Lebowa 
(Niehaus 2002). The ‘homelands’ were constructed to be labour reserves of black 
South Africans for the use of the white-run economy (Graaff 1987). ‘Homelands’ 
were considered ‘tribal’ areas, and were ruled under a combination of ‘traditional’ 
and statutory/bureaucratic leadership; a duality which has been retained to this 
day, along with the communal ownership, under chiefs, of most land (vanKessel and 
Oomen 1997; Ntsebeza 2004). The significance of this history and the roles of 
traditional authorities in the negotiation of belonging in the area are discussed in 
Histories, Changing Legal Frameworks, and Space.  
 
The map below shows details of Bushbuckridge District. The N40 road, as seen 
running from top to bottom along the left of the map, was the approximate dividing 
line between the old ‘homelands’, with Lebowa in the west and Gazankulu in the 
east. The map also shows the Wits Rural Facility (WRF, at the top centre) where I 
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lived from 2002 to 2006, my three case study villages Timbavati, Clare and Justicia B 
(red stars moving from left to right and down), and the Agincourt Health and Socio-
Demographic Surveillance System Site (outlined in blue) from which I have drawn 
extensively for quantitative data (see notes below on methods).  
 
 
Figure 2 
Detail of Bushbuckridge District 
 
 
 
An important aspect of many of South African’s former ‘homeland’ areas is their 
peri-urban character with a relatively high state presence, compared with other 
African rural areas. There is therefore a constant tension between seeing these 
areas as peripheral spatial exceptions within the South African state’s territory or as 
intimately tied into and captured by the structures and concerns of the central 
state. On the one hand, parallel legal systems, ownership regimes and social norms 
predominate compared with the urban ‘core’, including the widely used and 
respected traditional authorities and communal land ownership, which in practice 
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often replace rather than augment ‘national’ laws and structures (Ntsebeza 2004). 
On the other hand we must continually recognise the strong and historically deep 
presence of the central state through direct services such as formal education and 
health care, state welfare grants to children, the elderly and the disabled, and the 
ubiquity of national identity documentation as a basis for these services, along with 
the less institutionalised but no less powerful political and social impact of 
continuous circular labour migration of the majority of active adults back and forth 
between the urban cores and the ‘rurban’ peripheries. 65% of adult men and 20% 
of adult women are away from their rural households for over 6 months of the 
year, mostly in urban areas (Collinson, Tollman et al. 2005). In addition, institutions 
such as the traditional authorities are incorporated into the formal legal and 
institutional frameworks of the state, and so are not really parallel structures 
outside of it, although they in practice may act in contravention of or according to 
different logics than the state’s other bureaucratic representatives (Ntsebeza 2004). 
 
Economically, there is also more state dependence than in many other developing 
country rural contexts. Because of the lack of land, noted above, there is virtually 
no subsistence agriculture, although many households augment their cash incomes 
through small fields, vegetable gardens or collecting wild foods (Hunter and Twine 
2005). The Apartheid policy of prohibiting black-owned business, among other 
factors, has led to relatively little local entrepreneurial self-employment in former 
‘homeland’ areas (Bhorat 2001). Residents of Bushbuckridge therefore aspire to be 
hired into a formal job, or they depend on government welfare grants (known as 
social grants) for pensioners and children.7  In 2001, 24,1% of households in 
Bushbuckridge depended on government welfare grants as their main source of 
income (Statistics South Africa 2002).8 Since there have been extensive government 
drives to make grants more accessible in rural areas, this proportion has probably 
7 The South African government provides a social welfare grant to all citizens (and since 2004 all permanent 
residents – see Law) over the age of 60 (2011 value R1140/ GBP90.30), and for all children under the age of 18 
(2011 value R260/ GBP20.60). These grants are means-tested, and provide the backbone of South Africa’s rural 
poor livelihoods (Triegaardt 2005; Inter-regional Inequality Facility 2006).  
8 I have not been able to find updated statistics on social grant distribution by district.  
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increased greatly since. Both formal employment and social grants require identity 
documents and therefore control by the state.  
 
This tension between distance from and inclusion in the state’s ambit is further 
exemplified by the fact that while an individual living in Bushbuckridge may still 
pass through life without any contact with the formal state - e.g. not having an ID, 
not going to school, using only traditional healers, entering into a customary 
marriage, not registering children for birth certificates, and working informally 
within the local area as a domestic or on small subsistence farm plots or as a casual 
local construction worker - and that each of the elements of this life would not be 
considered very unusual or a cause for social exclusion in the local context, such a 
person would inevitably remain very poor in relation to other local residents, and 
not enjoy high local social standing (except, perhaps, as a powerful traditional 
sangoma or nyanga9). This stands in contrast to many rural areas in developing 
countries, especially in Africa, where the reach of the state is more limited and 
where it is possible to live an average life on the basis of subsistence agriculture 
(Bakewell 1999; Englund 2002).10 In various accounts of refugee integration in 
African border contexts, as described above, this everyday distance from the state 
is a key element. In Bushbuckridge, the combination of state presence and parallel, 
local, non-state structures provides a centrally important context for the kinds of 
negotiation strategies discussed throughout this thesis.  
 
Bushbuckridge’s social and settlement patterns are fundamentally shaped by 
historical and current population displacements and migrations. The presence of 
Shangaan-speaking people in the border area is the result of several waves of 
movement from the eastern coast (now Mozambique) from the 1830s onward, due 
to violent leadership succession battles and violent colonial encounters (Ritchken 
1995; Niehaus 2002). This is recounted in detail in Histories. In addition, the 
9 In Bushbuckridge, sangomas are spirit healers and nyangas heal with the use of herbs. There is some overlap 
between the two.  
10 This is not to reify a categorical distinction between rural and urban or deny the (long-term and increasing) 
presence of the central state in rural areas throughout the developing world, but simply to note that there are 
different depths of state capture, and that for a marginal rural border area, Bushbuckridge has a relatively high 
rate of state involvement in everyday life. 
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establishment of ‘homelands’ in the 1930s-70s, including the formation of the 
XiTsonga-speaking11 Gazankulu in part of what is now Bushbuckridge, involved a 
dual forced resettlement within South Africa: of people with the same supposed 
‘tribal’ affiliation from around the country into designated rural ‘homelands’, and 
within these areas, from dispersed homesteads into concentrated villages (De Wet 
1995; Ritchken 1995; Niehaus 2002). These processes are within living memory. As 
a young South African-born woman explained to me: “When [my husband’s father’s 
family] were at Andover [then a farm], the government chased them away and said 
they want the place to make a game reserve. They forced them to leave the place 
without paying a cent. They lost everything at Andover: goats, cattle, houses and 
graves where they buried their fathers, friends and others.”12  
 
From 1985, only fifteen years after forced villageisation, tens of thousands of 
refugees from the Mozambican civil war arrived in the area, with an estimated 
40,000 out of an estimated national total of 320,000 settling in then-Gazankulu, 
mostly in the southern part which is now in Bushbuckridge District (Dolan 1997; 
1999). I will return to this below. It is important to emphasise that mobility and 
indeed a form of displacement is a continuous reality in Bushbuckridge, and not 
something which occurred in the past. Today, high levels of mobility continue to 
define the social and economic life of the district for all residents of the district. As 
noted above, 65% of adult men and 20% of adult women are away from their rural 
households for over 6 months of the year, mostly in urban areas (Collinson, Tollman 
et al. 2005). Such high levels of labour mobility apply to those of Mozambican and 
South African origins (although female Mozambican mobility is lower than for South 
African women (Collinson, Tollman et al. 2005)). While this movement is generally 
termed ‘labour migration’ and is therefore presumed to be voluntary migration 
rather than forced displacement, the extremely high levels of unemployment in the 
area and the lack of local employment options present few sedentary options for 
most working-age people to support themselves and their families (Collinson, 
Tollman et al. 2005). While there is some permanent out-migration from the area, 
11 See footnote 6 on my use of terminology regarding ethnic group and language naming. 
12 Interview with NN, Clare, 24 May 2004 
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most of the current mobility is circular, meaning that migrants are still considered 
members of households in the Bushbuckridge area, even if they are physically 
absent for much of the year (Collinson, Tollman et al. 2005; Collinson 2009).  
 
Returning to the refugees from Mozambique, the focus in the essays collected here 
is on the trajectories they followed once they arrived in Bushbuckridge. I have not 
written about their (or their compatriots’) experiences of war or displacement per 
se, as others have (Johnston and Simbine 1998; Rodgers 2002), or on the quite 
different experiences of Mozambican refugees in other parts of the country, 
including in rural contexts which were not co-ethnic (Kloppers 2006) and urban 
areas (Lubkemann 2000; 2002; 2008; Madsen 2004; Vidal 2007; 2008). The 
collected essays repeatedly outline and in some cases discuss in detail the key 
context factors and events relating to this group, so I will only list them here: the 
lack of legal recognition as refugees on arrival; the acceptance and support of the 
Gazankulu leadership and traditional chiefs and village headmen; the establishment 
of separate settlement areas next to existing villages for the new arrivals, although 
many with existing family ties were able to settle in existing village structures; the 
coinciding of peace in Mozambique with political change in South Africa in 1992; 
the 1993 Tripartite Agreement between the governments of South Africa and 
Mozambique and the UNHCR to grant Mozambicans refugee status, but only to 
enable repatriation and not legal integration; the 1994 democratic elections in 
South Africa through which may Mozambicans received ID documents; the 1994/95 
UNHCR repatriation programme which only 13% of refugees made use of; the 
amnesties for miners (1995) and citizens of Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) countries (1996), through which over 90,000 Mozambican 
refugees received permanent resident status; the withdrawal of refugee status in 
1996; the Exemption for Former Mozambican Refugees in 1999/2000 through 
which a further 82,000 Mozambicans received permanent residence; and the 2004 
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Constitutional Court Cases Khosa and Mahlaule13 through which permanent 
residents were granted access to government welfare grants.  
 
By the end of my field work in 2006 most of the legal barriers to formal belonging 
to the state had been removed – more than 80% of Mozambicans who had arrived 
in the 1980s, and their children, had either South African citizenship or permanent 
residence, and they had access to the materially and symbolically crucial state asset 
of social welfare grants. While it is certainly possible that the conditions of 
belonging may change again (for example, national origin may be politicised in local 
or national power struggles leading to discrimination or violence against foreigners, 
as was seen in urban areas of South Africa in May 2008 (Misago, Monson et al. 
2010)), and while certain indicators of previous ‘outsider’ status remain in place 
(such as ‘Mozambican neighbourhoods’ in villages), the twenty-year process 
towards group ‘integration’ in the sense of approximating local South African living 
conditions, is advanced. The essays, especially Changing Legal Frameworks, 
Histories, Invisible Integration and Space, discuss the meaning of the above-listed 
events and processes, and how they have worked together with the interpretations 
and actions of Mozambican- and South African-born residents of Bushbuckridge to 
result in integrative relationships (or not) as well as integrated outcomes. 
 
6. Methodology 
 
To conclude this Introduction I will discuss how my theoretical approach to studying 
integration reflects in three sets of methodological choices: the categorization of 
respondents into ‘identity groups’ in the sampling process; combining quantitative 
(‘objective’) and qualitative (interpretative) data sources to look for coherence but 
especially discrepancies in terms of group boundary construction and crossing; and 
researcher (including research assistant) effects in representations of identity 
issues. The underlying recognition behind my methodological strategy is that as 
13 Khosa & Others v. Minister of Social Development and Others [2003] CCT 12/03 and Mahlaule & Another v. 
Minister of Social Development and Others [2003] CCT, 13/03, 58, 
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/1344.PDF  
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refugee integration is a process of negotiated relational identity construction, so 
the research engagement itself is part of this process of self- and group-
representation and construction. The ways in which researchers interact with their 
respondents, through their methods but also just through who they are, co-creates 
the subject matter being researched (Fox, Green et al. 2007), especially regarding 
subjects such as identity construction. While this recognition is well established in 
certain traditions of anthropology (Gupta and Ferguson 1997), it is rarely 
adequately reflected upon in ‘refugee studies’ (Schmidt 2007) and specifically in 
accounts of refugee integration. 
 
The research on which these essays are based was conducted over a four year 
period (2002-2006) of living and working in my ‘field site’ as a researcher for the 
University of the Witwatersrand’s Refugee Research Programme (later part of the 
Forced Migration Studies Programme) and a resident of the Wits Rural Facility (a 
multi-disciplinary rural research station). The following figure (also used in Space) 
outlines the variety of methods I used.  
 
Figure 3 
Methods 
 
1. Household survey: 3 villages, 68 households, 567 individuals (purposive 
sampling) 
2. Repeated individual interviews: 3 villages, 57 individuals (from same households 
as household survey), 50/50 SA/Mozambique-born 
3. Mapping of movements and social connections in the village: 82 individuals 
(from same households as household survey) 
4. Repeated key informant interviews with village leaders: headmen, community 
development forum chairmen, Community Development Forum members, ward 
councillors, teachers, etc. 
5. Observation and informal interactions: village meetings, informal visits and 
conversations 
6. Census data from the Agincourt Health and Socio-Demographic Surveillance 
System, Medical Research Council Unit in the School of Public Health, University 
of the Witwatersrand: 1992-2004 data, annual census of 21 villages, 11,000 
households and 70,000 individuals per annum.  
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 In addition to these formal data gathering processes in three villages, I spent time 
with, made friends with, and generally ‘hung out’ (Rodgers 2004) with people in 
Bushbuckridge, including both South Africans and Mozambicans. I also worked with 
and for them in a variety of other projects, most significantly managing a Wits 
affiliated NGO (the Acornhoek Advice Centre) which assisted Bushbuckridge 
residents, especially Mozambicans, to access identity documents and other 
government services. For methods 1-4 above, I worked with research assistants 
from each village (e.g. village ‘insiders’), as I do not speak Shangaan adequately to 
conduct detailed conversations on my own. All the interviews were carried out in 
Shangaan, using an English-language questionnaire or interview guide. The 
questions and appropriate translations were discussed with the research assistants 
in detail, and questions deemed to have complex meanings or words which could 
be interpreted or translated in different ways were pre-translated into Shangaan. I 
gathered my data, therefore, over a long period of time, in various ways, in a 
context where I and the institutions I was associated with (Wits Rural Facility, the 
RRP and the AAC) were known and had particular reputations, and where my 
research assistants were known, but where I was not ‘embedded’ in village life in a 
classical ethnographic manner.  
 
I have already discussed the question of conceptual categories and the problematic 
ease with which we adopt the boundaries of ‘imagined communities’ when 
designing research. How conceptual categories impact on methodological processes 
– especially on sampling – which in turn affects who we can ‘see’ in our findings, is 
also discussed in detail in Invisible Integration. I have argued there that integrated 
refugees are made invisible “not only as a function of methodological, political or 
policy preconceptions within the field of refugee studies… but also [as] a result of 
the more general processes of categorization.” (Polzer 2008:477) Since working 
with categories is unavoidable, an awareness of “how we form and manipulate our 
own constructed categories” (ibid) as academics is especially relevant in the process 
of selecting/sampling respondents, and then in how data received from these 
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respondents is interpreted in relation to the categories these respondents 
supposedly represent.  
 
In this regard, Oliver Bakewell’s observations about designing a methodology to 
study ‘repatriation’ of Angolans from Zambia have many parallels with my study of 
‘integration’ of Mozambicans in South Africa (as noted in brackets) and they are 
therefore worth quoting at length: 
“In order to question the assumptions about repatriation [integration] 
it was important to avoid embedding them in the research methods. 
To try to identify refugees and then ask them about their interest in 
moving to Angola or not [their feelings about being in South Africa], 
would presuppose firstly, that it is possible to differentiate a refugee 
from others; and secondly, that they would have a special interest in 
moving [special feeling about living in SA] compared to others who 
may fall outside the initial refugee category. It was important to see 
the whole process of movement to Angola [developing a national and 
citizenship identity in South Africa] set in the context of the historical, 
social and economic change in the area, rather than necessarily as a 
special event to occur once the war ends. Thus, the study became 
concerned with the wider impact on cross border movement from 
Zambia of the improving situation in Angola [the wider impact of the 
post-war and post-Apartheid situation on the development of group 
identity in a border area]. It would include those who might be 
thought of as refugees by others but it would not impose that label on 
people.” (Bakewell 1999:7) 
 
My own sampling process started with preconceived notions of group 
categorisations, and I only developed a more nuanced approach through the 
various data production iterations and in the data analysis process. My long time 
period in the field was therefore crucial. Initially, I selected my case study villages 
based on how visibly separate the ‘Mozambican neighbourhoods’ of these villages 
were (with variation from a completely separate village to a separate village section 
50
to a set of households closely attached to the rest of the settlement), with the 
assumption that less visible neighbourhoods meant greater (or different) 
integration. Over time, it became clear to me that movement and interaction 
patterns were similar in each of these spatial relationships (e.g. my attempt at 
nuanced categories was not useful) and so I analysed spatialised identity formation 
dynamics for all three villages together (see Space). 
 
In each village I recruited four research assistants who had all recently completed 
high school, including two ‘South Africans’ and two ‘Mozambicans’. I did this by 
asking either the village Community Development Forum Chairman or the high 
school principal to recommend youngsters, specifying my nationality preferences 
and the request to include young women if possible. In most villages these leaders 
found it difficult to identify ‘Mozambican’ youth (especially women, so I ended up 
only working with South African women) who had finished high school (see Space 
for the continued educational discrepancies between ‘South Africans’ and 
‘Mozambicans’). It is quite possible, however, that there were youth of 
Mozambican extraction whose families were so well integrated that the leaders I 
consulted no longer thought of them as being ‘Mozambican’ enough to recommend 
to me. In the other direction, the story of Noel, told in the Prelude to this 
Introduction, illustrates how someone recommended to me as ‘South African’ then 
turned out to ‘be’ ‘Mozambican’, at least in terms of where he and his parents were 
born. In retrospect, it is very possible, even probable, that Community 
Development Forum Chairman Nelson Ubisi, also portrayed in the Prelude, while 
telling me that there were no sufficiently educated ‘Mozambicans’ in the village and 
then suggesting Noel as a field workers, did this in the full knowledge of Noel’s dual 
identity, and perhaps even the hope that the young man would come to appreciate 
his Mozambicanness through working with me. This possibility illustrates how, in 
small and large ways, researchers of identity construction become part of local 
(personal and collective) projects and contestations.  
 
To select households within each village I also initially sampled purposively 
according to a priori categories of national difference combined with what I thought 
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were observable indicators of integration – whether a household was located in a 
‘Mozambican’ part of the village or in the main village section, and whether the 
household was recognised (by my local research assistants) as being ‘successful’, 
e.g. relatively well-off materially. This sampling process was done in several stages: 
1. I asked the research assistants to draw a map of their village; 2. I asked them to 
mark on the map, based on their existing knowledge of village residents, which 
households were ‘Mozambican’, which ‘South African’ and which ‘mixed’; 3. I then 
purposively stratified my sample to include ‘Mozambican’ households in the 
‘Mozambican neighbourhood’, ‘Mozambican’ households in the main village 
section, and ‘South African’ households (all of which were in the main village 
sections). I used a random counting process to select the sampled households 
within each of these categories so that there was no bias in terms of households 
personally close to my research assistants. At the time, I was already aware that my 
research assistants might not know the nationality of all village households, or that 
particularly well-integrated Mozambicans in the main village section would not be 
identified through this method. My sampling was therefore consciously only 
indicative of potentially relevant integration trajectories, with the actual ‘identity’ 
indicators of all respondents remaining open to revision through the actual 
research process. The importance of letting identity characteristics emerge slowly 
(and change) through the research engagement is discussed next in relation to my 
use of multiple methods over time. 
 
The appropriate combination/ triangulation of multiple methods in order to capture 
(and co-produce) different aspects of identity representation is a challenge. My 
approach to triangulating findings from quantitative and qualitative processes, and 
indeed through different qualitative approaches such as interviewing, family trees 
and mapping, followed what Kelle has called the complementarity model, rather 
than the trigonometric model (2001), since I was looking for greater richness of 
data, rather than expecting complete overlap of the findings of different sources. In 
fact, I was explicitly using different methods with the expectation that each type of 
data production worked through different forms of relationship and would 
therefore necessarily result in somewhat different expressions of relative identity.  
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 A brief description of the different ‘phases’ of data generation illustrates how I 
aimed to get at the same information in different ways with each method. After a 
brief introductory visit to each sample household to introduce the project, myself 
and my research assistants, the first interview was conducted by one of the 
research assistants alone with an adult household member (chosen to balance the 
overall number of men and women interviewed) and consisted of gathering basic 
information about the household: who lives in the household, when and where 
they were born, what identity documents they have and when they got them, how 
they are employed, and whether they receive government social grants. The main 
household respondent and another respondent, chosen to have a different gender 
and age than the main respondent, were then asked about how they acquired their 
IDs, or, if they did not have one, what difficulties they faced.  
 
In the same or a second visit soon after, the research assistant then facilitated two 
‘mapping’ exercises: a family tree and a social network and movements map. The 
main respondent’s family tree was recorded, listing the place of birth and place of 
current residence of each person mentioned. The social networks and movements 
map was based on our hand-drawn map of the village. The main household 
respondent was asked to draw a line from their own household to each place she 
had visited in the past seven days (whether for work, shopping, fetching water, 
visiting friends and family, church, etc.). Then she was asked to connect her 
household with the households of all family members in the village and in 
neighbouring villages. Finally, she was asked to identify “important people” in her 
life, including friends, business partners, favourite family members, etc. Finally, 
after the conclusion of the interview, the research assistants independently 
evaluated the socio-economic status of the household based on criteria of wealth 
and poverty developed as locally relevant before-hand, including quality of housing, 
quality of clothing, ownership of various assets such as TV, radio or car, and regular 
consumption of meat. The first phase of the research was therefore intended to 
gather enough information for a general sense of the household in terms of its 
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national origin, composition, legal status, socio-economic status and family and 
social networks. 
 
These same indicators were also addressed in different ways in the following two 
phases. The second interview was in the form of a long survey-type questionnaire 
which a research assistant carried out with one member of each previously 
interviewed household. This included questions about interactions with state 
institutions and representatives, beliefs about and expectations in the South African 
government, means of defining the respondents own group identity and 
understanding that of others, inter- and intra-group relationships within the village, 
feelings about borders and migration in general, and finally some questions for 
‘Mozambicans’ about their migration histories and plans regarding remaining in 
South Africa or returning to Mozambique. After this survey phase, I analysed the 
information produced so far, identifying areas of interest or in need of clarification 
for each household. My research assistant and I then returned to each household 
and conducted a final unstructured interview in which respondents were asked to 
talk freely about their lives, followed by questions to clarify and follow up on points 
that had been raised through previous research phases. 
 
As an example of complementary ‘triangulation’, we asked about the respondent’s 
place of birth several times and in different ways through the different research 
phases. In the first questionnaire we asked in what year and in what place each 
household member was born. In the family free, each person’s place of birth was 
recorded. In the longer survey, carried out a month later, there was a section on all 
the places in which a person has lived. In the unstructured interview, many people 
started with where they or their parents were born, when asked to speak freely 
about their lives. There were several occasions when respondents changed their 
places of birth from one interaction to another – usually starting by claiming South 
African birth and later mentioning a Mozambican place of birth. As an example, a 
young woman in Justicia said initially that she was born in 1986 in Pretoria. This 
matches what her ID document states. In the second phase’s migration history, the 
same young woman stated that she lived in Mozambique in 1985 and then moved 
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to Pretoria the same year with her parents. Three other women revised their 
stories in similar ways from one phase to another. 
 
Another key element of triangulating multiple data sources and forms is the 
relationship between quantitative and qualitative data. One of the unique 
opportunities of studying refugee integration in Bushbuckridge is the presence of 
the Agincourt Health and Socio-Demographic Surveillance System, part of the 
Medical Research Council Unit in the School of Public Health at the University of the 
Witwatersrand. This is the only long-term demographic survey site in the world 
which includes large numbers of self-settled refugees (Tollman, Herbst et al. 1999; 
Collinson 2009) and its now almost 20 year longitudinal dataset enables the tracing 
of a range of external integration indicators over time, including individual and 
household socio-economic characteristics, household spatial distribution, migration 
patterns, etc. In Invisible Integration I discuss how this dataset potentially obscures 
integrated refugees through the way in which it categorises people. Nonetheless, 
the dataset provides extremely valuable information, especially when combined 
with other forms of qualitative data. My discussion in Space shows how comparing 
and contrasting objective, external measures of current social conformity and 
similarity between ‘Mozambicans’ and ‘South Africans’ with subjective speech-acts 
(by leaders as well as ordinary residents) about the construction and relationships 
between these groups is productive. Combining these various forms of data allows 
us to take account of the experienced, ascribed and described as well as the 
instrumentalised aspects of belonging.  
 
The final point relates to researcher effects on how our methodological choices co-
produce identity group construction, and indeed how the research process creates 
identity construction moments. Schmidt points out that “forced migration research 
can be described as taking place in what sociologists would call situations of 
‘heightened reflexivity’ where both findings and terrain are strongly influenced by 
the presence of the researcher.” (Schmidt 2007:82) I will reflect briefly on how 
identifications according to race and nationality, and various iterations of ‘insider’ 
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and ‘outsiderness’ of the researchers (including myself and my research assistants) 
impacted on the production of information.  
 
Race in South Africa colours everything. As “one of the most thoroughly racialised 
social orders in the world” (Posel 2001:88),14 it is impossible to think about inter-
personal relationships, including the relationship between researcher and 
researched, in South Africa without considering race. Such a consideration brings 
up interesting complexities concerning how multiple layers of ‘in’ and ‘outsiderness’ 
are created, and how these relate to trust. I was interested in the relational 
construction of identities between ‘black’ groups, but my own racialised identity (as 
‘white’) strongly influenced what information I could access. There was, in fact, a 
three-way process of (value-laden) racialised identity construction: between myself 
and my black respondents; and between myself and ‘other’ whites, with the 
background context of the relationship (real and stereotyped) between the black 
respondents and ‘other’ whites. In discussing the significance of his identity as a 
white, male South African during his fieldwork, Rodgers describes how images of 
‘other whites’ – the Portuguese in colonial Mozambique or the Afrikaner farmers in 
South Africa – were related or contrasted with him as his respondents experienced 
his interactions with them (Rodgers 2002:88). I also had many interactions in which 
people said at the end of an interview that “now we know there is no more 
Apartheid” or “we can see that there is no Apartheid in your heart” because I came 
to ask them about their lives in their homesteads.  
 
Wilson speaks of how “most of the ‘benefits’ that will arise from the study of local 
people, limited as they probably will be, will come from the human contact and 
intellectual stimulation in the actual field-work process. Researchers must share of 
themselves and their world, and be as prepared to entertain and be studied as they 
hope local people will be.” (Wilson 1992:188) In the context of the racial 
stereotypes in Bushbuckridge, I was always conscious in my interactions with 
respondents and community leaders of trying to counter the stereotypes about 
14 When I had just arrived in South Africa, the young black man guarding the gate of the Wits Rural Facility told 
me with conviction that “in the Bible it says there are Whites, Blacks, Indians and Coloureds.”  
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distant, arrogant and racist white people who have no respect for or interest in the 
lives of black people. This is to say that my racialised identity was not only 
continually present in implicit ways, with its attendant power implications (as 
discussed next) but that my ‘performance’ of a particular kind of relational 
racialised identity (I am not like ‘those other whites’) was an active part of the 
research interaction and therefore an active part of the production of ‘rapport’ and 
‘trust.’  
 
That most respondents recognised me as an outsider, but an outsider who is ‘with 
us’, actually resulted in different kinds (and often significantly more) openness 
towards me than towards the ‘insider’ research assistants. This is another 
illustration that the research interaction is a complex social interaction in itself 
which involves various layers of ‘front and back-stage’ work (Goffman 1969) in 
terms of representing the self to others, and that the research interaction is itself a 
“negotiation [which reveals] the manner in which group members define the 
boundaries of the group, the attributes they associate with it, and the meaning of 
the group itself.” (De Andrade 2000)  
 
There were several cases where respondents would tell my research assistants 
something about their personal history (like that they were born in South Africa) 
even though they knew that the research assistants knew it not to be true 
(especially where the research assistants were themselves of Mozambican 
heritage). However, on another occasion the same person would tell me the truth 
that they were born in Mozambique, with the same research assistant being 
present. This cannot be understood either in terms of hiding a potentially 
compromising fact from an untrusted outsider feared to be ‘behind’ the research 
assistants (me) since I was spoken to openly in person, or in terms of hiding an 
identity element within the village social context, since the research assistants 
already knew (and were known to know) something of their family backgrounds 
and since some of these respondents lived in visible ‘Mozambican’ neighbourhoods.  
 
57
Perhaps the relatively formal interview situation established by the research 
assistants (with questions written down on a piece of paper, etc.) was perceived by 
(rural, often illiterate) respondents as related to the distant ‘legible’ world of the 
state, therefore requiring narrative coherence with the personal information 
captured on identity documents. The more informal setting of the unstructured 
interviews which I conducted myself may have contributed to more openness. 
Alternatively, the multiple visits by research assistants and myself prior to my own 
longer interview visit may have built gradual trust that no adverse effects would 
result from being open. Another possibility is, as I was told to my face, that ‘we 
trust whites more than blacks’, even if (or because) the white person is a relative 
stranger and foreign. In a context of generalised distrust within one’s own 
community (Golooba-Mutebi 2003; Golooba-Mutebi 2004; Golooba-Mutebi 2005), 
with Bushbuckridge scoring lowest on an index comparing social capital in former 
‘homeland’ areas (Strategy & Tactics 2002) asking questions of one’s neighbour is 
very suspicious. There may also have been an element of the complex power and 
status dynamics within the village context, leading to the maintenance of a façade 
by some (very poor) respondents towards those perceived to be (locally) more 
powerful (Scott 1990). Even though my research assistants were all young (recently 
finished with high school) and relatively poor (none were part of the more 
established and powerful families in any of the villages), simply the fact that they 
had completed high school, spoke good English, were working, and were working 
with/for a white person gave them status. Several told me that they had to contend 
not only with raised family expectations on their new (and modest) incomes, but 
also with ‘jealousy’ from other youth since they started working with me. Such 
jealousy was associated with witchcraft and so was feared. Their roles as ‘insider’ 
researchers were therefore significantly more difficult than my role of being a 
‘trusted outsider’. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
This introduction seeks to set out the analytical framework on refugee integration 
which I have applied in the five articles which make up this thesis. It also relates my 
framework to theoretical approaches to integration proposed by others, whether to 
contest or borrow from these traditions. I have taken the space to provide more 
background on the case study area than was possible in any of the shorter journal 
articles. Finally, I have reflected on the need to be self-aware regarding one’s own 
(and one’s collaborators’) identity constructing practices within the research 
engagement, even as one is ‘studying’ the identity construction practices of others.  
 
The articles which make up the body of this thesis were written over the period of 
seven years (initial drafts of Negotiating Rights and Histories were written in 2004) 
and so some insights have changed over time. The fundamental perspective on 
‘outsider’ integration as a process of political negotiation has remained constant, 
however, and the following articles work through this concept from a range of 
angles. Whereas I have used this introduction to frame the articles in terms of 
‘integration’ theories, I will use the conclusion article to relate my approach to 
‘integration’, and to refugee integration in a rural border area specifically, to four 
broader areas of debate in the social sciences, namely 1) minority politics, 2) the 
relations, negotiations and resistances of marginal groups and individuals with 
powerful institutions, categories and interventions, 3) national identity 
construction, and 4) the construction of identity groups.  
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Negotiating Rights:  
The Politics of Local Integration
Tara Polzer
Abstract
Advocacy campaigns against the “warehousing” of refu-
gees in camps suggest the facilitation of local integration 
as a preferred policy option for states, international organ-
izations, and non-governmental organizations. This paper 
argues that the institutions, assumptions, and habits that 
the international refugee protection system has developed 
over the past forty years hinder our understanding of local 
integration as a fundamentally political and refugee- and 
host-driven process. The paper uses African case stud-
ies to show how local integration is part of broader pro-
cesses of local politics. It proposes alternatives to three key 
assumptions of conventional policy-oriented approaches 
to local integration: (1) that local integration is a form of 
local politics rather than institutionalizable process for an 
exceptional category of people (e.g., refugees); (2) that local 
integration is negotiated by refugees based on a range of 
legitimacy claims and forms of exchange rather than pri-
marily based on “refugee rights”-related claims; and (3) 
that local integration is enabled by hosts for a variety of 
reasons rather than mainly for reasons related to the idea 
of “refugee protection.”
Résumé
Les campagnes contre le « stockage » des réfugiés dans 
des camps suggèrent la facilitation de l’intégration locale 
comme option à privilégier par les États, organisations 
internationales et organisations non gouvernementales. Le 
présent article soutient que les institutions, hypothèses et 
habitudes développées par le système de protection interna-
tionale des réfugiés au cours des quarante dernières années 
entravent notre compréhension de l’intégration locale en 
tant que processus fondamentalement politique mis en 
œuvre par les réfugiés et les hôtes. La recherche s’appuie sur 
des études de cas africains pour montrer comment l’inté-
gration locale fait partie du processus plus large de poli-
tique locale et propose des alternatives à trois hypothèses 
clés des approches classiques à l’intégration locale axées 
sur les politiques : 1) que l’intégration locale est une forme 
de politique locale plutôt qu’un processus institutionnali-
sable pour une catégorie exceptionnelle d’individus (par 
ex., les réfugiés); 2) que l’intégration locale est négocié par 
les réfugiés à partir d’une série de revendications de légiti-
mité et de formes d’échange et non plus principalement à 
partir de revendications liées aux « droits des réfugiés »; 3) 
que l’intégration locale est permise par les hôtes pour une 
variété de raisons, plutôt que pour des raisons essentielle-
ment liées à l’idée de la « protection des réfugiés. »
Introduction
The “local integration” of refugees is usually conceived of 
as a policy option: something which professional institu-
tions could and should plan and implement as a response 
to displacement. From the perspective of these institutions, 
such as United Nations agencies, governments, and non-
governmental organizations, this conception is understand-
able, given that they are debating their own programming 
options and impacts. However, this paper argues that a 
policy-oriented approach significantly limits the possibil-
ity of understanding the process of local integration and 
the contexts which facilitate or hinder it. I follow Oliver 
Bakewell in arguing that academics must move beyond the 
assumptions and categorizations of policy-oriented think-
ing and bring the interaction between refugees and others 
“back into history”1 by applying “broader social scientific 
theories of social [and political] transformation and human 
mobility” rather than “privileging their position as forced 
migrants as the primary explanatory factor” for protection 
outcomes.2
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This paper starts by outlining several key assumptions 
which the “refugee protection industry” has adopted about 
itself and about refugees in the past forty years which pre-
dispose institutions against local integration. It then dis-
cusses a prominent advocacy campaign which critiques 
some of these assumptions: namely the “anti-warehousing” 
campaign which promotes local integration as an alterna-
tive policy solution to the encampment of refugees. While 
this campaign against camps is valuable within the policy 
field, I argue that in critiquing camps and advocating for 
integration its policy focus nonetheless maintains three 
related conceptual blinkers. Firstly, it implies that local inte-
gration is an institutionalizable process for an exceptional 
category of people (e.g., refugees); secondly, that refugees 
integrate through claiming “refugee rights”; and thirdly, 
that hosts enable integration with the aim of providing 
“refugee protection.”
In contrast, this paper uses predominantly rural African 
case studies to show how local integration is in practice 
part of broader processes of local politics. By local politics 
I mean a process through which individuals and groups 
negotiate with local power holders for access to needed 
resources. This approach places refugees and hosts at the 
centre of the process, rather than professional refugee pro-
tection institutions, and assumes that refugees are political 
actors, using political strategies and tactics just like other 
individuals and groups. This argument is based on an analy-
sis which includes recognizing a range of legitimacy claims 
used locally by refugees, apart from “refugee rights,” and a 
variety of reasons why hosts allow and enable integration, 
apart from reasons relating to “refugee protection.”
The paper ends by returning to the policy field and 
assessing potential policy-based critiques of such an empir-
ical and political understanding of local integration. It con-
cludes that as local integration is largely a process which 
happens without or in spite of currently dominant insti-
tutional interventions, future interventions which wish 
to support rather than undermine local integration must 
first have the conceptual tools for understanding its locally 
specific logics.
Framing Local Integration
Before outlining the policy debate about local integration 
as an alternative to refugee encampment, let me clarify my 
understanding of local integration. The term has been used 
in many, often conflicting, ways.3 I am not referring to the 
various types of purportedly self-sufficient refugee settle-
ments, where refugees are largely isolated from local popu-
lations by host governments and international actors.4 Even 
though these settlements may reduce some of the worst 
economic dependency problems of fully-catered camps, as 
it were, they do not change the essential separateness of refu-
gees and therefore their removal from local political life.
Some authors define “local integration” in terms of 
a final state of similarity to (although not necessarily of 
assimilation with) local populations. Jacobsen, for example, 
describes what she calls de facto integration as “where the 
lived, everyday experience of refugees is that of being part 
of the local community.” This includes lack of physical dan-
ger; freedom of movement in the host country and free-
dom to return to the home country; access to sustainable 
livelihoods; access to government services like education, 
health, and housing; social inclusion through intermar-
riage and social interactions with the host community; and 
comparable standards of living in comparison with the host 
community.5 Jacobsen also emphasizes the importance of 
formal legal status, ideally permanent residence or citizen-
ship in the host country, as the final step to full integration, 
since without it de facto integrated refugees remain vulner-
able.6 Crisp defines local integration primarily as reflecting 
the “assumption that refugees will remain indefinitely in 
their country of asylum and find a solution to their plight in 
that state,”7 in contrast to the assumption of temporariness 
inherent in camps and repatriation programs.
Jacobsen’s description of “being integrated” is valu-
able, as is Crisp’s focus on “indefiniteness,” especially since 
both include the understanding that integration need not 
preclude eventual repatriation or cross-border livelihoods 
and identities. However, these authors retain many of the 
assumptions about the refugee protection system which I 
analyze below—such as the primacy of international and 
national law, and the “refugee” label—by underemphasiz-
ing the social and political process of integration and the 
local actors involved (not only “refugee protection” profes-
sionals). I believe that a very broad, process-focused defin-
ition of integration is necessary in order to overcome many 
of the thought-blinkers “refugee-studies” academics have 
developed. I define local integration as a process of negoti-
ating access to local legitimacy and entitlement on the basis 
of a variety of value systems determined by local power 
holders in dialogue with refugees. Such a broad analysis of 
negotiation strategies, local value systems and local actors is 
necessary to develop a subtle, rather than a blueprint, debate 
on integration. I will return to this below.
There is an extensive literature on the integration of 
refugees in northern countries, focusing on the interaction 
between the individual/small group and the host state/society 
around issues of cultural assimilation, economic access, etc.8 
There are fewer studies on refugee integration in the con-
text of “mass” movements in the “South,” but it is definitely 
a phenomenon that occurs more often than is academically 
observed.9 The examples of local integration I will discuss are 
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all African and mainly rural or small-town based,10 including 
on my own research among Mozambican refugees in South 
Africa (2002–2006).11 The analysis applies equally, however, 
to locally integrated urban-based refugees, who now make up 
over half of recorded refugees worldwide.12
Finally, my understanding of local integration applies 
at all stages of the displacement process.13 Refugee protec-
tion institutions commonly distinguish between interim 
or “temporary” responses to displacement, where the main 
policy options are seen to be encampment or local integra-
tion, and “durable solutions” to displacement, which are 
voluntary repatriation, local integration or third country 
resettlement. The a priori distinction between “temporary” 
and “durable” solutions is largely an institutional and policy 
construction, since the displaced themselves rarely have a 
clearly phased or linear interpretation of the temporariness 
or durableness of their current life situation.
There are many refugees, especially in African host coun-
tries, who self-settle and start integrating as soon as they 
cross the border, usually without any organized intervention 
on their behalf. Some authors with an intervention-focus 
have also suggested that local integration should be planned 
for by refugee protection agencies even in the immediate 
emergency phase of refugee influx, and not only as a second-
phase, medium-term option.14 Jacobsen explicitly focuses 
on protracted conflicts during which refugees integrate in 
the host country while waiting for many decades to “return 
home.”15 Finally, integration is a concern for those refugees 
whose countries of origin have achieved some peace and 
stability but where the country of asylum offers different 
opportunities, has become “home” in various ways,16 or has 
become enmeshed with the country of origin as a locality 
for cross-border livelihoods.17
While local integration is potentially an option at all 
stages of the refugee experience and for individual as 
well as large-scale refugee movements, this is not to sug-
gest that it is always an option, or always the best option, 
or that all refugees wish to integrate in the short or long 
term. However, it is an option which is often overlooked 
or actively prevented by intervening institutions because 
of the assumptions about refugees and refugee protection 
outlined below. In order to understand in what situations 
refugees and hosts are likely to succeed in integrating on 
their own, when targeted outsider interventions are likely 
to facilitate or hinder the process, or when other forms of 
intervention are needed, we need a clearer understanding 
of the integration process itself.
Before developing my approach to local integration as 
political negotiation, I briefly outline the assumptions about 
refugee protection interventions that dominate mainstream 
discussions, including the anti-warehousing debate.
Encampment and Local Integration  
as Policy Options
Since the 1970s, the major international actors in refugee 
protection and the majority of academic commentators have 
seen local integration of refugees in poor host countries 
as problematic.18 In terms of international expenditure,19 
academic attention,20 and media and popular perception, 
refugee camps have become the dominant response to 
most mass displacement situations by both host states and 
the international community. This is especially the case in 
Africa and increasingly in Asia.21 The Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and 
many states see camps as the best interim or preparation 
stage where displaced people are held and helped until the 
conditions are ripe for the preferred “durable solution” of 
repatriation to their country of origin.
In reality, this has not always been the case. For thou-
sands of years, it has been the norm for people who have 
moved away from conflict (just like people who moved 
for other reasons) to integrate locally, and local integra-
tion was espoused as the natural and ideal solution at the 
inception of the international refugee regime in the 1950s.22 
Furthermore, a large proportion of displaced people today, 
whether refugees or internally displaced, still self-settle and 
integrate, often without contact with official state or inter-
national assistance programs. Estimates of independently 
self-settled refugees are notoriously unreliable,23 but they 
have ranged from 30 per cent to 75 per cent of the total num-
ber of refugees in Africa.24
There are currently approximately 2.5 million refugees 
living in camps around the world, making up one-third 
of the refugees counted in the UNHCR’s global statistics. 
In contrast to global percentages, 60 per cent of UNHCR-
counted refugees in Africa are in camps.25 This does not 
include the much larger numbers of internally displaced 
persons also living in camps or camp-like settlements. The 
dominant characteristics of encampment are that camp 
residents are segregated from the local population and 
that they have limited freedom of movement or economic 
independence. Camps are often financed and managed by 
international organizations, while some are managed by 
host states.
The policy and practice of refugee encampment has 
developed historically in explicit opposition to the settle-
ment of refugees among the local population of the host 
country. Crisp describes the historical and political rea-
sons why host states in Africa increasingly rejected local 
integration of refugees from the 1970s onward in favour of 
encampment. These included concern about economic and 
environmental burdens in poor countries (and in richer 
countries), security concerns, anger at being “abandoned” 
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by richer nations, fear of the domestic ramifications of 
popular xenophobia, and the perceived need to reassert 
sovereignty over porous borders.26 Other writers note that 
host governments benefit from the international aid asso-
ciated with encampment, which would not be forthcoming 
for self-sufficient, integrated refugees.27 These arguments 
recognize a realist state-centric perspective and are based 
on the view that state rights (sovereignty) trump individual 
rights, and that citizen rights trump human rights. In this 
perspective, encampment is a legitimate means to prevent 
perceived threats and gain desired benefits for the state and 
for citizens without injuring any significant interests (since 
refugee interests are not considered a priori significant).
The trend toward camps and away from local integration 
comes not only from states but also reflects an institutional 
logic within the international “refugee protection industry” 
today.28 This logic has seven elements which make it difficult 
for professional refugee protection institutions to recognize 
the localized and political nature of local integration.
First, refugee protection has become a specialized and 
bureaucratized industry with international, national, and 
non-governmental organizations dependent on recreating 
interventions for themselves.29 Social and political pro-
cesses which cannot be clearly traced to institutional inter-
ventions cannot be used to raise funds or claim positive 
impact. Second, beyond the immediate material incomes of 
specific organizations and specialists, there is a deeply held 
assumption that the responsibility for, as well as the cost of, 
refugee protection should lie with a centralized institution 
(the state or an international organization) rather than being 
diffused among the communities in which refugees might 
settle. Third, the idea that refugees can bring benefits to host 
communities, rather than only costs, is a common refrain 
in the mainstream refugee literature and in the publicity 
material of refugee assistance institutions, but interventions 
are rarely conceptualized around the resources and capaci-
ties which refugees have independently. Especially encamp-
ment is based on the assumption that all refugees are a prob-
lem and have problems; not that only those refugees who 
have problems and are problematic require assistance or 
intervention.
A fourth consequence of the bureaucratic focus is a tauto-
logical definition of who is a refugee: only those people who 
fit into an intervention-driven definition of refugee are 
counted and assisted; therefore a perception arises that all 
refugees are counted and assisted. Those refugees who self-
settle and integrate are often not counted at all in the offi-
cial statistics.30 Even in situations like Guinea, where only 
20 per cent of Sierra Leonean and Liberian refugees are in 
camps, the greater visibility of camps “strongly [shapes] the 
image outsiders have of all the refugees.”31
Fifth, bureaucratization has led to a predilection for blue-
print “solutions” and standardized procedures, of which 
refugee camps are particularly replicable examples. The 
problems associated with importing camp models without 
consideration for local specificities have been discussed 
elsewhere.32 Sixth, in parallel to the programmatic special-
ization and blueprints, there have developed deep discursive 
specializations and blueprints. This includes the assump-
tion that a discourse of refugee identification and refugee 
rights, as defined by international conventions, will in all 
cases be beneficial to the refugees concerned and therefore 
is desired by them. As Andrews points out,
UNHCR and humanitarian agencies commonly use the category 
of “refugee” in order to determine the population eligible for aid 
or resettlement. However, for understanding … how the displaced 
themselves negotiate their survival with their hosts, this demo-
graphic category obscures more than it reveals.33
Finally, the international agencies mandated with refugee 
protection, as well as many academics, have accepted some 
of the host states’ arguments against local integration.34 
Some authors argue convincingly that refugee protection is 
only possible with the co-operation of host states, and that 
their priorities and concerns must be taken into account.35 
This is clearly correct in terms of immediate advocacy goals. 
However, by accepting states’ fears of permanence as asso-
ciated with local integration, and therefore supporting 
“temporary” encampment interventions, international (and 
national) non-state actors have contributed to the construc-
tion of the refugee as a liminal and apolitical category, a 
temporary aberration in the “national order of things.”36 In 
addition to having wide-ranging practical implications for 
the lives and livelihoods of refugees, as well documented by 
authors like Smith and Harrell-Bond37 among others, this 
depoliticization and dehistoricization of refugees has deep 
disciplinary and theoretical effects on our ability to under-
stand how refugees actively respond on arrival in a new 
place.38
These assumptions about refugees made by host states and 
international refugee protection actors must be abandoned 
in order to understand local integration as an empirical, 
contextual, historical, and political process. Before describ-
ing this integration process in the next section, I briefly dis-
cuss the contribution of the “anti-warehousing” campaign, 
which for several years has been advocating against encamp-
ment and for increased use of local integration as a policy 
option in response to displacement.39 I argue that while 
this campaign has merits, it is misleading to present local 
integration as a different but functionally equivalent policy 
to encampment, in that it is something which professional 
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refugee protection institutions do in response to large-scale 
displacement of people. The “anti-warehousing” campaign 
is focused on identifying the problems with encampment, 
rather than understanding the process of integration per se. 
The campaign therefore challenges some of the assumptions 
underlying the logic of encampment and professionalized 
refugee protection, but not others.
In contrast to a state-centric logic, the dominant propon-
ents of the anti-warehousing campaign explicitly advance 
the primacy of international law (such as the 1951 UN 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1948 
Declaration of Human Rights) and human and individual 
rights in informing their judgments.40 The refugee rights 
codified in the Refugee Convention are presented as a min-
imum standard to which host states and especially inter-
national institutions such as the UNHCR have subscribed. 
Measured against this standard, refugee encampment is pre-
sented as not only illegitimate, but also “unnecessary, waste-
ful, hypocritical, counterproductive, unlawful, and morally 
unacceptable.”41
As part of this argument, sovereignty and citizenship rights, 
as emphasized by host states, are acknowledged, but evidence 
is presented to debunk many of the security and resource com-
petition concerns routinely expressed by host governments.42 
Smith, who identifies long-term camps not only as dehuman-
izing in general but also as racist, spells out the moral element 
very clearly. He points out that when Europeans were design-
ing a system of refugee protection for other Europeans in the 
1950s, camps were considered an unconscionable throwback 
to dictatorial practice and local integration was the assumed 
and natural route for refugees. If the architects of today’s 
camps, including international actors and host governments, 
considered refugees as their own equals, they would not con-
sign them to “warehouses.”43
Regarding the assumption that professional institutions 
are the best placed to protect refugees, the anti-warehous-
ing campaigners document rights abuses by the UNHCR 
and international NGOs in detail. They criticize the con-
trolling approach to refugees in camps which often stems 
from narrowly interpreted organizational imperatives and 
the pressure on institutions to continue interventions for 
their own benefit rather than a consideration of refugees as 
human beings with rights and desires.44 The conviction that 
refugees are a potential asset and not a burden is central to 
the anti-camps argument, which they document with exten-
sive examples. Smith and Harrell-Bond and Verdirame also 
explicitly refer to the greater psychological well-being and 
health of self-settled and integrating refugees in comparison 
with camp-based refugees.45
I agree with the anti-warehousing campaigners and most 
commentators on refugee issues that human rights and the 
rights enshrined in the Refugee Convention are expressions 
of what every human being (which is what refugees are in 
the first instance) should have access to in their lives. What 
I am arguing is that conventional assumptions about refu-
gee protection limit our ability to understand how refugees 
actually access and enjoy these rights and resources. There 
are three key assumptions, all related, which the anti-ware-
housing debate does not move away from sufficiently, and 
which are critical to answering the empirical question of 
how refugees access rights and resources and therefore to 
understanding the process of local integration.
The first assumption is that refugees are a particular group 
of people, categorically different from “locals” or other kinds 
of migrants, with different means of accessing rights and 
resources, whose actions can be understood through a spe-
cialized knowledge. I suggest that refugees negotiate access 
to rights in relation to local power holders like any other 
political actor. A second, related, assumption is that a dis-
course of refugee rights is always the strategically best way 
of assisting refugees. I submit that often refugees use other 
identities to claim rights to resources and power in a local 
context, such as ethnic identification, kinship networks, pol-
itical clients or allies, etc. In some contexts, the refugee iden-
tification does indeed facilitate access to resources, but in 
others it can be counterproductive and alienating. The third 
assumption is that “durable solutions” and “refugee protec-
tion” are the result of specific interventions by specialized 
refugee protection organizations based on internationally 
defined refugee rights. I suggest that local integration often 
happens as a function of local relationships, in the absence 
of specific refugee protection interventions, and that it can 
be actively hindered by them. In fact, refugee protection can 
be seen as a by-product of successful integration processes, 
rather than integration being a result of refugee protection. 
These three points will be discussed in the following sections 
on the basis of African case studies.
Local Integration as Political Negotiation
My argument is that empirically, local integration is in the 
first instance a social and political process of incorporat-
ing newcomers into an existing political community. This 
process may or may not be connected to a discursive and 
institutional framework of “temporary” or “durable” solu-
tions to displacement that assumes certain things about 
refugees, refugee rights, the role of the state and the role of 
international organizations.
The underlying questions for understanding integra-
tion as a political process is: how do refugees (actively) get 
what they need to live? This question is empirical and situa-
tional, not normative and universal: what does enable refu-
gees to access the things they need, rather than who should 
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protect them. Academics should consistently be looking 
at how refugees gain access to actual power and resources 
locally, as achieved through negotiation with a variety of 
actors, some of whom but certainly not all may be agents 
of the state, international organizations, or NGOs. Within 
this framework, I agree fully with Verdirame and Harrell-
Bond’s assertion that “socio-economic integration is the 
best solution from the point of view of the refugees’ enjoy-
ment of their fundamental rights”46 because it gives them 
more space to actively negotiate access to rights and resour-
ces with whatever local power holder can actually enable 
those rights at any particular time.
There are three guiding questions for a political analysis 
of refugee integration:
1. Who are the local actors who control access to power 
and resources and what are their interests?
2. What is the relationship of (different categories of) 
refugees to those actors—what resources do refugees 
have which these actors can use, or which threats do 
they (are they perceived to) present?
3. What tactics and strategies do refugees use within the 
framework of these relationships to negotiate access to 
power and resources?47
Local Power Holders and Interests
Local actors are all actors who impact directly on the local 
conditions in which refugees live. In the rural context of my 
own research in South Africa, powerful actors have been 
village headmen and religious leaders but also locally based 
officials of national state organs, such as the Department of 
Home Affairs, which is responsible for identity documenta-
tion. In this conception, local actors may also include staff 
members of international organizations, if they are present in 
that locality. I am counting state and international actors as 
“local” in this context, since the relevant points of interaction 
for refugees are the locally-based individual representatives 
of such larger institutions, and the ways in which those indi-
viduals act empirically, which may be quite different from 
the legal mandates or institutional interests their structures 
theoretically represent.48 A focus on the specifics of the local 
is important, since, as numerous case studies point out, the 
conditions for integration are different from one district to 
another and from a rural area to the adjoining town, not least 
because different local actors hold power.49
In spite of much debate on “weak” and “failed” states 
in Africa and elsewhere, the state always remains a central 
power holder in refugee affairs. Particularly the question of 
legal documentation, as controlled by the state, is often a 
crucial constraining factor for refugee options.50 The inclu-
sion of a variety of actors in the analysis is not to negate the 
importance of state power to constrain or enable access to 
rights in many situations. However, the particular character 
of state power in a particular locality, including the specific 
meaning and use of documentation, cannot be taken for 
granted.
Who can access documentation or who needs it is not 
always a question of the law and formal state policy. As 
Hovil points out about self-settled Sudanese refugees in 
Moyo district of Uganda, many have avoided the entire con-
cept of refugeedom by paying tax and carrying “graduated 
poll tax tickets that act as a means of official identification” 
virtually equivalent to citizenship.51 This is effective even 
though the government requires refugees to be registered 
and live in camps. Bakewell writes that legal documenta-
tion was only relevant for Angolan refugees self-settled in 
remote and rural Zambian villages if they wanted to travel 
to towns to work, and that many “locals” had a range of 
different identity documents, including refugee cards, for 
different purposes.52 In South Africa, many Mozambicans 
with the requisite social or financial capital were “adopted” 
by South African families of the same ethnic group and 
acquired citizenship documentation through them.53
There are also cases where the state has little influence on 
border areas where refugees self-settle, such as in Zambia in 
the early 1990s.54 In the absence of the state, other signifi-
cant actors may be traditional leaders who control access to 
land and have an interest in increasing their political fol-
lowing; international organizations and NGOs who offer 
resources and have an interest in docile clients; and armed 
groups who offer or withdraw security and have an interest 
in recruits.
Matching actors and their interests also illustrates that 
different local actors will be most useful (or dangerous) to 
different groups of refugees depending on what resources 
the refugees bring with them and what strategies they are 
pursuing. In the Guinean case, for example, rural Mano 
refugees easily integrated in rural areas, where traditional 
authorities and the general population were the relevant 
local actors. Urban refugees from different ethnic groups did 
not have the resources, such as political clientage traditions, 
agricultural knowledge, and labour power, to negotiate with 
these actors and did not want to, and therefore addressed 
themselves to international actors and the state for aid by 
establishing a “spontaneous camp” in Thuo town.55
Verdirame and Harrell-Bond provide a sophisticated 
analysis of the roles and power relations between a pleth-
ora of actors involved in refugee protection in Kenya and 
Uganda.56 They include not only the mandates of the vari-
ous institutions, but their on-the-ground practices and indi-
vidual belief systems of staff members. What is needed in 
studying other refugee contexts, including local integration, 
is a similarly complex understanding of the powerful actors 
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and their interests and assumptions, with the understand-
ing that the roles of government and organized humanitar-
ian actors may be quite marginal in certain contexts.
Refugee Resources
In the ideal international system of refugee protection, the 
main resource of refugees in relation to host states and 
refugee rights organizations is their ability to claim legal 
and moral capital as refugees, which is seen as sufficient 
to access resources and protection. In reality, however, 
refugees can rarely access rights purely on this basis, and 
many have to (or choose to) make use of other resources 
they bring with them. These may be material resources 
of exchange (financial resources, labour power and skills, 
trading relationships) or various forms of legitimacy 
claims (kinship, client-patron relationships, ideological 
affiliations). Hansen’s early work on self-settled refugees 
in Zambia especially shows the relevance of cultural and 
social resources.57 An analysis of resources enables us, for 
example, to see cases of co-ethnic integration not as “nat-
ural” occurrences, but rather as examples where negotia-
tion for rights and resources is enabled through various 
existing legitimacy resources including language, cultural 
norms such as reciprocity, kinship ties, and common spirit-
ual-religious origins (ancestors) which act along with other, 
more material considerations.
These resources, however, only facilitate integration if 
they are deemed valuable by local counterparts or used 
by refugees for the purpose of integrating. In Malkki’s 
well-known work on Burundian refugees in Tanzania, for 
example, both camp-based and “town” refugees were of the 
same ethnic group, which was related to some of the local 
ethnic groups. For the “town” refugees this affinity assisted 
with an integration process based on remaining invisible to 
authorities and locals, while for the camp refugees it was 
irrelevant in their quest for a separate “mythico-historical” 
identification as exiles.58
Other useful resources which refugees can use to facili-
tate integration are labour power or their contribution to 
shifting demographic patterns. An increase in popula-
tion density in a previously sparsely populated area can 
help locals attract state services. Bakewell’s comment on 
Zambia applies just as well to Mozambican refugees in 
South Africa:
The arrival of the refugees was regarded positively by Zambian vil-
lagers as not only did they cultivate the bush, but they also boosted 
the population to levels better able to draw in services such as 
schools and clinics. For the chiefs and headmen, the increased 
population also increased their prestige.59
In camp situations, the refugees bring the same poten-
tial economic, social, and political resources with them, but 
there is usually no demand from the side of those in power, 
leaving refugees with fewer bargaining tools. Kinship, lan-
guage, and symbolic ties are usually non-existent with inter-
national actors, whose own prestige is not dependent on 
attracting political clients except to the extent that there are 
a sufficient number of “beneficiaries” who remain passive, 
needy, and controlled. Financial exchanges or individual 
patron-client relationships that develop between humanitar-
ian staff and refugees in camps, which are so often decried as 
corrupt and deviant, should in fact be understood as part of 
the same process by which refugees, just like any other social 
group, use the resources they have and which are in demand 
by those in power to negotiate desired outcomes.
Arguing that refugees claim rights as a negotiation for 
mutual gain with powerful actors, rather than based on 
abstract principles such as “refugee rights,” is not neces-
sarily a purely realist argument. It is in fact a crucial, but 
often unstated, element of idealist debates on accountabil-
ity. Rights are only truly protected if those claiming them 
have a means of sanctioning those with the power to grant 
or withdraw positive freedoms and rights and the power to 
infringe or protect from infringement of negative freedoms. 
Such sanction presupposes a mutual, not entirely one-sided, 
relationship. By being based on local political negotiation, 
which requires a measure of mutuality if not necessar-
ily equality, local integration by definition includes more 
accountability in the relationship between refugees and 
power-holders than camp-based situations, even as refu-
gee rights advocates and academics are arguing for greater 
accountability in humanitarian practice.60
Refugee Strategies and Tactics
Of course, there is no simple or automatic supply-demand 
mechanism of resources for rights; resources are deployed 
by refugees according to particular strategies, depending 
on the desired outcomes and depending on often significant 
constraints. Malkki’s example is useful once again, as the 
“camp refugees,” in contrast to the “town refugees,” did not 
want to integrate locally but rather to develop and main-
tain a group identification centring on return to Burundi. 
They therefore targeted their claims to resources and rights 
at international actors on the basis of their “refugeehood.” 
We do not know what would have happened if those same 
refugees had not had powerful actors like the UNHCR who 
were responsive to this strategy. What other actors would 
they have turned to for food and shelter? Would they have 
had to adopt a different strategy?
Refugees also employ more subtle tactics, such as the 
day-to-day construction of moral legitimacy through 
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the invocation of shared history by Shangaan-speaking 
Mozambican refugees in relation to their Shangaan-
speaking hosts in South Africa.61 While many, even most, 
Mozambican refugees remained extremely poor for twenty 
years after their arrival in South Africa, the mutually 
reinforced identity link with their hosts has meant that they 
have not experienced the often violent xenophobia which 
plagues refugees and migrants in other parts of post-1994 
South Africa.62
Although I have been emphasizing negotiation for 
resources and power as an active process, there are clearly 
different levels of individual or collective agency in the 
choice of strategies and tactics. Some interactions (such as 
bribing a UNHCR status determination official to arrange 
resettlement or offering group allegiance to a chief) are 
more  purposeful and active than others (such as increasing 
the population density of an area).
This broad model of political negotiation which looks 
at actors, resources, and strategies has several benefits. It 
allows us to describe and compare refugee responses across 
a variety of contexts and times and with a variety of other 
groups of actors, such as vulnerable citizens, internally dis-
placed persons, and economic migrants. It is only seemingly 
paradoxical that a situationally defined approach would 
facilitate comparison; refugee studies has been obsessed 
with classification and labelling so that camp-based refu-
gees are studied differently from returnees, who are again 
imbued with different characteristics to internally displaced. 
This kind of classification without a unifying theoretical 
model does not help to assess the relative achievement of 
rights. I am not proposing negotiated rights as a means of 
understanding local integration only; it is a means of seeing 
local integration as one scenario on a continuum of rela-
tive freedom to negotiate rights which stretches from ware-
housed refugees, slaves, trafficked children, etc. on the one 
end, to fully enfranchised citizens on the other. Along this 
continuum there may be more powerful refugees and vul-
nerable ones, as well as more or less marginalized citizens.
Sometimes, marginal citizens may have fewer rights than 
some refugees living among them, especially if we con-
sider prominent political exiles or members of rebel groups 
befriended with the host state’s government. Sudanese refu-
gees in northern Uganda and Kenya enjoy certain rights 
not by virtue of being refugees, but through their associa-
tion with the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) rebel 
group, which is in political allegiance with the respective 
host governments. SPLA membership cards allow free-
dom of movement in much of Uganda,63 while, in contrast, 
Acholi citizens of Uganda have been resettled to govern-
ment “villages” through a violent constraint of movement 
in the past twenty years. The warehousing critique correctly 
challenges the treatment of all refugees as a homogeneous, 
vulnerable, and dependent group, and the approach of ana-
lyzing the negotiation of rights gives us a means of acknow-
ledging the more powerful as well as the vulnerable.
This negotiating-rights perspective also allows us to com-
pare current negotiations for rights with historical periods 
when international refugee law and human rights concepts 
did not exist as benchmarks. This gives the study of refugee 
flows and responses a much longer historical context and 
allows for more cross-fertilization with historical studies 
in other disciplines. An active, political perspective there-
fore brings refugees “back into history” in more than one 
sense, comparatively over time and by not taking them out 
of a normal process of political change and development 
through refugee labelling and sequestration in camps.64
Local Integration through Refugee Rights?
Using the model of politically negotiated rights, “refugee 
rights” become one of many possible strategies that refugees 
can use to access rights within a set of structural constraints. 
However, claiming “refugee rights” will only be effective as 
a strategy if there are powerful actors present who are likely 
to react positively to this strategy. Some host governments, 
international organizations and NGOs are clearly responsive 
to this strategic claim.65 But even in cases where the organ-
ization most mandated to respond to the claim of refugee 
rights—the UNHCR—is powerful, the legal rights of refu-
gees as set out in the Refugee Convention have often been 
ignored in favour of UN-supported “warehousing.” So the 
invocation of the refugee identification towards institutions 
mandated to respond to that label has just as often led to a 
direct constraint of rights as to an expansion of rights.
As noted above, other common strategies which refugees 
use for claiming access to rights include historical associa-
tion, political allegiance, and ethnic identification. In the 
case of Angolan refugees in the Zambian border regions, 
Bakewell points out that there was an existing historical 
community spanning the formal border. In the absence of 
a strong central state presence in the border communities, 
this historical and ethnic connection was more important 
than differences of formal citizenship in accessing relevant 
resources such as land.66 In terms of political allegiance, the 
case of SPLA members in Uganda is mentioned above.
The case of Mozambican refugees in South Africa serves 
as an example of ethnic identification, claimed in parallel, 
at different points in time, with other forms of legitimacy. 
Shangaan-speaking Mozambicans escaping the civil war 
in the mid-1980s were welcomed and integrated in South 
Africa by the Shangaan-speaking “homeland” government 
(located immediately on the border with Mozambique) as 
ethnic and black brothers in explicit opposition to a racist 
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central state.67 Even though it did not obviate all discrimin-
ation or conflict with locals, ethnic identification was there-
fore an important strategy through which Mozambican 
refugees could access basic local rights (such as access to 
land, low-level employment by local residents, etc.) in the 
first ten years of their stay in South Africa.
After the 1994 transition to democracy in South Africa, 
the ethnic “homelands” were dissolved. Faced with a central 
state that still only had a fledgling refugee rights legislation 
or culture, Mozambicans’ strategy shifted to claiming rights 
from the state (rather than only from local authorities), but by 
identifying themselves as long-term residents from a neigh-
bouring country rather than as refugees per se. In 1995 and 
1996, over 90,000 Mozambican refugees received perma-
nent resident status by virtue of being counted as miners or 
migrants from within the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC). Only in 1999, fifteen years after their 
arrival, did the strategy of claiming “refugee rights” bear 
fruit for Mozambicans in South Africa when a government 
amnesty was specifically oriented around the right to legal 
regularization for Mozambican refugees.68
The negotiation for documentation and rights from the 
state as “migrants” and “refugees” continued to be paral-
leled by a local negotiation for rights from the host com-
munity on the basis of common ancestry and tradition, as 
mentioned above.69 In fact, trying to claim local rights on 
the basis of being a refugee was seen by many Mozambicans 
as being counterproductive. While South African hos-
pitality initially included empathy with the horrors the 
Mozambicans had experienced during the civil war and 
their extreme poverty on arrival in South Africa, this char-
ity soon underpinned an unequal hierarchical relationship. 
To gain expanded access to resources and rights, many 
Mozambicans have worked hard to renounce the need 
for charity, pity, or special treatment on the basis of their 
refugeehood and have made claims for local equality on 
the basis of long-term residence, education level, or South 
African citizenship documents.
Local Integration as Refugee Protection 
Intervention?
People have moved to escape persecution and wars for thou-
sands of years and have always found ways, sometimes with 
ease and more often with much difficulty, of establishing new 
homes among new people, or else moving on until they did. 
Only rarely were those fleeing war welcomed and integrated 
merely because they were displaced by war. Even since the 
invention of the modern refugee regime in the 1950s, most 
local integration has not been the result of a host-country or 
host-community strategy based predominantly on the aim 
of providing refugee protection.
The European Cold War–era refugee regime was cen-
trally about geopolitical and ideological rivalry, rather than 
about humanitarianism.70 In Africa, some refugees were 
welcomed by host states and societies as African brothers 
and neighbours (not as refugees qua refugees) during the 
wars of independence.71 Some, such as the Mozambicans 
in South Africa72 or the Liberians in Cote d’Ivoire,73 have 
more recently been welcomed as co-ethnic brothers (again 
not as refugees per se). Other refugees have chosen to evade 
the host state’s official refugee protection system and try 
their luck as “undocumented migrants” or pose as locals, 
calculating that there was some greater benefit in this 
arrangement.74 In sum, those who were integrated officially 
were not integrated on the basis of being refugees per se, and 
those who are integrating unofficially feel that their lives 
and chances are better by not being recognized or identified 
as refugees. Neither is therefore really integration on the 
basis of intentional refugee protection.
There are many case studies of local integration where 
the absence of state and international interventions has been 
instrumental in facilitating integration. In Sierra Leone of 
the early 1990s, for example, Leach found that, “in local 
terms, ‘self-settlement’ and ‘integration’ were not special, 
but an inevitable and well-precedented way of dealing with 
[the arrival of Liberian refugees].”75 Even in the European 
context, Zetter et al. note that “in Italy, the lack of a nation-
ally coordinated framework of policies for settlement and 
control of geographical mobility appears to have the effect of 
facilitating integration and enabling local networks to con-
solidate and support labor market access and social mobil-
ity.”76 When refugees decide not to live in camps but rather 
to self-settle and integrate, they are often avoiding not only 
the specific strictures of the camp setting, but just as much 
the refugee label and concept itself and the involvement of 
external institutional actors in their lives.
There are three questions implicit in the relationship 
between local integration and intentional refugee protection 
interventions. One is whether local integration interventions 
explicitly motivated by refugee protection aims have had a 
good record in facilitating local integration. We have very few 
empirical examples of how well locally integrated refugees 
would do if they were supported by both governments and 
the UNHCR without the presence of additional political or 
institutional interests apart from refugee protection. As men-
tioned above, in those cases where the government explicitly 
welcomed refugees (such as Cote d’Ivoire in the early 1990s,77 
Tanzania of the 1960s,78 or Malawi79) there was little UNHCR 
or NGO assistance and governments had other strategic 
imperatives. We do have evidence of cases where interven-
tions intended for refugee protection have constrained refu-
gee rights and imperiled existing local integration, including 
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various examples of forced encampment of refugees living 
independently in villages or towns.80
The second question is whether local integration has had 
a good record in protecting refugees—i.e., whether inte-
grated refugees enjoy more rights and freedoms than refu-
gees in other situations. Compared with long-term camp 
sequestration, the anti-warehousing advocates have convin-
cingly argued that local integration is generally preferable in 
terms of basic rights such as the right to free movement, the 
right to work and self-sufficiency, and the right to associa-
tion.81 Others have argued that integration is also preferable 
to nominally self-sufficient settlements which nonetheless 
constrain free movement.82 Still others note that health 
and socio-economic indicators for self-settled refugees are 
generally better than for those in camps.83 Even where the 
economic conditions are more difficult for refugees out-
side camps, many choose to stay outside the camps because 
the freedom to determine their own lives is deemed more 
important than easy access to some services.84
We are left with the third, essentially normative, question 
concerning the relationship between local integration and 
refugee protection: what about those refugees who do not 
have the resources to negotiate for successful integration and 
what about situations where the local actors offer no space for 
refugees to negotiate or indeed attack them? What happens/
would happen to refugees in such situations in the absence of 
an international or national refugee protection intervention 
such as a camp? What about those subgroups considered the 
most vulnerable, and with the least independent resources 
for negotiation, such as unaccompanied children, women 
with small children, or refugees who are ill or disabled? 
What about Goma or Kosovo or Darfur, or any other large-
scale (and high-profile) mass refugee exodus, especially 
where there is ongoing and widespread violence in the areas 
to which people are displaced?
There are undoubtedly contexts in which particular refu-
gees do not and cannot survive without external assistance 
and without the kind of protection provided by a spatially 
separate and securitized camp. However, the existence of 
such particular needs and contexts does not invalidate the 
point of needing to empirically study and understand local 
integration where and when it happens. Furthermore, on 
the normative question of which type of protection (local 
integration or camp) is on average or aggregate better for 
particularly vulnerable refugees in contexts of ongoing vio-
lence or very large-scale movement, this may be impossible 
and indeed dangerous to answer, given the context-specific 
nature of refugee needs, desires, and options.
If we do attempt a review of the available evidence com-
paring the record of camps versus local integration in these 
extreme contexts, we have little clear evidence, as noted 
above, whether encampment interventions have a positive 
or negative effect in balance on refugee welfare, including 
for particular subgroups of refugees. It is even more diffi-
cult to make counterfactual suppositions; i.e., what would 
it have been like if there were no camps. In order to make 
a counterfactual argument, we would have to take away 
not only the economy of the camps (for the international 
organizations and host states involved), but also the polit-
ical option of camps which host states, host communities, 
and some refugee groups can now use to fall back on inter-
national actors. We would also have to imagine away the 
insidious discursive construction of helpless, dependent and 
burdensome refugees which comes with camps and which 
affects even those refugees who are currently not in camps.
We can look at cases where large-scale refugee move-
ments have been absorbed by hosts without the need for 
camps. Guinea is, to a large extent, such a host country, as 
were Malawi, Tanzania, and also many European countries 
after the Second World War. We can also look at cases where 
refugees, including supposedly vulnerable subgroups, have 
chosen to remain outside available camps and brave the fight 
for survival on their own, or at least without handouts based 
on “refugee rights.” Here we do have evidence that seems 
to show that self-settled refugees suffer less hardship than 
camp-based ones, or are willing to suffer greater economic 
hardship for the added freedoms of self-settlement. We 
should also be doing more comparative work with historical 
migrations, to see how refugees survived, or not, before the 
invention of an international system of refugee rights.
Conclusion
To pre-empt a range of criticisms which a focus on refu-
gee agency and the social and political “normality” of the 
 integration process may potentially and to some extent legit-
imately provoke, let me outline four dangers of this approach. 
First, it may seem to underplay the structural constraints 
which refugees face, most significantly the role of the state 
in deciding on who has rights within its borders. Second, 
it may seem to gloss over the hardship that many refugees 
certainly experience. Third, it could be misunderstood as a 
fatalistic perspective, which holds that if integration happens 
“naturally” it is inevitable, and if it does not happen “natur-
ally” there is nothing which concerned institutions can do 
about it, even if vulnerable people are suffering. Finally, it 
may seem to underestimate the power and importance of the 
legal framework as a potentially progressive and protective 
or constraining and discriminatory force. It is certainly not 
my intention to suggest these things.
In relation to the first two points, I am simply arguing 
that we need to look at both structural constraints and 
hardship situationally in each case of local integration (or 
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where local integration is not happening), and how refugees 
empirically react to and manage them. In looking at how 
refugees negotiate protection, rights, and access to resour-
ces, we should not overlook informal non-state actors (such 
as community leaders, individual local residents, etc.) and 
their roles in protecting and enabling access to rights and 
the management of hardship in the local context. There is 
no suggestion that constraints and hardships do not exist 
where local integration takes place, or that they are a priori 
any greater or lesser than in encampment contexts.
In relation to the following two points—fatalism and 
law—we should be aware that both the dominant power 
structures and the laws which form the basis of the ideal 
refugee protection framework which is often held up as a 
model are, in fact, quite recent inventions, that they are 
not universally experienced, and that they have changed 
significantly in the past fifty, twenty and even five years. 
They will change again. Therefore, in understanding what 
actually happens on the ground, we should not start from 
a prescriptive idea of what should be, how states should act, 
and how the law should function, but rather start from a 
descriptive analysis of how states and communities act and 
how the law functions.
Finally, any comparison of local integration and encamp-
ment as ways of living needs to be clear on what benchmark 
is being applied. The “enjoyment of rights” by refugees is 
often touted as a measure, assessed through welfare indica-
tors such as access to food, health, education, employment, 
etc. But this may be missing much of the point of how refu-
gees experience local integration. The freedom to act polit-
ically and strategically, i.e., the “freedom to pursue normal 
lives,”85 may be the more important criterion from their 
perspective. The defining characteristic of encampment is 
the constraint of this freedom.
Hovil expresses the significance of freedom well in her 
study of Sudanese refugees in Moyo District, Uganda:
The most striking contrast between those refugees living in settle-
ments and those who are self-settled is not the difference in rela-
tive standards of living, but the response they have to their pre-
dicament. The feeling of powerlessness pervading the interviews 
with settlement refugees stands in direct contrast to those who 
had opted out of the refugee assistance structures and were tak-
ing responsibility for their lives. There is obviously a danger of 
over-romanticising the lives of self-settled refugees. By no means 
are their circumstances easy—not least of all because they are 
not recognized by the refugee assistance structures in operation. 
However, the fact remains that their ability to move freely has a 
positive impact on their lives, allowing them to utilize fully the 
resources around them and make choices based on where they 
exist.86
The actual physical constraint of the camp is matched by 
a much more subtle constraint, which I am arguing against. 
This is the assumption that it is up to “us,” as professionals 
and institutions mandated with refugee protection, to “give” 
refugees freedom to negotiate access to their own rights. 
Justice Albie Sachs, in the introduction to Verdirame and 
Harrell-Bond’s new book, shows how deeply this perception 
sits when he says: “there is a need for giving refugees a far 
more active role in deciding on their future.”87
I have made an argument primarily about how we think 
about refugee responses and responses to refugees, not 
about what specific policy should be followed in response to 
displacement or to facilitate integration. Anti-warehousing 
advocacy campaigners are doing valuable work presenting 
arguments for a change in policy around encampment, 
within the context of the institutional arrangements (and 
the concomitant interests) that we have today. This debate 
against camps is appropriately based on a combination of 
arguments about human rights (contributing to showing 
up the hypocrisy and double standards of an aid system 
supposedly based on this concept), basic welfare, and cost-
benefit analysis, thereby showing that camps do not provide 
a good service to refugees and only an illusory and mor-
ally indefensible service to states and international agencies. 
This campaign is a step in the right direction.
When the follow-on policy question arises, “Well, if not 
camps, what else shall we do with them then?” one can make 
many arguments about human rights, basic welfare, and 
cost-benefit analysis in favour of local integration, and can 
define government and international aid interventions which 
are likely to facilitate or constrain it. These are mainly to do 
with documentation, access to labour markets, and access to/ 
investment in basic services for all residents of a particular 
area, as has already been well-argued in documents such as 
the UNHCR Standing Committee’s “Framework for Durable 
Solutions for Refugees and Persons of Concern,”88 and vari-
ous academic papers.89 It is definitely desirable to raise the 
profile of local integration with refugee rights and advocacy 
organizations who are arguing within the current, dominant 
“durable solutions” paradigm.
But I am also suggesting that academics must take the 
additional step of looking beyond the current institutional 
arrangements and their demands for particular policy justi-
fications.90 Empirical research which does not start from an 
explicit policy perspective is not merely a luxury. Bakewell 
has argued that “research which is designed without regard 
to policy relevance may offer a more powerful critique and 
ironically help to bring about more profound changes than 
many studies that focus on policy issues from the outset.”91 
This is partly because institutions, especially ones special-
ized in crisis management, tend to have short historical 
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memories and therefore tend to assume that things are as 
they are because they cannot be otherwise (or at least that 
only minor policy tweaks here or there are possible).92 
More importantly, by circling around a policy objective, the 
expert refugee industry is largely talking to itself and tell-
ing itself what it should do rather than considering all the 
actors and options available in real life. This is not in itself 
wrong, as institutions should be taking responsibility for 
monitoring their own interventions and holding themselves 
accountable as much as possible.
However, the problem remains that policy talk is inevit-
ably and by definition skewed toward a consideration of 
existing institutional responses and logics. It is a simple fact 
that the majority of people we may call refugees does not 
actually experience the institutional interventions and logics 
as institutions assume they do. A significant proportion of 
refugees is not in camps and has never been “captured” in 
statistics or target-group specifications. For them, creatively 
negotiating power relations with local power holders is not 
a policy option; it is simply what they do. Even of those who 
are “captured” in the system, only a minority internalize it 
to the extent that they conform to the models institutions 
provide—either in camps or during repatriation drives or in 
local communities. By taking these models as the exclusive 
(explicit or implicit) benchmarks for refugee actions, we, as 
academics, run the risk of “warehousing” refugees not only 
with barbed wire and tents but also with words.
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This paper argues that analyses of refugee integration processes need to be ‘brought 
back into history’ by comparing recent cases with refugee flows before the introduction 
of the current regime of international refugee protection conventions and institutions. 
The integration strategies pursued by two waves of Mozambican forced migrants (from 
the 1830s-90s, and in the 1980s) in a rapidly changing South Africa are explored. 
Tracing how different waves of forced migrants have integrated shows that the bases 
for negotiating integration change radically depending on shifting local power 
structures, including tribal leaders, colonial government, missionaries, Bantustans, 
traditional community leadership, democratic local and national government, and 
refugee rights NGOs. The strategies employed by refugees and hosts at different points 
in time should therefore not be thought of as a policy or intervention derived mainly 
from international law, but rather as local politics. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Since the field’s inception in the 1980s, authors have lamented the ahistorical nature of 
much of the refugee studies literature (Malkki, 1997, Harrell-Bond, 1986). This paper 
argues the importance of bringing the analysis of refugee integration processes ‘back 
into history’ (Malkki, 1997, Gemie et al., 2009) by comparing recent cases of refugee 
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integration with refugee flows which occurred before the introduction of the current 
regime of international refugee protection conventions and institutions. I explore the 
integration strategies pursued by two ‘waves’ of Mozambican forced migrants (from 
the 1830s-90s, and in the 1980s) in a rapidly changing South Africa. A historical 
comparison shows that theoretical frameworks for analysing integration processes 
cannot take the legal, institutional and normative assumptions of one specific period 
for granted, but must be capable of capturing and reflecting different forms of and 
motivations for integration across epochs. To this end, the paper analyses refugee 
integration as ‘local politics’ (Polzer, 2009) rather than as a specialised form of 
apolitical and ahistorical policy intervention (Malkki, 1997).  
 
Even though an early journal special edition on refugees called for a ‘comprehensive, 
historical, interdisciplinary and comparative perspective which focuses on the 
consistencies and patterns in the refugee experience’ (Stein and Tomasi 1981:6, 
quoted in Black, 2001:59), the lack of historical analysis in refugee studies has been a 
common critique for several decades. Mainstream publishing and conferences in the 
field continue to reflect a focus on the period since the establishment of the current 
international refugee protection regime in 1951. As illustration, only 9 out of 80 full 
articles in the 2009, 2010 and 2011 editions of the Journal of Refugee Studies include 
any references to refugee movements, or indeed events, before the 1950s, and only 
two are substantively about pre-1950s events. Even the conference on ‘Writing 
Refugees into History’, summarised in the Journal, while usefully bringing a historical 
disciplinary focus to the field, only included case studies from the twentieth century 
(Gemie et al., 2009). Recent reviews of literature on refugee (and immigrant) 
integration follow the same trend (Smyth et al., 2010, Strang and Ager, 2010, Ager and 
Strang, 2008, Jacobsen, 2001, Castles et al., 2001, DeWind and Kasinitz, 1997). There is 
literature which deals with histories of displacement and integration from various 
disciplines, such as the authors I use for my historical analysis here (Ritchken, 1995, 
Niehaus, 2002, Harries, 1989) and others (Vigne, 1994, Kaprielian-Churchill, 1993, Lust-
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Okar, 1996), but such authors often do not see themselves as part of refugee studies, 
and they are generally not quoted in mainstream ‘refugee studies’ forums. 
 
The current international system of refugee rights, supported by international law and 
refugee protection institutions, is a recent invention (Black, 2001), still does not reach 
many refugees today (Bakewell, 2001), and does not protect many of the refugees it 
does affect in the way it was intended (Smith, 2004, Harrell-Bond and Verdirame, 2004, 
Polzer, 2008, Polzer and Hammond, 2008). Refugee rights, just like human rights, while 
a useful benchmark for judging our progress as a community of peoples and of states, 
is not a good starting point for understanding how and on what basis refugees 
integrate in practice (Polzer, 2008). In cases where institutions who subscribe to the 
international refugee rights Conventions (including state and non-state actors) play a 
significant role in refugee lives they are always only some actors among many others 
(Bakewell, 2008). They therefore need to be understood within this wider local context 
to judge their impact on how refugees live and on the choices they (are able to) make. 
 
The lack of historical reflection highlights two related characteristics of refugee studies 
as a field. The first is the overall policy focus (Black, 2001) and policy category 
dependence (Bakewell, 2008, Malkki, 1992, Malkki, 1995bb) of the field (2009, see also 
Polzer, 2008), so that time periods in which different policies and categories apply 
become incomprehensible. Second, and more specifically, there is often a focus on the 
perspective of international organisations, the ‘administrator gaze’ (Malkki, 
1995bb:505), rather than on the actions and perspectives of local actors. International 
organisations often constitute refugees as a depoliticised ‘ahistorical, universal 
humanitarian subject’ by ‘[leaching] out the histories and politics of specific refugees’ 
circumstances’ (Malkki, 1995aa:224). The aim of this paper is to focus on specific 
histories and politics and document the ways in which refugees (and indeed hosts) are 
indeed ‘historical actors rather than simply… mute victims’ (ibid). This is not an 
ideological enterprise, but something which is quite simply there in the historical 
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record, and it becomes easier to see if one looks at periods of time and places where 
there were no international organisations and therefore less rhetoric about ‘refugee 
protection.’ 
 
Elsewhere, I have discussed the implications of looking at the process of refugee 
integration as a political negotiation (Polzer, 2009). I follow three guiding questions to 
present a political analysis of refugee integration processes in different time periods:   
1. Who are the actors who control access to local power and resources and what 
are their interests?  
2. What is the relationship of (different categories of) refugees to those actors – 
what resources do refugees have which these actors can use, or which threats 
do they (are they perceived to) present? 
3. What strategies do refugees use within the framework of these relationships to 
negotiate access to power and resources? 
 
Re-historicising refugee studies and using such a political analysis has several effects. It 
de-naturalises the policy and institutional regimes of any particular time period, 
showing not only how institutions and their policies change but also how they may be 
of very limited relevance to the actual integration processes of particular times and 
places. Second, it broadens our consideration of relevant actors and institution based 
on who actually makes and influences decisions regarding the local integration of 
displaced persons. Third, it dissolves categorical distinctions (based on legal 
categorisations rather than empirical differences) between ‘refugees’ and ‘hosts’ and 
between different ‘kinds’ of people who move. It therefore allows the recognition of 
continuities and linkages, both between groups at one point in time and within groups 
over time (e.g. refugees becoming hosts or labour migrants becoming refugees). 
Similarly, the focus on negotiating for resources and power in different ways over time 
allows us to see refugees, other migrants, and indeed locals, as acting in the same 
social and political spaces with the same political tools, without the assumption that 
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forced displacement, or even voluntary movement, makes a person somehow 
categorically different and necessarily more vulnerable or agency-less than others 
(Malkki 1995a, 1997). 
 
A historical and political analysis also allows for the use of case studies of refugee 
movements to directly engage with debates in the social sciences which are not related 
to narrowly defined refugees or refugee policy. One such debate is the extent to which 
the late 19th and early 20th century link between the European history of nation-
building and the construction of a ‘refugee problem’ (White 2002:74) is mirrored in 
other regions of the world, or whether there are alternative interactions between a 
developing national consciousness and the treatment of displaced people. A second 
important debate is the nature of ethnic group identity construction. The research on 
which I draw for much of the historical evidence in this paper is framed largely in terms 
of anthropological debates on ethnicity (Harries, 1989, 1994, 1988, Niehaus, 2002, 
Ritchken, 1995). My discussion of how different waves of Mozambican refugees have 
negotiated becoming South African ‘Shangaans’ can also be read as a contribution to 
‘theories of complexity’ which go beyond ethnic identity construction as ‘manipulation 
from above’ (Niehaus, 2002: 559, referring to an approach by Vail 1989) to a more 
multidimensional perspective, recognising ‘the diverse processes of ethnicization, and 
[celebrating] the capacity of ordinary people to adopt terms of their own definition as 
the basis for collective assertion.’ (Niehaus, 2002: 558). 
 
Before continuing with the case study, let me clarify how and why I am using the term 
‘refugee’ in this context. Both ‘waves’ of Mozambican arrivals in South Africa crossed 
an international border to escape the chaos and violence of war. In this they fulfil the 
legal definition of a refugee, based on the 1969 OAU Convention. My concern is not to 
try to apply legal categories retrospectively, which would be anachronistic. Indeed my 
argument about the nature of local integration is that international legal categories 
often have very little influence even when they are in force. I am rather using the term 
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to point out a comparison and continuity over time. The Mozambicans who came to 
South Africa in the 1980s were (eventually) granted refugee status on the basis of the 
OAU Convention. Even though it was 100 years before the international Conventions 
on refugee rights came into force, the Mozambicans who entered the Transvaal in the 
1830s-1890s were also fleeing general insecurity caused by civil war and colonial 
occupation, and they moved along almost exactly the same path as their later 
compatriots. It is therefore useful to compare their experience with the experience of 
the more recent Mozambican arrivals in South Africa. As a means of engaging the field 
of ‘refugee studies’ on the value of studying such continuities, I apply the same 
terminology across epochs, without thereby implying any actual legal status. Some of 
the literature I draw on for this article uses ‘refugee’ in a similar fashion (Niehaus, 
2002).  
 
Finally, a brief note on methods. My analysis of Mozambican integration in the 1800s 
and early 1900s is based on evidence presented in secondary sources. The discussion 
of integration from the 1980s-2006 is based on a combination of archival research 
about responses to the refugees’ arrival in the 1980s, data collected by colleagues in 
the Bushbuckridge-based Refugee Research Project of the University of the 
Witwatersrand between 1993 and 2002 and my own extensive primary research with 
the Wits RRP from 2002 – 2006.  
 
Mozambican refugees in South Africa 
 
I will look at how two ‘waves’ of Mozambican refugees in South Africa have integrated 
in order to show how refugees respond to different constellations of actors and 
interests to claim political space for themselves. Each wave acts as a separate case 
study, although they also show how migration, integrating, and being ‘local’ are 
continuous processes.  
 
93
First I will outline the process through which the first Shangaan-speakers,1 who came 
to the South African lowveld in the 1830s-1890s fleeing colonial and chiefly succession 
wars, established themselves to the point of claiming a separate ethnic ‘homeland’ on 
the basis of ethnic autochthony in South Africa from the 1930s to the 1970s. Then I will 
describe a more recent flow of refugees from the 1975-1992 Mozambican civil war to 
the Bushbuckridge district in the lowveld. Here, I will look at two periods of time: 1985-
93 when the civil war refugees first arrived in the Bushbuckridge area and settled 
under the ‘homeland’ system of the apartheid regime; and 1993-2006, in the context 
of the newly democratic South Africa, in which time 80% of the Mozambicans decided 
not to repatriate and 80% of those who remained received permanent resident or 
citizenship status from the South African government.   
 
 
1830s – 1970s 
 
In the mid-1800s, the societies of the Southern African lowveld, what is now the border 
area of South Africa and Mozambique, were characterised by conflict and migration. 
Indigenous nations were warring on both sides of the border, and contested chiefly 
successions coincided with accelerating colonial encroachment from both east 
(Portuguese) and west (British and Boer). From the 1830s-1890s several groups of 
people, speaking various related languages (later to be standardised into 
Tsonga/Shangaan, as discussed below) moved west from Portuguese East Africa (now 
Mozambique) into the South African lowveld to escape the political turmoil (Niehaus, 
2002, Hartman, 1978). They found an ethnically mixed population, sparsely settled 
(Niehaus, 2002:559). There was no single dominant ethnic group or leader and 
‘anarchic’ local power structures were wracked by conflict (Ritchken, 1995:38ff). The 
1 There is some debate over the proper terminology for referring to the ‘ethnic group’ and language in 
question. As one of South Africa’s eleven official languages it is called XiTsonga, but for simplicity and 
following local colloquial usage in Bushbuckridge (when speaking English), I will refer to the people as 
well as the language as ‘Shangaan.’ This also follows Niehaus’ usage in NIEHAUS, I. 2002. Ethnicity and 
the Boundaries of Belonging: Reconfiguring Shangaan Identity in the South African Lowveld. African 
Affairs, 101, 557-583..
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refugees scattered and settled under different chiefs in the region. ‘They were 
attached to homesteads as individuals, or, as small groups under their own headman, 
were scattered throughout the veld, colonising those areas where human and animal 
diseases, poor soil or lack of water had previously restricted settlement.’ (Harries, 
1989:84)  
 
In this fragmented political context (Ritchken, 1995:38ff), the most important local 
actors, with control over resources and power, were the chiefs. The chiefs determined 
access to land for subsistence agriculture, access to the law of the court in the case of 
disputes, and spiritual protection. The followers of chiefs were ethnically mixed, since 
‘the ability to provide protection, rather than ethnic affiliation, determined residents’ 
loyalty to a chief.’ (Ritchken, 1995:53) The refugees, in spite of differing culture and 
language, were able to offer the resource of political clientage and receive protection 
in return, albeit as political dependents rather than as independent settlers or 
conquerors. In this political context, the integration strategy of patronage depended on 
not emphasising a distinct political group identity, but rather in assimilating as 
individuals and families. Intermarriage was common, and many refugees adopted the 
languages and practices of other groups, including the Pulana (a Sotho sub-group) 
practice of male circumcision and initiation, as well as attending Pulana courts as 
councillors (ibid:179, Niehaus, 2002). 
 
In the first decades of the twentieth century, a new powerful actor with different 
interests gained increasing importance in the lowveld: the South African colonial state. 
This offered the refugees, as well as other residents of the lowveld, access to different 
kinds of power and resources and demanded that they use different strategies of self-
presentation. The state, represented mainly by Native Commissioners and the Native 
Affairs Department, intervened in the fluid and heterogeneous political system of 
multi-ethnic chiefdoms to create an increasingly rigid structure of state-recognised 
chiefly authority based on ‘tribal’ affiliation. Not least, the influential Ramsey report of 
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1940 recommended to the Native Affairs Department of the central government that 
the ‘district should be divided into Shangaan and Basotho spheres of 
influence.’(Niehaus, 2002:564) But beyond this ‘manipulation from above’ Ritchken 
recounts a case which shows how ordinary people, in this case the relatively recent 
arrivals from Mozambique, used the new power broker, and the state’s ideology of 
‘tribes’, to advance their interests in relation to local native leadership. In order to 
move from dependent patronage to recognised self-rule under the new set of power 
relations, the new strategy of ethnic group identification became useful.2 The case also 
illustrates how renewed migration, i.e. ‘exit’ (Hirschman, 1970), was still an important 
tool to express the search for rights and representation.  
 
After the Boer war a “petty Shangaan chief” named Masipali arrived in the 
district with a “handful” of followers from Mozambique. They were settled 
under an Mbayi chief, Mangulube. On the death of Masipali, his family sent 
a delegation to the Sub Native Commissioner (SNC) at Graskop requesting 
recognition for Shugela Ndlovu, Masipali’s son. The basis for the request 
was that they had “nothing in common with the Mbayi people” whose 
customs were “totally different” from theirs… After the Commissioner 
checked that Shugela did have majority support from the refugees, Shugela 
was recognised for administrative purposes. A small section of 11 families, 
involved in a succession dispute with the recently recognised chief, 
requested and were given permission to leave the district for Mozambique 
following the appointment of Shugela. (Ritchken, 1995:62) 
 
From 1913, Shangaan chiefs were able to consolidate their independent political 
position by entering into allegiance with another new powerful actor, the Swiss 
Mission Church. The Swiss Mission was looking for converts, and for their own ‘tribe’ to 
modernise beyond the people ‘belonging’ to other missionary churches (Ritchken 
2 This is not to suggest that previously there was no self-identification as ‘Shangaan’ among refugee 
groups in the lowveld, but that now it became a means of accessing independent political power. 
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1995). Harries documents how this process included the ‘invention’ of a common 
Shangaan culture in the diaspora (Anderson, 1991), based on a language documented 
and standardised by the Swiss Mission, out of previously disparate groups from 
different areas of Mozambique (Harries, 1989:106). Even though ‘one should not over-
state the agency of a few European missionaries in the making of local African 
identities’ (Niehaus, 2002:562), by making external judgements on the legitimacy of 
essentialised ‘tribes’ and by constructing concrete indicators of ‘tribes’ such as 
language and political affiliation, the church, along with the state, provided Shangaan 
leaders with opportunities to actively consolidate their constituencies in the new 
territory and with ammunition to claim indigenous political status for that 
constituency. The changing opportunity structure enabled a shift from political 
assimilation (integrating with the locals) to political autochthony (being the locals). 
 
In the 1950s and 60s, when the South African state was apportioning ‘independent 
homelands’ to South Africa’s ‘native tribes’, the Shangaan claim of autochthonous 
status in the lowveld led to a direct conflict with Sotho-speaking groups. ‘[M]embers of 
the ‘Sotho’ group attempted to equate being ‘Shangaan’ to being a refugee, and on the 
basis of this definition, demand a ‘Sotho’ monopoly of political power.’ (Ritchken, 
1995:168) For the Pulana, their autochthony arose from having conquered the land, in 
contrast to the ‘refugees’ who had settled through political allegiances (Niehaus, 
2002:560). Through superior education (from the Swiss Mission) in how to conform 
with government expectations of a subservient native ‘tribe’, Shangaan Chiefs 
countered the ‘Sotho’ accusation by claiming to be first settlers on land owned by the 
(white) SA state (Ritchken, 1995:168). They succeeded in overriding Sotho claims to the 
extent of being granted an ‘independent homeland’ in the lowveld in 1973 (Ritchken, 
1995:189), next to the ‘homeland’ for Sotho-speakers. This ‘homeland’ was named 
Gazankulu, the great Gaza, in direct reference to the Gaza region of Mozambique.  
 
97
The early 20th century Mozambican refugee strategy was therefore alliance with the 
state for political autonomy on the basis of ‘tribal’ identity and culture, instead of 
assimilation with ‘local’ groups. This led to complete formal integration and rights in 
South Africa, in the sense of being granted full legal status by the state (as far as 
possible for any Africans under a draconian and racist colonial and later apartheid 
system). Significantly, as the naming of the ‘homeland’ illustrates, this achievement of 
political and legal integration in South Africa on the basis of tribal autochthony did not 
preclude a continued acknowledgement of Mozambican roots. This would be 
important later, when the second wave of Mozambicans arrived in the lowveld.  
 
This case illustrates the length of time which may be required for such an integration 
process: over 100 years from arrival. It also shows that integration is not necessarily 
linear. The resurgence of ‘Sotho’ rhetoric about ‘Shangaan refugees,’ after peacefully 
co-existing and intermarrying with them for 100 years, demonstrates the long-term 
danger of claiming rights only from one actor, like the state, when other local groups 
do not accept claims to those rights or do not accept the basis on which those claims 
are made. Finally, the disagreement between the colonial state and Sotho groups 
about legitimate bases for claiming autochthonous status exemplifies how powerful 
actors can create competing opportunity structures for refugees, which then have to 
be negotiated and which can lead to conflict. 
 
 
1985-2006 
 
From the early 1900s to the 1970s, Mozambicans continued to move into South Africa, 
including into the lowveld, but in smaller numbers and mainly as labour migrants to the 
growing mines and commercial farms. In 1985, the civil war, which had been raging in 
independent Mozambique since 1975, escalated in the south of the country, driving c. 
320,000 Mozambican refugees into South Africa over the next five years (Dolan, 1997). 
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They were mostly Shangaan- and Ronga-speaking (which is related to Shangaan) 
peasants.  
 
The white minority-ruled Republic of South Africa did not recognise refugees. It had 
not signed any of the international Conventions on refugee rights and had no domestic 
law distinguishing between refugees and other migrants. It had accepted white settlers 
fleeing independence in Mozambique (1975) and Zimbabwe (1980) as immigrants, not 
refugees, and quickly offered them citizenship. In contrast, all black Mozambicans were 
treated as illegal aliens, including an active deportation programme back to 
Mozambique.  
 
However, the national government informally allowed the ‘independent homelands’ to 
accept the refugees if they chose to (Polzer 2007). The government of Gazankulu 
explicitly welcomed the refugees as Shangaan brothers, and the majority settled 
there.3 The neighbouring ‘homeland’ Lebowa, which had been set up for Sotho-
speakers, refused the refugees protection, although they were accepted by the Swazi 
‘homeland’ KaNgwane further south.4 
 
The relevant power holders at this time were the central apartheid state, the 
Gazankulu political leadership, traditional village headmen who controlled land 
allocation, and the general population of Gazankulu. The lack of recognition by the 
central state was highly significant in constraining the ability of most refugees to 
achieve secure livelihoods. The South African state was extremely controlling of 
everyday life. The ‘homelands,’ as densely populated ‘labour reserves’ for the minority-
ruled economy, offered few employment opportunities and virtually no option of 
subsistence agriculture. In contrast to Angolan refugees in rural Zambia, for example 
3 Significant numbers of Mozambican refugees settled in other areas of South Africa among local 
populations of different language groups, including in the main urban areas. The context in which they 
had to negotiate access to rights was very different from Gazankulu, but will not be described here.
4 The long-term migration history of some Shangaan-speaking groups also includes periods in Swaziland 
and Swazi-speaking areas.
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(Bakewell, 1999), who could live off agriculture on land allotted by local authorities 
without much constraint by the state, Mozambican refugees had little option but to 
engage with the state by sending men to the cities to work along with their citizen 
neighbours. This exposed the men (and by extension the families dependent on their 
incomes) to the dangers of deportation, since they had no documentation, and 
severely limited the economic options of those who did not take the risk. The lack of 
documentation also precluded access to government welfare like old age pensions. 
This legal constraint on access to the major livelihood options in the ‘homelands’ 
limited the ability of many refugees to improve their socio-economic status and made 
them exploitable by Shangaan ‘locals’ and commercial farmers in the area. A further 
effect of the lack of refugee recognition by the state was that there was no significant 
international aid, no UNHCR presence, and only limited domestic aid, mainly from the 
local homeland government and churches.  
 
The refugees had no means of negotiating with the central state for better conditions 
as they had no political purchase on the apartheid regime. Already an international 
pariah, it was unimpressed by international legal norms. The (very few) pro-refugee 
academics writing at the time were reduced to arguing at the most basic level that 
Mozambicans were indeed refugees (and not illegal immigrants or terrorists) and that 
deporting them amounted to refoulement (Murray, 1986). The strategy which some 
refugees therefore tried to follow, if they had the necessary resources, was to evade 
and subvert state categories by acquiring South African documentation and ‘passing’ as 
South African (Niehaus, 2002:574).5 The host population in Gazankulu was crucial in 
this endeavour, as described below. The lack of legal recognition as refugees and the 
lack of refugee-specific aid or camps, therefore, to some extent facilitated local 
integration in that it forced refugees to engage fully with local actors in Gazankulu. 
 
5 See also GOFFMAN, E. 1979. Stigma, Harmondsworth, Penguin. on the concept of ‘passing’.
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The Gazankulu government, the second main local actor, welcomed the refugees 
specifically because the white government rejected them and because of the apartheid 
government’s involvement in the Mozambican civil war. It welcomed them as ethnic 
brothers in explicit parallel to the white government’s acceptance of white 
Mozambicans ten years previously (Dolan, 1997:footnote 120). This was by no means 
inevitable. Only a few months before the mass influx of new refugees in 1985, the 
Gazankulu government had dealt with an outbreak of violence over the ‘border’ with 
Lebowa (Niehaus, 2002:567), in which Sotho political organisations had called for all 
Shangaans to ‘go to Mozambique because there is no place for them here.’(Ritchken, 
1995:230) This recent challenge to Gazankulu’s political legitimacy could have led to a 
rejection of the new refugees (since solidarity with them could be seen to support the 
claim of Shangaan foreignness), but instead the Gazankulu government chose to 
welcome them as an explicit challenge to the apartheid government’s policy of ethnic 
segregation and racist exclusion (Rodgers, 2002:15). This can be seen as a parallel to 
Western Europe’s acceptance of refugees from the communist Block during the Cold 
War, i.e. a political statement which went beyond the specific identities of the refugees 
themselves. The colonial government, which had provided the descendants of 
Shangaan refugees with the basis for claiming autochthony twenty years earlier, now 
became the opposition against which cross-border brotherhood and ancestry were 
invoked.  
 
The refugees were welcomed by village headmen, the third important group of local 
actors, and allocated communal land on the outskirts of established villages on which 
to settle and grow crops. This was in spite of the fact that Gazankulu was already very 
densely populated due to forty years of forcible resettlement of black residents within 
South Africa. Individual headmen’s and chiefs’ influence and incomes increased with 
the additional subjects and tribal authority taxes levied from the refugees (Harries, 
1989, Dolan, 1997, Rodgers, 2002:15, De Jongh, 1994). As in the 1800s, the refugees’ 
strategy toward the chiefs was clientage. Villages with large refugee populations were 
101
also able to claim more services, such as new schools and additional teachers, from the 
state – many teachers today still acknowledge that they owe their jobs to the presence 
of the refugees.6  
 
In relation to the general population, finally, refugees developed a complex and 
ambivalent relationship based on a combination of vulnerability and strength. Similar 
ambivalence is reported in many other host-refugee interactions (and Hovil, 2002 on 
Sudanese in Uganda, see Van Damme, 1999 and Andrews 2003 on Liberians in Guinea). 
Because of their vulnerability in relation to the state, many refugees accepted a 
‘second class’ status of dependence and provided more established Shangaans (as well 
as commercial farmers in the area) with cheap agricultural and domestic labour in 
return for a meagre income or food and shelter. This directly benefited the ‘locals’ and 
gave them an interest in assisting and accepting the refugees. Assistance was also 
offered in the belief that the refugees would not stay for long but would return to 
Mozambique with the end of the war. Apart from cheap labour power, the refugees 
had a strong negotiating position due to the long history of migration in the area. It has 
been pointed out that it is not the fact of common ancestry, but rather the recognition 
and validation of it which is relevant in political terms (Barth, 2000, Anderson, 1991), 
and in Gazankulu of the 1980s the ancestral origin of all Shangaans in Mozambique (i.e. 
from the first wave of refugees described above) was explicitly acknowledged. Rodgers 
expresses it well:  
 
In terms of local historical understanding of the [border] landscape, it was 
not only the recent refugees who appeared out of place, but all Tsonga 
[Shangaan]-speaking people in the Bushbuckridge area (part of Gazankulu). 
In fact, because the refugees were the more recent arrivals in South Africa, 
they appeared historically as less displaced in South Africa than their South 
African kin, who were the descendants of migrants and refugees who 
6 Interview with teachers in Clare Village, 13 May 2004.
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arrived from Mozambique during the nineteenth century… Ironically, by 
emphasising the  “Machangana people” as belonging in Mozambique 
through everyday practices, history “worked” for Mozambicans by 
destabilising the host communities’ sense of belonging in South 
Africa.”(ibid:104) 
 
The grandparents of many South African Shangaans had come from Mozambique in 
the late nineteenth century, in living memory. Furthermore, labour migration from 
Mozambique to the lowveld had continued throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries and many refugees had family members who had been to South Africa or had 
settled there. Therefore some refugees could mobilise the resource of kinship or 
friendship from previous labour migration to evade dependence, second class status 
and the state imposed stigma of ‘alien.’ They almost immediately assumed a ‘South 
African’ identity, including identity documents, and settling in established villages, 
away from easily identifiable ‘refugee settlements.’ Intermarriage was common and 
generally accepted. This strategy of assimilation was accepted and facilitated by the 
‘locals.’ The strategy of evading the state was therefore only possible because of the 
simultaneous strategy of assimilation with the local population. This combined strategy 
was only available to some individuals and families, however.  
 
Ethnic and ancestral affiliation did not lead to complete goodwill from ‘locals.’ There 
were wide-spread perceptions among ‘locals’ that the refugees were thieves and 
witches, leading to (and expressing) social discrimination and segregation. While this 
clearly resulted to hardship for many people, it should not be seen as a purely 
disempowering relationship. In the context of legal insecurity and exploitability, the 
resource of (perceived) strong spiritual power, including the ability to magically punish 
anyone who harmed a Mozambican, provided a measure of protection from physical 
violence and trickery. Spiritual healing power, especially as practiced by Shangaan 
women healers who channelled spirits from different ethnic backgrounds (including 
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Sotho ancestors), was also a form of ‘ethnic assimilation’ (Niehaus, 2002:572). Among 
Shangaans today, witchcraft is associated with xintu (tradition), in contrast to the 
modernising influences of xilungu (the ways of the whites) (Rodgers, 2002). It can 
therefore be understood as part of the larger tactic to claim political space and 
legitimacy by emphasising the common ‘traditional’ ancestry of all Shangaans in 
Mozambique. As Rodgers puts it:  
 
Unlike in other refugee situations, Mozambicans in South Africa never 
experienced much pressure to prove the “well founded-ness” of the fear 
that drove them into exile, in any international legal sense. The ad-hoc 
nature of aid also meant that they did not need to perform their suffering, 
to appeal to an international humanitarian discourse. However, through 
being incorporated into a “traditional” local authority structure, 
Mozambican refugees found themselves in a situation where the 
demonstration of their traditional purity and cultural authenticity was 
important to advance their settlement interests in South Africa. (Rodgers, 
2002:16) 
 
In summary, Mozambican refugees in the 1980s were able to establish a moral right to 
be in Gazankulu through ethnic and ancestral linkages to a particular segment of the 
South African population, even as, and indeed because, the state denied them the 
moral right to access the rest of the national territory as refugees. They were able to 
use this sub-national moral capital to mitigate the hardship resulting from a lack of 
legal protection, some more successfully than others. 
 
From 1993, the political context and constellation of actors with which the refugees 
were engaged changed dramatically, leading to a change of strategies and tactics 
toward integration. The Mozambican civil war ended in 1992, coinciding with a 
transformation in South African domestic politics culminating in the 1994 democratic 
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election of a majority (black) government. After the end of the civil war, c. 67,000 
refugees returned to Mozambique from South Africa, according to UNHCR figures. This 
includes 31,589 formally repatriated by the UNHCR in 1994-95 and 35,471 who 
returned independently (Dolan, 1999). Even if the actual number who returned 
uncounted was much higher, it is safe to estimate that around eighty per cent of the 
original estimate of 320,000 retained some family members, if not the entire family, in 
South Africa. As part of the new dispensation after the 1994 elections in South Africa, 
the ‘homelands’ were abolished as ‘semi-autonomous’ administrative units and their 
territories and populations were incorporated into the overall South African state. 
While the authority of the unified South African government, and its forms of elected 
local government, were extended over former ‘homeland’ areas, they also retained, 
under the new 1996 Constitution, parallel systems of ‘traditional’ governance, 
including formally recognised ‘Tribal Authorities’ and communal land ownership (2004, 
Ntsebeza, 1999). The main actors whose changed interests the remaining refugees had 
to contend with and adapt to were therefore the new African National Congress (ANC) 
government, the UNHCR and new domestic refugee rights advocates, new local 
government structures, and transforming local communities.  
 
The new ANC government offered an ambivalent context within which the 
Mozambican refugees could claim rights, both enabling and constraining access to legal 
status and resources. On the one hand, it created a strong legislative framework, 
domestic and international, through which refugee rights in South Africa are protected. 
In 1993, even before the formal change of government and after the peace agreement 
in Mozambique, the South African and Mozambican governments made a special 
agreement with the UNHCR to retrospectively grant all Mozambicans who had come to 
South Africa on account of the war group refugee status. As described further below, 
this lasted until 1996, when the cessation clause was invoked (1951 Convention, Art. 
34). South Africa acceded to the 1951 UN Convention and the 1969 OAU Convention in 
1995 and 1996 respectively. It passed a domestic Refugee Act in 1998 which came into 
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force in 2000. Finally, South Africa’s Constitution of 1996 codifies extensive rights to 
‘everyone’ resident in the country, not only citizens. This legal framework has 
significantly improved how the South African state deals with new refugees from 
around Africa today (even though there remains much room for improvement (Landau, 
2004ba, Landau, 2004ab, de la Hunt, 2002, Handmaker et al., 2008). However, this 
legal framework was only selectively applied to Mozambicans from 1993-96 (see below 
and Polzer 2007), and the Refugee Act has never impacted on them, since they were 
no longer considered refugees after 1996. Nonetheless, the framework allowed non-
governmental actors to advocate on behalf of the Mozambican refugees in various 
ways (see below). This was an important contrast to the apartheid years, when the 
concept of refugee rights was not accepted at all.  
 
The government also provided various opportunities for Mozambican refugees to 
access legal documentation. This included an amnesty for miners in 1995, for which 
many refugees were eligible; another amnesty for citizens of Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) countries in 1996, when 85,000 Mozambicans, mainly 
refugees, received permanent resident status; and finally an exemption programme 
specifically for ‘former Mozambican refugees’ in 1999-2000, when 82,000 more 
refugees became permanent residents. By the end of 2000, c. 80% of those 
Mozambican refugees who had remained in South Africa had legal documentation as 
permanent residents or citizens. Notably, more refugees received legal status as 
miners or migrants than as refugees (Polzer, 2007).  
 
On the other hand, a draconian regime for controlling illegal immigration survived 
largely intact from the apartheid days, and many Mozambican refugees continued to 
be threatened with deportation when trying to work outside the (now former) 
homeland areas. Even when they had been accorded formal refugee status by the 
state, this did not include the distribution of documentation to this effect, and so 
Mozambicans remained vulnerable to arrest as illegal aliens (Polzer, 2007, Dolan, 1997, 
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1999). The numbers of deportees to Mozambique in fact escalated massively from 
1993 onward, so that Mozambicans were actually more likely to be deported during 
the years they were recognised as refugees than before (Polzer, 2004). Even once 
many refugees had permanent residence documents, the levels of xenophobia in the 
police forces meant that Mozambicans with proper documentation were still regularly 
deported on accusation of having fraudulent documentation.  
 
The Mozambican refugees had various means of negotiating with this new 
government. Most immediately, large numbers voted in the 1994 elections. As part of 
the pre-election preparations to empower the maximum number of (black) voters, 
identity documents were distributed widely and non-citizen residents were allowed to 
vote. A former refugee now living in Mozambique said: ‘we voted for Mandela… He won 
the elections for our cause.  There are many Shangaans in South Africa.’7 (see also Polzer, 
2007). The expectation by the refugees, and indeed the promise made by the ANC at the 
time, was that those who voted would be given documents and the right to stay in South 
Africa. Another former refugee expressed this succinctly: “We were guaranteed that if 
we voted, we would be South African citizens and wouldn’t have to return [to 
Mozambique].’8 Importantly, the refugees did not make this claim for legal integration 
towards the government on the basis of being refugees. They voted for the ANC as 
Shangaans, and they expected citizenship along with all the other long-term resident 
‘illegal aliens’ from neighbouring countries who had been denied formal residence 
rights under apartheid. Finally, they referred to the protection which Mozambique 
accorded the ANC in exile, which they felt should have been reciprocated now that the 
ANC was in government. The election promise was broken, and it took several long 
years of legal insecurity before the government acquiesced to an amnesty for migrants 
from neighbouring countries.  
 
7 Interview in Simbe, 17 April 1996. All quoted interviews in Mozambique were carried out by Caetano 
Simbine under the direction of Chris Dolan for the Wits Refugee Research Programme
8 interview in Matongomane, Mozambique, 25 April 1996 
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The strategy of voting also reflects the basic relationship of Mozambican refugees to 
the post-1994 state. While in the early 1900s recently arrived Mozambican Shangaans 
interacted with the state as an autochthonous ‘tribe’, and in the 1980s as illegal aliens 
and ‘homeland’ brothers, in the 1990s they interacted with the state as potential 
citizens in the expanded democratic state. This placed them, along with other recent 
immigrants, in perceived competition with existing citizens for the new services and 
rights being extended to the previously disenfranchised black majority (Polzer, 2005). It 
is a significant indicator of the strength of local social integration, as described above, 
that the Mozambicans in Bushbuckridge did not experience the same levels of 
xenophobia that resulted from this perceived competition for rights elsewhere in the 
country (Crush, 2000, Crush, 2008, Harris, 2001, Human Rights Watch, 1998, Landau, 
2009, Misago et al., 2009, Monson and Misago, 2009, Polzer, 2005).  
 
A second strategy that refugees used for interacting with the state arose from the 
combined strength of the post-1994 state (in providing services and limiting free 
movement), and its weakness (in administering rural areas): this strategy was fraud. 
The crucial identity document which is the key to legal and economic integration is 
issued by the Department of Home Affairs, one of the most incapacitated departments 
at the local and the national level. A national computerised system has made the local 
arrangements prevalent under the ‘homelands’ impossible (many IDs that had been 
issued to Mozambicans in Gazankulu were cancelled in the mid-1990s through the 
computerisation of the system) and the xenophobia of many non-local Home Affairs 
officials working in the rural areas has created more barriers for South African sponsors 
willing to assist neighbours of Mozambican origin to register for documents as their kin 
(Polzer, 2007). As is the case anywhere in the world, a rare but necessary commodity 
will create its own market, and South Africa’s restrictive policies on documentation for 
immigrants has led to the widespread sale of identity documents, either by 
enterprising forgers or by Home Affairs officials themselves. In this, Mozambicans in 
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Bushbuckridge who buy IDs are no longer following a specifically local strategy but 
have become part of a national response to the state. 
 
The refugees’ third negotiation strategy with the state was through domestic NGOs 
and refugee rights advocates (many of them foreigners), who became significant actors 
for Mozambican refugees after 1994. They acted primarily as conduits to the state, 
rather than as direct service providers. It is slightly misleading to call this relationship a 
negotiation strategy, since NGO pressure on the state was rarely initiated by the 
refugees themselves. Nonetheless, the refugees benefited from the pressure which 
(mainly legal, human rights oriented) NGOs placed on the government to comply with 
international standards of refugee treatment and make up for the bad treatment of 
the previous regime. This pressure pushed through the 1998 Refugee Act and the 1999 
Exemption for former Mozambican refugees, both of which the government was very 
slow in implementing. The Refugee Act and most refugee-rights related campaigns in 
post-1994 South Africa have focussed mainly on new refugees from other countries. 
Because of this, and because the retrospective advocacy for Mozambicans on the basis 
of a (legal) refugee identity was conducted in the main cities, far from the actual 
refugees and largely without their direct participation, it did not require the 
Mozambicans in Bushbuckridge (or elsewhere) to ‘perform’ their refugee-hood 
(Rodgers, 2001, Rodgers, 2002).9 It is significant that the UNHCR played a very minor 
role in arguing for the rights of Mozambican refugees in South Africa. After the 1994-95 
voluntary repatriation was declared a success by the UNHCR, even though it was only 
used by 13% of the potential ‘case load’, and formal refugee status was revoked in 
1996, the UNHCR held a narrow interpretation of who was a refugee and who was not 
and where its mandate therefore ended.   
 
9 On the performance of refugee identities, see also HELFF, S. 2009. Refugee Life Narratives The 
Disturbing Potential of a Genre and the Case of Mende Nazer. Matatu - Journal for African Culture and 
Society, 36, 331-346.
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Because of my own dual ‘identity’ in Bushbuckridge – as a researcher and as the 
Director of a paralegal advice centre which assisted Mozambican refugees to access 
legal documentation – I have had (the opportunity) to reflect on what strategic basis 
claims for rights should be made in this context. While the unit (in existence since 
1992) had originally worked explicitly on ‘refugee issues’ and advocated on the basis of 
‘refugee rights’ (Dolan et al., 1997, Johnston, 2001, Johnston, 1999, Johnston and 
Simbine, 1998), it became clear that after the 1999/2000 Exemption for Former 
Mozambican Refugees, a strategy of advocating for rights on the basis of a ‘refugee’ 
identity was not only inappropriate for a largely integrated community but also 
potentially counterproductive. One reflection of this recognition was to change the 
name of the unit from Refugee Research Programme to Rural Research Project, to 
emphasise its concern with all residents of the area and not only a particular externally 
defined sub-group. Secondly, our paralegal advice office was opened to all residents 
requiring paralegal support, and focused on assisting Mozambicans with all their 
concerns, including issues like domestic violence which were not directly related to 
their status as non-citizens. The Mozambican clients, for their part, presented 
themselves for assistance not on the basis of being refugees, but on the basis of being 
long-term residents of Bushbuckridge who felt a right to government services equal to 
that enjoyed by citizens. Thirdly, the main RRP advocacy initiative conducted when I 
was present, driven by the direct request of former refugees who had permanent 
resident status, was for equal access to government social grants such as child support 
grants and old age pensions. This 2003/2004 campaign through the Constitutional 
Court (fought by the Legal Resources Centre) was explicitly argued on the basis of the 
Constitution’s guarantee of rights for ‘everyone,’ even though most of the beneficiaries 
were former refugees (Khosa and Mahlaule 2003a).  
 
The third important group of local actors for former refugees in Bushbuckridge today 
are the local traditional and elected authorities. As the ‘homelands’ were dissolved in 
the democratic South Africa, along with the national political salience of ethnic 
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affiliation, ‘Shangaanness’ as a tactic has lost some of its political clout. This is 
especially as the importance of contrast with Sothos has been reduced. Niehaus 
discusses the shift ‘from ethnicity to regionalism’, as evidenced by the Bushbuckridge 
border dispute from 1994-1998 when Shangaan- and Sotho-speakers worked together 
against the national government (unsuccessfully at the time) to have their shared 
district of Bushbuckridge placed in one province rather than another (Niehaus, 
2002:575). The moral legitimacy of refugees based on shared Shangaan ancestry 
described by Rodgers above remains important, however. Added to this is a new 
discourse of legitimacy used by South Africans and Mozambicans alike in 
Bushbuckridge: the ‘we are all Africans’ discourse associated with the first democratic 
President Nelson Mandela (Niehaus, 2002:575, Polzer, 2004). When it became clear in 
the mid-1990s that the majority were planning to stay, however, many ‘locals’ refer to 
the speeches of President Mandela as significant in convincing them that the 
Mozambicans had the right to stay.  
 
Local community leaders, including Chairmen of Village Community Development 
Forums, Ward Councillors and traditional village headmen today say that they actively 
discourage the use of terms like ‘Mozambican’ or ‘refugee’ and derogatory words like 
mapoti (from Portuguese) to describe long-term residents of their villages. Bakewell 
describes something similar in Zambia where ‘the late senior chief Kanongesha, 
…decreed that nobody should be referred to as a refugee in his area, as that they were 
all simply (his) people.’(Bakewell, 1999:11) While this rhetoric of inclusion certainly 
covers up some continued discrimination and prejudice, it is nonetheless significant as 
a political aspiration, especially given the atmosphere of xenophobia which is so 
common in other parts of the country (Crush, 2000, Crush, 2008, Harris, 2001, Human 
Rights Watch, 1998, Landau, 2009, Misago et al., 2009, Monson and Misago, 2009, 
Polzer, 2005).  
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Mozambican refugees in Bushbuckridge today have a clear expectation of inclusion as 
citizens with equal rights, both in relation to the state (such as through access to 
government welfare grants) and in relation to the local community, the final local 
actor. The security of legal status has superseded the strategic need to accept the 
‘second class’ status of the 1980s and given the refugees the ability to negotiate not 
only for tolerance but also for acceptance by ‘locals.’ The demand for acceptance is 
now made independent of their socio-economic status, which is in many cases still 
lower than the average for South Africans, but which is likely to improve with the 
eligibility for social grants. One example of the change in confidence is a recently 
established group of men in Hluvukani village, mainly children of former refugees, who 
call themselves ‘Baghdad’ and who threaten to beat up anyone who uses the term 
mapoti to refer to Mozambicans.10  
 
In summary, the process of legal integration of Mozambican refugees from the 1980s is 
virtually complete in democratic South Africa. The process of social integration, even 
though it started much earlier than legal status, is still being negotiated, albeit on 
better terms now than previously. The refugees have been able to make use of 
multiple strategies in negotiating for rights, including a continued reference to 
ancestral connection with South African Shangaans, themselves descendants of 
previous waves of refugees. Reference to refugee rights in relation to NGOs and the 
state has been useful only in very limited circumstances. The main strategy of the 
1990s, however, has been the claim to citizenship rights on the basis of long term 
residence, support for the ruling party (and especially former President Mandela), and 
reference to the inclusive Constitution.  
 
10 Thanks to Aderito Machava for pointing out this story to me. 
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Conclusion 
 
Mozambican refugees of the 19th and 20th centuries have been able to stay on South 
African territory and there gain access to power and resources with only very limited 
reference to ‘refugee rights’ or any international (or even national) legal protection. In 
the two historical periods outlined here, the dominant actors have changed from chiefs 
to the colonial state, from homelands and the local community to the democratic state 
and citizenry. Strategic relations included those based on clientage, autochthony, 
ethnic brotherhood, spiritual power and current claims to respect and equal treatment 
as residents of South Africa and South African permanent residents under the 
Constitution.  
 
Integration has been a very long process and in both epochs can be argued to be 
incomplete. Within the South African national context, ‘Shangaans,’ no matter whether 
they can trace their ancestry in South Africa for 150 years or 15 years, are still 
associated with Mozambique and with rural backwardness, tradition and superstition 
in South African ethnic stereotypes and are ridiculed and even sometimes persecuted 
by other ethnic groups. But generally, and certainly formally, they have all rights as 
citizens or permanent residents under the constitution. The achievement of rights has 
also not been linear or homogenous for all who arrived at the same time – some 
individuals or groups who arrived in the 1980s immediately assimilated completely and 
are now indistinguishable from ‘locals’ (Golooba-Mutebi, 2004). Some have not been 
able to muster the resources and remain very poor and politically vulnerable even 
today. It is important that the state has always been only one actor among many in 
relation to which the refugees negotiated their status. For the first ‘wave’, groups of 
refugees challenged constraining local social and political arrangements by appealing 
directly to the state, while for the second ‘wave’, constraints imposed by the state 
were subverted with local political and social support. Finally, in the last and most 
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recent epoch, an inclusive discourse of citizenship and Africanness provided by the 
state was once again used to argue for more inclusive treatment at the local level.  
 
This analysis of the complex interplay of shifting actors, interests and strategies gives 
us a rich understanding of how Mozambican refugees have managed the integration 
process in South Africa, where this process has been facilitated and where it has been 
stymied. It is clear that interventions by actors arguing specifically on the basis of 
refugee rights have been of marginal significance in the process, in the first epoch 
because the refugee concept was not present, and in the second epoch because it has 
only tangentially applied to this group of people. Significantly, by comparing the two 
epochs discussed here, we can see that refugee integration was at different times 
facilitated by very different powerful actors. Even in relation to one actor – the state – 
different conditions and policies have had impacted on refugee integration, including 
policies to construct ethnic groups, to create racially and ethnically segregated 
governance systems, and to transform politics into democratic rights- and welfare-
based citizenship. 
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This paper shows how successfully integrated refugees are often made invisible
to institutions, academics and within social contexts. It argues that certain
elements of social and institutional categorization processes—including partial-
ity, functionality, conflation, immutability, self-confirmation and negotiability—
tend to obscure people who are integrated. The paper presents a case study
which juxtaposes the ways in which three different kinds of categorization have
been applied to people of Mozambican birth who settled in a rural South
African border area after fleeing the Mozambican civil war in the 1980s. The
three cases of categorization come from the South African government for the
purpose of legal regularization; from an academic unit of the University of the
Witwatersrand for the purpose of demographic and public health research; and
from residents of Bushbuckridge District to describe and manage their relation-
ships with each other. The paper demonstrates how each of these different
perspectives obscures the experiences of integrated Mozambican refugees.
Keywords: Mozambican refugees, South Africa, categorization, integration, invisibility
There is very little information available about successfully integrated refugees,
especially in the global South. There are a few studies of refugees ‘making it’ in
developed countries (Portes 1969). However, there are very few which describe
the experience of refugees who have either been officially granted full and
‘durable’ protection by the host state through permanent residence or citizen-
ship, or have achieved a state of ‘local integration’ independently of overt
host state policies. Exceptions are studies of cases where such integration
was challenged or negated by governmental repatriation programmes
(Bakewell 1999), or by the constant need to hide from officials (Sommers
2001), or where integration collapsed into violence (Andrews 2003). Some
reasons for this limited coverage of ‘successful’ integration include the general
dearth of scholarship on self-settled refugees (Crisp 2004) and the overwhelm-
ing focus on the ‘durable’ and not-so-durable solutions of camps, repatriation
and resettlement (Jacobsen 2001). In addition, the overall policy-orientation of
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refugee and forced migration studies (Bakewell, this volume) makes success-
fully integrated refugees seem uninteresting to many academics and practi-
tioner institutions because they ‘don’t need help’. There are also logistical
difficulties of identifying and sampling people who are dispersed and not
immediately distinguishable from the general population (Vigneswaran
2007). Finally, for many refugees, the invisibility of being integrated is a
strategic choice, adding an ethical difficulty to studies which seek to make
people visible who have chosen to ‘disappear’.
The argument for ‘making visible’ groups which are excluded and over-
looked by institutions or academics is usually that they are marginal and
vulnerable (Sender and Johnston 1996; Chambers 1997; Malkki 1997; Bean
et al. 2001). This is undoubtedly important, but I argue that it is equally
important to be aware of those whose integration experiences have been
successful. Allowing successful integration to remain invisible and unrecog-
nized has an impact on our understanding of the processes of refugee adap-
tation and integration and perpetuates the idea of refugees as eternally
vulnerable and dependent on institutional intervention. The goal is clearly
not to reify or impose the ‘refugee’ label even as individuals integrate, but to
be able, as academics, to trace individuals as they transition from the status
of ‘refugee’ to other statuses, such as ‘citizen’ or ‘local’.
Furthermore, I argue that the invisibility of integrated refugees is not only
a function of methodological, political or policy preconceptions within the
field of refugee studies. I suggest that it is also a result of the more general
processes of categorization. These processes affect a wide range of institutions
and actors collecting and processing information about social groups, includ-
ing refugees. The bias of refugee studies against studying integration is there-
fore reinforced by an epistemological blind spot which makes it much more
difficult to ‘see’ the integrated and the non-vulnerable as a part of the overall
population to be studied. This paper is consequently not about the nature of
or conditions for successful integration per se, but rather focuses on the
nature of this epistemological challenge of categorical ‘invisibility’.
Grouping individuals into categories is one of the most basic social pro-
cesses (Jenkins 2000). We cannot think or act socially without social groups,
and institutions cannot function without them. The process of categorizing
people into groups, by emphasizing certain characteristics over others and by
drawing boundaries, inevitably makes particular people ‘invisible’. This
applies to a wide range of contexts in which categorization takes place,
from bureaucratic labelling, to the operationalization of academic concepts
through the categorization of research subjects, to the construction of social
groups within a community. Categorization clearly cannot and should not be
avoided, but a key aspect of social scientific academic enquiry is a critical
awareness of the constructedness of categories. This includes an awareness of
how we use data constructed by institutions, how we evaluate group claims
made by communities about themselves and others, but also how we form
and manipulate our own constructed categories.
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In this paper, I directly juxtapose the ways in which three different kinds of
categorization—bureaucratic, academic and social—have been applied to the
same people. In this case, these are people of Mozambican birth who settled
in a rural South African border area, Bushbuckridge District, after fleeing the
Mozambican civil war in the 1980s. The three cases of categorization come
from the South African government for the purpose of legal regularization;
from an academic unit of the University of the Witwatersrand for the pur-
pose of demographic and public health research; and from residents of
Bushbuckridge District to describe and manage their relationships with
each other. I demonstrate how each of these different perspectives obscures
particular people and experiences, and, furthermore, how these three very
different categorizations conceal the same people: namely, those
Mozambicans who have acquired South African identity documents, who
live in areas where South Africans predominate, and who have adopted
‘South African’ lifestyles. In effect, they all make successfully integrated
Mozambican refugees invisible. Before describing these cases, I briefly outline
what I mean by ‘processes of categorization’.
There are many ways of thinking about categorization in the social
sciences. Barth’s seminal work, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, presents rea-
sons and contexts for the construction of social categories as oppositions
rather than inherent descriptions, as well as emphasizing the maintenance
of such categories ‘despite changing participation and membership’ of the
constructed groups (1969: 10). Anthias (1998), in her discussion of sociologi-
cal approaches to social divisions (such as gender, ethnicity and race),
also emphasizes that categories are ‘social realities’, and argues that it is
necessary to take into account their experiential, intersubjective, organi-
zational and representational forms. Scott’s theorization of how the
modern state constructs simplified and standardized categories to control
its territory and population focuses on the institutional purposefulness of
categories, as well as their social impacts, and on how they are resisted
(1998). Zetter’s (1991) five characteristics of bureaucratic labelling—stereo-
typing, conformity, designation, identity disaggregation and political/power
relationships—are also useful signposts for the micro-politics of certain kinds
of categorization.
Given my concern with how categories make people invisible, and drawing
selectively on the above theorists, there are six elements of categorization which
I consider most relevant to the creation of invisibility. They are partiality,
functionality, conflation, immutability, self-confirmation and negotiability.
Partiality means that all categories have a source: an actor or actors who
construct the category. The category does not exist in isolation from the
characteristics of those actors and their intentions (Barth 1969), and so cate-
gorizations must always be analysed through a particular and partial perspec-
tive. As illustrated below, the perspectives of the state, an academic
demography census and a local counsellor will be quite different when
describing the same people.
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Functionality refers to the fact that categories are functional for the institu-
tions or social collectives which create and use them. This functionality defines
the characteristics of the category. Apart from necessitating a simplification and
standardization of characteristics as discussed by Scott, Zetter and Anthias
(which the latter two refer to as stereotyping), a hierarchy of characteristics
is created in which some take precedence over others in defining the nature of
the group and its membership. People who do not have high-priority character-
istics, although they might share lower-order characteristics with the group,
are made invisible. For example, an NGO may define ‘refugees’ in order to
distribute aid, so those who do not need or want aid become invisible.
Conflation is an aspect of how the hierarchical, functional characteristics of a
category become implemented. Conflation not only homogenizes members of
the category (as in Anthias’ ‘principle of collective attribution’ (1998: 516)), but
also means that various other characteristics are assumed to correlate with the
high-priority characteristics. Using our example, the NGO giving aid may
assume that everyone who needs aid is also female and concentrated in one
place. Those who do not conform with the entire purported bundle of charac-
teristics, even though they may share the priority characteristic, are not seen.
Immutability refers to the relationship which categorization has with
change over time. The functionality of a category sets it at a particular
point in time, when the action or relationship that the category is intended
to facilitate is taking place. However, the process of categorization is usually
based on a claim of timelessness, ‘common sense’ or ‘nature’ (Anthias 1998:
517). Categories therefore rarely incorporate an awareness of the different
trajectories and identities members may have taken previously, nor do they
allow for members to take different future trajectories. The implication for
invisibility is that those people who take a different path than that assumed
for the group may exit the category without being seen to do so. Aid-receiv-
ing ‘refugees’ who become self-sufficient, for example, may simply cease to be
viewed as ‘refugees’ without there being a change in the characterization of
the category ‘refugee-as-aid-recipient’ to a revised ‘refugee-as-self-sufficient’.
Self-confirmation refers to the process through which the impression of
immutability is self-reinforcing through the creation of ‘knowledge’, data
and an archive about a group using the defined characteristics and bound-
aries (Foucault 1972). Sources of information about a category are therefore
important and different kinds of information sources make groups invisible in
different ways. Categories are often constructed using endogenous informa-
tion sources. A common example is institutional interventions which define a
‘target group’ on the basis of the intervention itself. A humanitarian NGO
which only assists refugees in camps may define only those people who are in
camps as refugees and then claim to be assisting all refugees.
Negotiability, finally, is the process through which categorization is always
an engagement between groups of actors. A focus on negotiation contradicts
Zetter’s description of labelling as being designation, without the participa-
tion of those being labelled (Zetter 1991). In fact, people in the group being
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defined can take part in and respond to the grouping process in several ways.
In the case of both institutional and social categorizations, they can embrace
it, internalize it or instrumentalize it, or they can resist and subvert it (Scott
1985, 1998). As we are interested in invisibility, the question is to what extent
someone being targeted for categorization, as it were, can choose to remain
invisible to the process.
These six processes apply broadly to many different contexts and kinds of
categorization. They are not in themselves problematic for many of the func-
tions of social categorization, but they make it dangerous to accept the
resultant ‘group’ as a given for any other function than for what it was
defined. Five questions encapsulate these theoretical concerns and enable us
to practically interrogate the categories which we and others use:
1. Partiality Who is defining the category?
2. Functionality and
Immutability
What is the purpose of defining the category at a particular
point in time?
3. Conflation What characteristics of the category are emphasized
over others?
4. Self-Confirmation What sources of information are used or created to confirm
the existence of the category?
5. Negotiability What reasons and opportunities are there for the individuals
who are targeted for categorization to remain invisible?
Before applying these questions to the three categorization processes that
have been applied to Mozambicans in Bushbuckridge—bureaucratic, aca-
demic and social—I present a brief background on the case study at hand.
Historical Background
Between the mid-1980s and 1992, over 300,000 people fled southern
Mozambique into South Africa to escape the Mozambican civil war (Dolan
1997). Most settled in the north-eastern border area of South Africa where
there was a long previous history of cross-border migration and shared lan-
guage. Bushbuckridge district, my case study area, is one of the areas of highest
concentration of settlement. South Africa’s white minority government did not
legally recognize the Mozambicans as refugees when they arrived in the 1980s,
and there was no large-scale international aid intervention. However, several of
the semi-autonomous, ethnically-defined ‘Bantustans’ in the border area wel-
comed the Mozambicans based on shared ethnicity and history (Ritchken 1995;
Rodgers 2002; Polzer 2007). After the end of the civil war in 1992 and the
transition of South Africa to democracy in 1994, the vast majority of people
who had come from Mozambique and settled in the border areas remained in
South Africa rather than returning to Mozambique (Dolan 1999). Today, over
80 per cent of those who remained in Bushbuckridge either have permanent
residence or citizenship status in South Africa (Polzer 2007).
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In the south-eastern parts of Bushbuckridge, closest to the Mozambican
border, 29 per cent of the district’s population self-identify as Mozambican
(i.e. of Mozambican origin, independent of their current legal status), according
to the Agincourt Health and Population Unit’s demographic census discussed
below. Mozambicans live in villages alongside South Africans and use the same
public services and the same traditional local governance system of village
headmen and chiefs. There are still clearly identifiable areas in many villages
where Mozambican households are concentrated, based on land which was
granted them by traditional leaders when they first arrived. However, spatial
integration is substantial, as at least half of the households headed
by Mozambicans are located outside these ‘Mozambican’ neighbourhoods
in mixed village sections (based on data from the Agincourt census).
Intermarriage is increasingly common, and there is a strong public expression
of the will to integrate from local South African elites (teachers, pastors, elected
councillors), and from South African and Mozambican residents (Polzer 2004).
My description of the three categorization processes is based on four years
of living and researching in Bushbuckridge district (2002–2006). Insights on
the state’s categorization of Mozambicans through an amnesty process come
from official documentation and from colleagues who actively participated in
the process at the time, as well as through my association with the Acornhoek
Advice Centre which assisted Mozambicans to apply for identity documents
from 2000 to 2006. Regarding the demographic survey, I have been working
in partnership with the Agincourt Health and Population Unit of the Uni-
versity of the Witwatersrand to analyse their data on Mozambicans. Finally,
my own research focused on the social construction of group identities such
as ‘Mozambican’ and ‘South African’ in Bushbuckridge, using a variety of
qualitative methods in three villages. The methods included participation in
public gatherings, key informant interviews with village leaders (headmen,
school principals, pastors, elected counsellors, Community Development
Forum chairmen), and repeated structured and life history interviews with
57 respondents, 29 of South African and 28 of Mozambican birth, and other
members of their households.
Case Study 1: Bureaucratic categorization: the 1999/2000 Amnesty for
Former Mozambican Refugees
From the mid-1990s, the government of South Africa decided to grant var-
ious groups of immigrants the opportunity to apply for permanent resident
status in South Africa. These ‘amnesties’ included one for mine workers in
1995, for citizens of the Southern African Development Community (SADC)
countries in 1996, and for ‘former Mozambican refugees’ (FMR) in 1999/
2000. The latter was agreed to by Cabinet on 4 December 1996, but only
implemented at the end of 1999. Out of 150,592 applications for the FMR
amnesty, 81,969 people were granted permanent resident status, 16,772 were
rejected and 32,007 remained pending, of which most were never processed.
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On the question of partiality, the dominant actor in these amnesty pro-
cesses was the South African state as represented by the Department of
Home Affairs.1 As with other amnesties in South Africa and elsewhere, the
central motivation of the state in the case of the FMR amnesty was to
‘regularize’ and therefore be able to ‘see’ thousands of residents of the coun-
try who were until that point undocumented and therefore administratively
invisible to the state. A subsidiary stated motivation of the FMR amnesty
was to right a historical wrong, since refugee status and permanent residence
had been denied to Mozambicans (and other Africans) under the apartheid
regime, even if they had been living and working in South Africa for many
years. These aims were to be fulfilled without encouraging or enabling new
immigration and without opening the opportunity for other non-citizens
residing illegally in South Africa to gain legal documents.
In relation to functionality, therefore, the characteristics of the category
‘former Mozambican refugees’ were defined to fulfil the dual aims of legal
regularization and preventing new migration. According to Home Affairs
Departmental Circular No. 34 of 1999, Section 1.2,
Mozambican refugees are citizens of Mozambique who entered South Africa
between 1980 and 1992 and live mainly in the Gazankulu, KaNgwane and
Winterveldt areas (i.e. the Northern Province, Mpumalanga and North West).
Some have also settled in the northern parts of Kwazulu Natal2 (Department of
Home Affairs 1999).
This definition explicitly sets out three criteria for belonging to the category
of ‘former Mozambican refugee’: country of origin, date of arrival, and place
of residence. A fourth criterion is implicit: lack of documents. This last arises
from the aim of regularization—i.e. moving from having no legal status to
acquiring legal status—while the first three are meant to distinguish eligible
applicants from other foreigners or new immigrants.
Critical legal and NGO analyses of the amnesty have emphasized the
groups which were excluded from the benefits of the amnesty process because
of the first three criteria (Johnston 2001; Handmaker and Schneider 2002).
Many applicants could not prove their Mozambican citizenship due to a lack
of documentation from either the Mozambican government before their flight
or the Mozambican consulate in South Africa. Others could not prove their
date of arrival in the country. The largest number of people was excluded by
the place of residence restriction, since many Mozambicans had, along with
their rural South African neighbours, moved to the urban areas in search of
work. This also affected families in the designated rural areas whose (mostly
male) heads of households were in urban areas.
In contrast to the primary criteria of country of origin, date of arrival, and
place of residence, the effect of a lack of legal documentation has only been
touched upon tangentially in the legal and NGO literature. This literature
focuses on those Mozambicans who had previously acquired fraudulent
South African identity documents and wanted to apply for legal documents
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during the amnesty. In fact, many of the Mozambicans who had arrived in
South Africa during the 1980s had already received documents by various
formal and informal means. Formal options for acquiring permanent residence
documents included the 1996 SADC Amnesty mentioned above, or registering
for permanent residence as a spouse of a South African. Common semi-formal
means of accessing citizenship documentation consisted of using the same offi-
cial channels as South Africans to apply for documents, claiming to be born in
South Africa. These included receiving documents when they were widely dis-
tributed to previously unregistered rural residents in advance of the 1994 elec-
tions; registering youth in schools along with their South African classmates;
registering for a ‘late registration’ ID on the basis of a ‘relative’s’ affidavit
(using South African neighbours and friends as references);3 or applying for
documents through employers (Polzer 2007). Finally, there was the option of
buying an ID from corrupt Home Affairs officials or private agents. Those who
still did not have documents in 1999 were therefore in many ways a marginal
‘rest’ group with specific age and gender characteristics (older and more female,
not working) who had not been able to use work, social connections, school
attendance or bribes to get documents previously. Of those who had arrived in
the 1980s as refugees, therefore, by 1999 only those who were not already seen
as SADC ‘economic migrants’ or ‘South Africans’ by the South African state
were still undocumented and therefore available to be categorized as ‘former
refugees’ for the FMR amnesty process.
Our fourth guiding question is what sources of information the state used
or created to confirm the existence of its category of ‘former Mozambican
refugees’. In this instance, there was virtually no prior data on the numbers of
‘Mozambican refugees’ living in South Africa before 1996; neither the apart-
heid nor the democratic state had tried to formally define or count this group
of people. In 1999, the Department of Home Affairs therefore commissioned
various NGOs to conduct research to estimate the numbers of people who
would need and want regularization, or who wanted help in returning to
Mozambique. However, these surveys were methodologically flawed and
designed to confirm the biases of the amnesty categorizations—a purely
rural focus on the undocumented (Handmaker and Schneider 2002). In the
end, the actual applications for the regularization programme became the
data source according to which FMR were defined. This made the invisibility
of those Mozambican refugees who did not come forward for the amnesty
absolute in the eyes of the state.
In relation to our fifth question on the extent to which ‘capture’ by the
state’s categorization process was negotiable, there were several reasons why
some Mozambicans would choose to remain invisible to the state during the
amnesty period. In addition to those who had fraudulent IDs and feared
punishment, those who had acquired ‘legal’ South African citizenship through
social connections or schooling had no reason to reduce their status to per-
manent resident by making themselves visible to the state during the amnesty
process. Finally, many who did not have documents feared the state,
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which they associated with arrest and deportation, and suspected the amnesty
to be a ploy to identify and remove Mozambicans from the country. By
the time successful applicants showed that this fear was unfounded, the
six-month application period had already passed, leaving many potential
applicants undocumented.
Mozambicans therefore remained invisible to the state in various ways.
Since the categorization of FMR was based on active self-identification,
invisibility came from the exclusion of those who were not allowed or enabled
to identify themselves, even if they might have wanted to; oversight of those
who might have conformed with the criteria set out, but did not wish to
identity themselves; and lack of need by those who already had documents.
Furthermore, there were no effective sanctions for non-self-identification.
Theoretically, those who did not register for documents were relegated to
‘illegal alien’ status and deportation programmes were increased during and
after the amnesty application period. In practice, however, this was not an
effective sanction because the deportation campaigns were concentrated in
urban areas while the amnesty was targeted at rural areas, there was no
effective follow-up to find and deport rural non-applicants or rejected appli-
cants, and those people who had already organized documents independently
were not at direct risk of reprisals.
In summary, the state’s bureaucratic categorization made the more success-
fully integrated Mozambicans invisible in several ways. Firstly, the interven-
tion was targeted only at those who were still undocumented after being in
the country for over fifteen years, making those with the social connections
and money needed to acquire IDs invisible. Secondly, the self-identification
principle enabled those who did not require the intervention because they
were already established, to choose to remain invisible. Finally, its geographic
focus on areas that were already associated with marginality, rural former
Bantustan areas, made those Mozambicans who had found work in or who
had otherwise moved to less stereotyped ‘migrant’ areas invisible.4
Case Study 2: Academic Categorization: the Agincourt Health
and Population Unit
My second example of academic categorization is very different from the first
example of state categorization. Nonetheless, the same framework questions
allow us to interrogate the categories created and to become aware of
invisibilities.
Since 1992, the Agincourt Health and Population Unit (AHPU) of the
Public Health Department of the University of the Witwatersrand has been
conducting a yearly demographic census in 21 villages in the south-east of
Bushbuckridge district (known as the Agincourt Health and Demographic
Surveillance System or HDSS). The census comprises 11,000 households
and approximately 70,000 individuals, and each household is surveyed
annually by trained local field workers. The programme’s goal is to
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understand the demographic transitions and public health concerns in rural
South Africa, with the aim of improving rural health systems (Tollman et al.
1999).
The Agincourt HDSS is in many ways a best-practice example for making
self-settled refugees academically visible. It is the only demographic survey
site in the world where a third of the population are self-settled refugees, and
the location was specifically selected to study the needs and experiences of
this group. Much thought has gone into accurately representing and tracking
the social and health characteristics of Mozambican-born residents and their
families, along with their South African neighbours, and important adap-
tations have been made to the census in recent years towards this aim.5 As
with all three categorization examples presented in this paper, the following
discussion is not a criticism of the institution constructing a category,
but rather an expression of the inevitable challenges which the necessity of
categorization brings to even the most careful institutional and academic
endeavours.
The result of any census, one would think, is the very opposite of invisi-
bility, since it records every individual living within a specified geographical
space. A census is therefore different from an intervention, such as the
amnesty described above, which only targets select individuals out of a
total population. Nonetheless, there are important forms of invisibility
which arise not from a complete exclusion from a census but rather through
the relative categorizations applied to individuals within the census. In the
Agincourt HDSS, the question is therefore whether an individual was made
visible as a ‘refugee’ or remained or became invisible within the larger mass
of ‘South Africans’.
When the AHPU census was designed in 1992, it was known that there was
a large number of Mozambicans living in the area, but there was virtually no
data on their numbers or the conditions in which they were living. A variable
was therefore introduced in the census called ‘Refugee/Mozambican’:
REFUGEE/MOZAMBICAN. To know the citizen status of a resident in the
study area follow the definitions below
– Refugee (Y) ¼ persons from Mozambique who entered SA before 1993 (true
refugee).
– Mozambican (M) ¼ persons from Mozambique who entered SA during or
after 1993.
– South African citizen (N).
– Other (O) ¼ persons from a country other than Mozambique or SA.
For children, if both parents are Mozambican then the child is Mozambican. If
the child has mixed parentage, then a patriarchal system will be followed where
the child takes on the status of his/her father:
– If both parents are M then the child is M
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– If the father is Y or M and the mother N then the child is M
– If the father is N and the mother is M then the child is N
– If both parents are Y and a child came with them the child is also Y; but, if
both parents are Y and the child was born in South Africa, the child is an M
(Agincourt Health and Population Unit Field Manual, 2006 version).
The functionality of this variable for the AHPU as an academic, demo-
graphic and public health programme, to answer our second question, was
to provide a possible explanatory variable for differential demographic and
public health outcomes. The hypothesis was, and remains, that the group of
people defined as ‘refugees’ would be significantly different in terms of demo-
graphic and health outcomes from the rest of the population and therefore
needed to be identified along with other traditional independent variables
such as gender, education status, and marital status. Importantly, this variable
was conceived of as an unchanging characteristic of a person. Once someone
was categorized as a ‘refugee’ (e.g. having arrived in the area fromMozambique
before 1993), they would remain so in the census, even as other characteristics
of the individual (such as education level, place of residence, documentation
status, etc.) might change. This makes the AHPU ‘refugee’ category very
different from the state’s ‘refugee’ category which ends when an individual
attains permanent residence or citizenship status. The maintenance over
time of a variable denoting ‘refugee origin’ is useful and important, from my
perspective of wanting to trace the process of integration, since a progressively
integrated ‘refugee’ remains identifiable even as other variables approach
parity with the host population. However, there are still characteristics of the
categorization which point to the possible invisibility of the most integrated
Mozambicans. These characteristics arise, as above, from the dominant
characteristics given to the category, the information source used to construct
the category, and the level of negotiability in the category.
To address our third guiding question, although the dominant character-
istics of identifying a ‘refugee’ in the AHPU census were superficially the
same as for the government regularization programme, e.g. country of
origin and date of arrival in South Africa, one significant difference is that
the state was interested in legal status while the census was not. The census
did not record the possession of identity documents for anyone in the survey
site until 2005. However, the original omission of documentation status as a
variable, while complicating AHPU’s ability to trace an important element of
the refugee integration process over time,6 probably did not contribute to
excluding successfully integrated Mozambicans from the ‘refugee’ categoriza-
tion in 1992, in the way that the state’s inclusion of the legal criterion did in
1999. This is because of the difference in the function of the categorization:
selective state intervention on the basis of legal status versus comprehensive
academic explanation (without direct material benefit for the respondent)
on the basis of country of origin. In the AHPU case, therefore, it is the
characteristic of country of origin which led to openings for the invisibility
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of well-integrated refugees. These openings were created through the data
collection (self-confirmation) process, within which there were spaces for
category negotiation.
Regarding the self-confirmation of the category ‘refugee’, the AHPU’s
source of information for its categorization is a single question which field
workers asked all respondents in the original census of 1992 and which since
then has only been asked of people who are new arrivals within the census
villages: ‘where were you born?’ The basic categorization of ‘refugee’ was
based on a combination of self-identification and field worker identification
of the place of birth. Field workers, who were all local residents of the census
area, used observations of accent, dress (more ‘modern’ or more ‘tradi-
tional’), housing style (brick or mud and thatch), area of residence within
the village (core or periphery) and other stereotypical ‘cultural’ attributes to
assess the ‘Mozambicanness’ of the respondents (Mark Collinson pers. com.
25 February 2008). The implications of these elements of data collection—
self- and stereotype-based identification based on a single question—for
creating and enabling invisibility are discussed below after a note on respon-
dents’ possible reasons for negotiating invisibility.
There are several reasons why Mozambicans might have wished to remain
invisible to the census as ‘refugees’. 1992, the year of the first census, was a
watershed year for Mozambicans in South Africa. The Mozambican Peace
Agreement was signed in October after 16 years of civil war. South African
politics were shifting dramatically, with the negotiated transition from apart-
heid to open elections still uncertain and the continued role of the Bantustans
in question. In this volatile political context, the Mozambicans were not yet
convinced of a lasting peace in Mozambique (Dolan 1997) and, with no clear
source of political protection in South Africa, had every reason to fear expul-
sion. The AHPU was not yet well known in the area and large-scale censuses
were likely to be associated with the feared state rather than with a univer-
sity. Finally, there were no sanctions for falsely self-declaring as a South
African, and no direct individual benefits from being identified as a ‘refugee’
in the demographic survey, for example through the development of targeted
interventions.
Apart from these motivations for invisibility which arose from the larger
political atmosphere, the specific migration history of the area both moti-
vated and enabled invisibility for certain groups of Mozambicans, especially
the more spatially and socially integrated. Mozambicans who worked in
South Africa before the mass influx of refugees in 1985 generally lived
among South Africans in the villages of Bushbuckridge, often married to
South Africans. These working Mozambicans often distanced themselves
from the destitute new arrivals who were settled at the outskirts of the
villages in clearly visible ‘Mozambican neighbourhoods’, while simultaneously
assisting some family members to integrate. Ethnographic studies of
Bushbuckridge have noted that people of Mozambican origin who live in
the core village areas (not in the ‘Mozambican’ neighbourhoods) are often
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reluctant to admit their Mozambican origin to outsiders because of the
stigma of poverty and foreignness attached to it (Golooba-Mutebi 2004;
Machava 2005). This makes a survey question about place of birth not a
neutral question of fact, but rather a political question of status and social
position within the village.
The ‘local knowledge’ stereotype-based data collection model for the
AHPU category of ‘refugee’ therefore provided avenues for the less stereo-
typical Mozambicans to remain invisible as ‘refugees’. This was particularly
the case where the conflation of origin, cultural ‘traditionalism’, poverty and
place of residence within the village did not hold (see further discussion of
this conflation in the next example). In sum, therefore, the AHPU category of
‘refugee’ constructed the invisibility of socially and spatially integrated
Mozambicans through an insufficiently defined category (conflation of indi-
cators) and oversight of those who might have conformed with the criteria set
out, but did not wish to identity themselves.
As in the case of state categorization described above, it is not possible to
estimate the number of persons made invisible in this way, and the omitted
percentage of all ‘actual’ Mozambicans in the census area may be small. After
all, 29 per cent of all the persons surveyed were categorized as ‘refugees’ in
1992, suggesting either a willingness to self-identify as such (in spite of the
dangers) or the effectiveness of field workers’ cultural knowledge. One can
also legitimately argue that the categorization fulfils its intended academic
function if those Mozambicans who were able to claim South Africanness in
the face of culturally savvy field workers are so well integrated that they do
not represent a distinct ‘vulnerable group’ within the surveyed population.
However, the ‘invisibility’ of well-integrated Mozambicans to the census may
over-emphasize the statistical ‘vulnerability’ associated with ‘nationality’,
since the categorical stereotype which contributed to the establishment of
the category had already internalized this vulnerability.
Case Study 3: Social Categorization: Intra-Village Relations and Local Politics
Qualitative researchers often argue that institutional categories used by the
state or narrowly defined categories in quantitative academic surveys misre-
present reality because they do not take into account how local people under-
stand and construct social categories. However, social categories are equally
constructed and can also make certain kinds of people invisible. This case
study shows that both elite and non-elite local self- and re-presentations using
the categories of ‘South African’ and ‘Mozambican’, while highly ambivalent
and often contradictory, nonetheless make the same kinds of people invisible
as the institutional categorizations, albeit for different reasons.
There are at least two different roles in which social categories play them-
selves out: in shaping the interaction between people in everyday life, and in
representing oneself and one’s community to outsiders, including researchers
(Jenkins 2000). My field work allowed me to observe both, to the extent
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that I participated in community interactions (such as community meetings)
that included both South African and Mozambican-born residents, as well
as speaking individually to South African and Mozambican-born village
residents and village leaders about their perspectives on the two ‘groups’.
As institutional categorizations fulfil functions for the institution, so social
categorizations fulfil specific functions for societies. My second guiding ques-
tion, the purpose of defining a category at a particular point in time, is
nonetheless more difficult to establish for social categorizations than for
institutional ones, not least because there are more actors involved and
because there is no single, documented definition of a category (as with the
government circular or the field manual quoted above). As with all social
group constructions, in Bushbuckridge the social categorization of people as
‘Mozambican’ or ‘South African’ is multifaceted, situational and has changed
over time. On the one hand, ‘Mozambican’ is a social category that has long
been used in everyday life by local leaders and by common people of both
South African and Mozambican birth as if its application were common-
sensical. On the other hand, shared language, culture and history have long
been recognized by both local elites and community members, and common-
alities and kinship links are often emphasized over differences, as expressed
by the often heard phrase ‘we are all South Africans now’ (Polzer 2004). This
tension between categorical recognition and elision works to obscure the
presence of successfully integrated Mozambicans.
The categories of ‘Mozambican’ and ‘South African’ are ‘functional’ for
non-elites and elites in Bushbuckridge for a range of purposes. At the non-
elite level, the categories are currently used as ambivalent markers of social
status and therefore as ways of structuring hierarchical normative relation-
ships. At the elite level, they are used for constituency building and to claim
external resources and plan interventions.
Regarding our third question, Table 1 shows some of the main character-
istics of ‘Mozambicanness’ which are emphasized at the intra-village, com-
munity level. The table summarizes responses to an open-ended survey
question which I asked 57 respondents in three villages in Bushbuckridge,
of whom 29 were born in South Africa and 28 in Mozambique.
The responses to this question illustrate several elements of the categoriza-
tion of Mozambicans which are supported by the findings of my other, more
narrative, methods. The first is that the most common response by both
South African-born and Mozambican-born residents is a denial of difference,
or refusal to engage with a discussion about difference with an outsider
(e.g. responding with ‘none’ or ‘don’t know’). Second is that many of the
common signs of ethnic or national differentiation are not considered rele-
vant, such as race, physiognomy, religion, or other markers of ‘blood and
ancestry’.7 In fact, sameness of culture and kinship are emphasized more
often by both sides, in the no-difference responses, than evocations of culture
as a marker of difference.
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This leaves characteristics of difference which are acquired, rather than
immutable, and which are often about lifestyle choices or practices rather
than inherent features. Cumulatively, these characteristics portray an image
of Mozambicans as ‘traditional’ or ‘uncivilized’ and South Africans as
‘modern’. Mozambicans love the land, are less educated or literate in the
modern schooling system, dress more conservatively, have more wives and
more children, and are willing to work hard with their hands and walk far.
Conversely, South Africans love money, are more integrated into a modern
education system, have smaller, nuclear families, and prefer well-paid office
jobs and cars. Other commonly mentioned markers of ‘Mozambicanness’, as
noted in the previous case study, are lack of an identity document and
residence in a marginal neighbourhood of the village. Finally, the memory
of Mozambican refugees arriving with nothing and being dependent on
handouts from local South Africans continues to shape the division of
Mozambicans and South Africans into status groups.
The significance of these characteristics of a socially categorized
‘Mozambican’ is that a person of Mozambican birth or parentage who has
a South African identity document, lives in the central section of the village,
dresses in stylish, modern clothes, is educated and has a respectable income
in a non-manual job is accepted as a South African and will in most situa-
tions define himself as South African. Such a person therefore becomes
Table 1
Perceptions of ‘Mozambicanness’
What is the difference between
South Africans and Mozambicans
in Bushbuckridge?
According to
South African-born
(N¼ 29)
According to
Mozambican-born
(N¼ 28)
None 9 10
Language/accent 5 0
Culture 3 1
Don’t know 3 8
Mozambicans love ploughing,
South Africans love money
3 4
Mozambicans are less educated 2 5
Dress 2 0
Mozambicans are discriminated
against by the state
1 0
Mozambicans don’t practise
family planning
1 0
Mozambicans are reckless 1 0
Mozambicans are uncivilized 1 0
Mozambicans walk not drive 1 0
Mozambicans are poorer 0 1
South Africans are poorer, more criminal 0 1
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invisible as a ‘Mozambican’ in local discourses of cultural or status grouping.
Conversely, various socially constructed categorizations of ‘Mozambicans’
in Bushbuckridge identify clearly ‘visible’ Mozambican communities who
still live in relatively isolated settlements, have access to fewer services,
dress conservatively, have retained a distinctive accent, and self-identify
openly as Mozambican.
Elite representations of ‘Mozambicans’ in Bushbuckridge, in contrast to
non-elite social interactions for status maintenance, are about claiming a
constituency and about addressing overt welfare needs within their constitu-
ency. In the post-1999 political context of Bushbuckridge, where over 80 per
cent of those who arrived as refugees in the 1980s have acquired identity
documentation and where they can constitute up to 60 per cent of the resi-
dents of some wards, it is in the interests of local ward counsellors, Commu-
nity Development Forum chairpersons and other locally elected officials to
speak about the residents of a village inclusively, without distinction accord-
ing to national origin. In interviews with such leaders, the common refrain
was ‘we no longer call them Mozambican because they are part of us now.’
Especially traditional leaders such as chiefs and village level ndunas
(headmen), who have significant amounts of local power over land allocation
and local justice, identify their constituents on the basis of ethnicity and
clientage and not on the basis of national origin or legal status (Rodgers
2002). The aim of constituency building therefore elides all mention of
Mozambicans in local elite discourses.
On the other hand, local leaders are mandated to address the development
and welfare needs of their constituents. The ‘Mozambican neighbourhoods’
of most villages remain the most under-serviced in terms of infrastructure
and, until relatively recently, large numbers of the Mozambican-born and
their children did not have identity documents and therefore struggled to
access formal employment or social welfare services and government welfare
grants.8 When describing the levels of welfare need within their constituen-
cies, therefore, local leaders do often mention ‘the Mozambicans’ as a partic-
ularly vulnerable group. There were several occasions when I, as a researcher,
was explicitly asked for assistance in communicating ‘the Mozambicans’’
needs to the government on behalf of local ward counsellors. In this context
then, as with the state’s categorization in the first case study above,
‘Mozambicans’ are defined exclusively as people in need of assistance and
intervention. Once again, those who have already succeeded in acquiring IDs
and moving out of the ‘Mozambican’ settlement areas were not included in
this definition.
Finally, on negotiability, I have already mentioned some of the incentives
for Mozambican-born residents of villages in Bushbuckridge to want to be
‘invisible’ as ‘Mozambicans’ in the local social context. These include the lack
of political value in emphasizing a Mozambican identity, and the status
stigma associated with the term.
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Implications for Refugee Studies: Obscured by Documents, Space,
Self-representation and Time
These three examples of how Mozambicans in Bushbuckridge have been
categorized show that different actors with very different interests and inten-
tions may nonetheless end up all overlooking or explicitly excluding success-
fully integrated refugees. Some of the reasons for this may be context specific
or limited to situations where refugees and hosts are co-ethnic, which is quite
common in southern contexts. However, other elements of this recurrent
invisibility are more generalizable and therefore have implications for the
study of refugees more widely. While the partiality and functionality of cate-
gories are universal features of social science enquiry, self-confirmation, con-
flation, negotiability, and immutability take on particular significance in the
study of migration. They do so via, respectively, issues relating to documen-
tation, space, self-representation and change over time.
In our three examples, those who already had acquired documentation and
those living in non-marginal spaces were invisible. In all three cases, voluntary
self-representation as ‘Mozambican’ is key to being recognized as one. In the
first and last case studies, the static categorization was not interested in captur-
ing the changing legal, social and identity conditions of the targeted group as
a whole, preferring to apply the category only to those individuals who retained
the stereotypical (vulnerable and needy) characteristics of the category.
The use of identity documentation as an information source for institu-
tional and academic categorization is common. This ignores the following:
accessing and issuing documentation is a strategic process for both the issuing
institution and the recipient (Bakewell 2007); documents are often withheld
from deserving recipients (Landau 2006); individuals choose not to access
certain documents to which they might have a right; individuals may hold
documents to which they are not entitled, and so on. Categorization on the
basis of documentation, while sometimes functional, always carries the
danger of conflation and self-confirmation. The implications for the invisi-
bility of the integrated are manifest. Refugees who hold host country perma-
nent resident or citizenship documents are made invisible for institutions
which use legal definitions as the core of their group categorization.
Therefore the problems successfully documented refugees may face in terms
of discrimination, service access, and other protection or welfare needs, or
indeed their lack of problems and their positive contributions to the host and
diaspora societies, also become invisible.
Similarly, refugees who have spatially integrated are often made invisible.
Spaces have social value, are more or less marginal, and are identified with
different identities and categories of people (Knox and Pinch 2006).
Therefore, when refugees move physically from one space to another within
their host country, town or village, this potentially also constitutes a social
category move, and the social value of spaces is often conflated with the
social value of the people in those spaces. As the example of state
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categorization above shows, spatially integrated refugees may become invisi-
ble through explicit exclusion in the definition of the category. This is also
common with humanitarian and welfare interventions which only focus on
persons settled in specific locations. A second form of explicit spatial exclu-
sion is through the strategic sampling choices made for studies or interven-
tions. An example are migration surveys which only include neighbourhoods
known to have high concentrations of migrants, and which therefore exclude
migrants who live in more integrated settings (Jacobsen and Landau 2003;
Makina 2007; Vigneswaran 2007). Another path to invisibility is that spatially
integrated refugees have more options to self-represent themselves as non-
refugees or non-migrants to outsiders since they are less likely to be pre-
defined as belonging to a category due to their location. This is clearly
shown by the academic and social category examples above. Finally, local
social categories may be constructed differently by elites or by non-elites
where refugees and migrants are concentrated, compared to where they are
dispersed and socially integrated.
As we have seen in the case studies above, self-representation plays a key
role in who becomes categorized as what, illustrating the constant negotia-
bility of categories. The ways in which refugees ‘misrepresent’ themselves to
aid agencies and international organizations in the contexts of camps have
been discussed (Kibreab 2004), as has the impact of non-refugees registering
for food aid or using refugee-targeted welfare services (Callamard 1994).
What is less studied is when refugees make choices to avoid being registered
or categorized (Sommers 2001; see also Bakewell, this volume). In a field that
is often concerned with increasing the use of and access to the refugee label as
a source of protection, we only rarely seek to understand the reasons why
people would want to evade such categorization, and what options exist for
protection through alternative routes, such as becoming a ‘local’.
Finally, the three case studies described above illustrate one of the fun-
damental characteristics of categories: that they freeze groups in time.
Institutional categories do this by creating a documented set of criteria
which then reach back into the past and forward into the future as if the
categorized group had always been and will always be the same (Posel 2001).
Social categories, while more flexible in how they shift through time, also
tend to construct a myth of immutability around whatever characteristics the
category currently holds (Smith 1986; Anderson 1991). In fact, one of the
most interesting questions in the study of migration and forced migration,
and in the social sciences generally, is how a person moves through time from
a (putative) starting position of vulnerability to a position where they are no
longer as vulnerable (or possibly the other way around). Most of the kinds of
invisibility described in the case studies above obscure the full spectrum of
trajectories which refugees take after their arrival in a new place. These
trajectories include life with citizenship or permanent resident documents,
in mixed or mainstream living arrangements, and with jobs, businesses and
generally successful lives.
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Conclusion
There are many reasons to pay more attention to successfully integrated refu-
gees. These include political reasons, such as balancing the image of the depen-
dent and the vulnerable refugee with alternative images and stories. There are
also operational reasons, such as learning what contexts and interventions
work, or not, towards building more or less cohesive and integrative societies.
Clearly, not all contexts in which refugees self-settle will have the same char-
acteristics as the case study presented above to facilitate successful integration.
My main argument in this paper, however, has been that, rather than
looking at or for integrated refugees per se, we should recognize the funda-
mental epistemological blinkers inherent in bureaucratic, academic and social
categorization and what those blinkers obscure. This has several reasons.
First of all, truncating our understanding of the full trajectory of refugee
experiences is analytically, as well as politically, limiting. Secondly, methodo-
logical and practical challenges, however real they are, should not be an
excuse for ignoring a theoretically important population. In addition, if cate-
gorical blinkers can reinforce each other, as illustrated above, this suggests
that traditional methodological strategies such as triangulation of data from
different institutional sources may not be enough to make certain groups,
such as successfully integrated refugees, visible. A conscious process of cate-
gorical deconstruction, by using the questions suggested above, is important
for ensuring that our methods do not unwittingly exclude. To the extent that
every study or intervention must knowingly and strategically focus on some
groups and not others, this should be a conscious and reflected choice.
Thirdly, a focus on careful engagement with categories is part of the wider
argument, also made by Bakewell in this volume, that refugee studies should
free itself from too great a focus on institutional perspectives and interven-
tions, and take on more theoretically grounded bases for how it conceptua-
lizes and categorizes the people it studies. Finally, and most broadly, being
aware of categorical invisibility, whatever form it takes, is simply about
sound and critical academic endeavour. This paper has presented a frame-
work for guiding such a critical engagement.
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2. Today’s Bushbuckridge is part of the former Gazankulu, and the Northern
Province has since been renamed Limpopo Province.
3. If a person does not receive a birth certificate as a child, they can apply for a ‘late’
birth certificate on the basis of affidavits from relatives and local leaders, confirm-
ing that the person is a member of the family and is known in the village. Many
rural South Africans still do not have birth certificates due to home births and the
distance and cost of accessing the Department of Home Affairs’ rural offices. This
was especially the case until the late 1990s. Therefore, Mozambicans settled in
these rural areas, sharing the same language with locals, could credibly claim to
be local, if supported by the appropriate documentation from South African neigh-
bours and local leaders.
4. While urban life for Mozambican refugees is not necessarily coupled with greater
economic success or deeper social engagement with South Africans, compared with
remaining in rural border areas, it often is. Furthermore, it is an element of
‘successful’ integration in that it involves leaving spaces which are specifically
identified with Mozambicans for more mixed spaces.
5. This includes recording forms of identity documentation (citizen, permanent
resident, none) since 2004, and introducing migration reconciliation for moves
from one location or village to another within the census site so that the
records for an individual before and after their move can be compared (recorded
since 2005).
6. The 2005 documentation status data showed that almost 80 per cent of
Mozambican ‘refugees’ had acquired permanent residence or citizenship in 2005,
from (anecdotally) very low levels of documentation in the early 1990s.
7. This is by no means self-evident, since there are many examples where groups with
common physiognomic, ethnic and linguistic characteristics have nonetheless poli-
ticized such differences to the point of genocide, e.g. in Burundi, Rwanda or
Darfur. The reference by South African-born respondents to language and
accent as a marker of difference is an exception here, but accent identifiers are
subtle and no larger than accent differences between XiTsonga speakers in north-
ern and southern parts of South Africa’s Limpopo Province. In this context, accent
is a mutable characteristic, rather than a clear indicator of ancestry.
8. Lack of documents is still a problem for around 20 per cent of Mozambican-born
and their children in Bushbuckridge but the percentage was much higher until
c. 2001 when the 1999/2000 amnesty process was completed. Since 2004,
Mozambicans holding a permanent residence ID are eligible to receive state old-
age pensions and child support grants, which have significantly improved their
livelihoods.
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 Adapting to Changing Legal Frameworks: 
Mozambican Refugees in South Africa 
 TARA  POLZER * 
 Abstract 
 This paper argues that legal frameworks to manage immigration and refugee rights need to 
be understood from below, namely, how they are interpreted and used locally by the im-
migrants affected and by the host communities, in their speciﬁ c historical context. Using 
the case of  Mozambican refugees in South Africa (1985 – 2006), the paper outlines why 
many of  the policies targeted at or affecting this group of  immigrants have had counterpro-
ductive effects (from the perspective of  policy makers) because of  the disjuncture between 
the goals and assumptions of  the legal framework and the reality experienced and desired 
by the refugees. The situation of  Mozambican refugees in South Africa over the past twenty 
years has been shaped by a radically changing legal context. These changes are charted and 
matched with how Mozambican refugees, especially those settled in the rural border areas, 
have adapted to, made use of  and subverted the various legal constraints and opportunities 
provided by the South African state and its local representatives. 
 1.  Policy and experience 
 Immigration and refugee law and policy are often analysed from the top, 
looking at the motivations, interests and backgrounds of  the actors writ-
ing and negotiating the texts. Or they are analysed from the side, from 
the perspective of  organized civil society debating its impact on the im-
migrant client. This paper looks at law and policy from below, namely 
how those laws and policies have been interpreted and reacted to by 
those they are intended to affect. Using the case of  Mozambican 
refugees in South Africa (1985 – 2005), it will be argued that many of  the 
policies targeted at or affecting Mozambican refugees have had counter-
productive effects (from the perspective of  policy makers) because of  the 
 disjuncture between the goals and assumptions of  the legal framework 
and the reality experienced and desired by the refugees. 1 
 Since the mid-1980s, South Africa has been host to hundreds of  thou-
sands of  refugees from the Mozambican civil war. When the end of  the 
war coincided with a political thaw in South Africa in 1992, around 
240,000 refugees decided to stay in South Africa rather than return to 
* Coordinator, Citizenship and Boundaries Initiative, Forced Migration Studies Programme, Uni-
versity of  the Witwatersrand, South Africa. This paper was ﬁ rst presented at the Workshop on Law 
and Society: ‘Constituting Democracy’, University of  the Witwatersrand, 9–10 Sept. 2004
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Mozambique. In the twenty years of  their presence in South Africa, they 
have been subjected to extreme shifts in government policy: from the 
apartheid regime’s complete refusal of  recognition and rights, to the dem-
ocratic regime’s slow, but now almost complete, conferral of  legal and 
socio-economic rights, and in many cases citizenship. Mozambican refu-
gees in South Africa, therefore, represent an important case study of  how 
changing government policy impacts on forced migrants and on immi-
grants in general. 
 Looking at the impact of  law and policy from below means paying 
attention to a range of  factors rarely considered in the analysis of  formal 
law. This includes considering the interstices between formal policies, the 
impact of  changing policies over time, local interpretations of  the labels 
and categories imposed by law, and the agency of  those affected by law to 
subvert, oppose and evade it. 
 Mozambicans in South Africa have never been subject to or protected 
by an established and structured refugee law. The South African Refugee 
Act was only passed by Parliament in 1998 and came into operation in 
2000, many years after the end of  the Mozambican civil war and the ces-
sation of  refugee status for Mozambicans. Mozambican refugees were 
always dealt with under legislation concerning illegal immigrants and 
migrant workers, like the 1991 Aliens Control Act and its antecedents, or 
other  ad hoc arrangements, such as the 1993 Tripartite Agreement (including 
UNHCR), which conferred group refugee status to Mozambicans, the 
1996 decision to revoke refugee status, or the 1999 Exemption for former 
Mozambican Refugees, which belatedly recognised the rights of  this group 
to apply for permanent residence. 
 In addition to the lack of  a speciﬁ c legal framework appropriate to the 
rights of  Mozambicans as refugees, and in addition to the  ad hoc nature of  
ofﬁ cial policies directed at them, there have been a host of  semi-ofﬁ cial 
and un-ofﬁ cial frameworks. These have not been legal in the sense that 
they are based in law, but they have, nevertheless, shaped interactions 
between Mozambican refugees and state actors and have enabled or con-
strained the acquisition of  legal status. This includes informal practices by 
local government ofﬁ cials as well as national practices. 2 Local informality 
can be the kind of  petty corruption that South Africans also face, making 
access to documents or services dependent on connections and money 
1 As the discussion below illustrates, labeling Mozambicans in South Africa is difﬁ cult. Even 
though Mozambicans ﬂ eeing the war were only formally recognized as refugees for three years after 
the end of  the civil war (1993–1996), and their progressive integration means the label may lead to 
misleading assumptions, I will use the terms ‘refugees’ and ‘former refugees’ to distinguish them from 
Mozambicans who came to South Africa as labour migrants before the mid 1980s or after 1992.
2 This stands in contrast to ‘legalizing’ by purchasing fraudulent documents from private suppliers, 
which is a difﬁ cult issue in South Africa, as elsewhere, but is not part of  this discussion on the inter-
action of  refugees and the state.
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rather than background. It can also be turning a blind eye when locals 
come to register a young refugee in their name so that she can ﬁ nish school, 
or when land parcels are allocated and grants are applied for on the South 
African neighbour’s ID number, or when rejected applicants for amnesties 
are not deported. Nationally, an important semi-formal practice was the 
distribution of  IDs to immigrants in advance of  the 1994 elections, with 
the promise of  citizenship for those who voted (see below). 
 In taking the perspective from below, these informal frameworks are as 
important as the formal ones because they are experienced, if  anything, 
more directly than what is theoretically encoded in law. Most Mozambican 
refugees do not know what the law says and their only interaction with the 
South African state is via its local representatives, who, especially in mar-
ginal, rural areas, mete out their own interpretations of  the law with a 
great deal of  impunity. 3 When these practices are the norm rather than the 
exception, and especially when they are seen as normatively acceptable, 
they cannot be understood as aberrations from the law but as constituting 
a regular and predictable set of  conditions through which people interact 
with the state, that is, a kind of  local law in themselves. 
 Another consequence of  looking at legal frameworks from below, is the 
need to consider their impacts over time. This requires consideration of  at 
least four different processes: ﬁ rst, the changing formal legal framework; 
second, the changing interpretation and implementation of  that frame-
work; third, the changing needs, desires and priorities of  those the legal 
framework is targeting; and ﬁ nally, the interaction between the framework 
and the target group desires, where the framework (and its implementa-
tion) can create incentives or disincentives for action. We must also take 
into account that current target group perceptions of  the framework may 
be based on memories of  past frameworks and implementation. 
 This perspective also requires us to take seriously local understandings 
of  cause and effect, policy motivation and categorisation of  actors. For 
example, distant academics tend to discuss immigration policy as a rela-
tionship between an undifferentiated group of  immigrants (or different 
legal categories of  immigrants) and a largely abstract state. What is con-
tested is access to relatively abstract rights within a conceptual framework 
that categorically distinguishes between national and non-national, 
 immigrant and citizen. The perceptions of  Mozambican refugees are 
much more personal and political: they interact with local Shangaan-
speaking chiefs who welcome them as a means to expand their power 
bases. They voted for the African National Congress party and Nelson 
3 This is by no means particular to rural areas, however, as studies of  the Refugee Reception Ofﬁ ces 
in Johannesburg and Pretoria have shown. See L.A. de la Hunt, Tracking Progress: Initial Experience with 
the Refugees Act, 130 of  1998 (Johannesburg: National Consortium of  Refugee Affairs, 2002).
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Mandela in 1994 as ethnic Shangaans. 4 They interpreted the post-1994 
arrests and deportations of  immigrants by the Department of  Home 
Affairs as political revenge against ANC supporters since the Minister of  
Home Affairs was the leader of  the opposition Inkatha Freedom Party. 
The signiﬁ cance of  these categorisations is discussed further below. 
 The ﬁ nal consequence of  the perspective from below is the centrality of  
agency by policy target groups, in this case Mozambican refugees, in crea-
tively adapting to, rather than merely accepting, policy-driven constraints. 
The law has almost always criminalized Mozambican refugees as illegal 
immigrants. As discussed below, even in the few years when refugee status 
was granted, this in no way removed the dangers associated with illegality. 
Only since 1996 have there been options for the legal acquisition of  legal 
status for Mozambican refugees and, even since then, there has been strong 
continuity with the historical national tendency to separate (black) immi-
grants from the body politic, rather than enabling access and integration. 
These policies of  exclusion stand in stark contrast with the reality of  the 
majority of  Mozambican refugees who are settled in the former home-
lands near the Mozambican border. Various conditions, summarised below, 
have led to signiﬁ cant local integration and the commitment to remain in 
South Africa. Rather than meekly adapting their reality to ﬁ t the con-
straints of  a legal framework which de-legitimised them (accepting their 
criminalisation), many creatively found entry into a legitimate identity as 
citizens of  South Africa ((ab)using the law to enable a normal reality). On 
the other hand, agency can come up against insurmountable odds: most 
refugees were forced to live largely outside the inﬂ uence of  the law and, 
therefore, outside the beneﬁ ts derived from the state, leading to decades of  
vulnerability. Even after accessing legal status by legal means during the 
1996 and 1999 government amnesties, this historical vulnerability contin-
ues to impact on their options and lives today. 
 Two main periods can be identiﬁ ed in the shifting legal frameworks 
affecting Mozambican refugees in South Africa: prior to 1996 and after 
1994, with some overlap in the mid-1990s. The ﬁ rst period was character-
ised by the goal of  separating and removing the refugees from the South 
African body politic, based on the assumption that they would and should 
return to Mozambique. The second period progressively regularised legal, 
as well as socio-economic, integration based on the recognition that they 
were in the country to stay. This dichotomy, however, is not absolute. The 
continued prevalence of   ‘ control and remove ’ priorities in South African 
4 There is some debate about the appropriate name for people who speak the Shangaan or Tsonga 
languages in South Africa. I use the term and spelling ‘Shangaan’ to refer to people in Bushbuckridge 
District because this is closest to the name used by South African and Mozambican XiShangaane-
speakers in Bushbuckridge District when they speak about themselves in English.
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immigration management after 1994 strongly affected the legalisation 
campaigns. 5 Furthermore, the post-1994 regularisation policies did not 
really reﬂ ect a pro-active government attitude toward the political inclu-
sion of  Mozambican refugees, whether as persons whose rights had been 
violated by apartheid, as refugees from an apartheid war, or as participants 
in the struggle for democracy. Rather, the policies were a reluctant acqui-
escence to regularise an uncomfortable status quo. 6 In the ﬁ rst period, 
refugee resistance to the legal framework was expressed largely through 
state avoidance and identity adaptation (often through fraud). The reac-
tions to the legal changes in the second period were generally positive, 
but cautious, retaining a level of  suspicion of  the motivations of  the state, 
primarily because of  the continued experience of  deportation and 
 discrimination. 
 The ﬁ rst period is characterised by the impacts of  the apartheid 
regime’s lack of  recognition of  refugees, the concomitant lack of  an institu-
tionalised aid response and the semi-formal spatial constraint to homelands 
from 1985 – 1993; the 1993 Tripartite Agreement between South Africa, 
Mozambique and the UNHCR which conferred group refugee status; 
the 1994 – 95 UNHCR-managed repatriation programme and deportation 
campaigns based on the 1991 Aliens Control Act. The second period includes 
South Africa’s ﬁ rst democratic elections in 1994, the impacts of  the 1995, 
1996 and 1999 – 2000 Amnesties affecting Mozambican refugees and the 
2004  Khosa and  Mahlaule Constitutional Court cases granting permanent 
residents the right to social welfare grants. 
 Before proceeding to the case study, it should be noted that this analysis 
is based on over ten years of  continuous engagement with the legal and 
social conditions of  Mozambican refugees in South Africa by the Citizen-
ship and Boundaries Initiative of  the Forced Migration Studies Programme 
of  the University of  the Witwatersrand (previously known as the Wits 
 Refugee Research Programme  – RRP) with a focus on Bushbuckridge dis-
trict in Limpopo Province, the area where most Mozambican refugees set-
tled. The author has been working with this community for the past three 
years and has drawn on the work of  prior colleagues. The RRP combined 
legal and paralegal advocacy and advice with in-depth ethnographic 
research. Many of  the post-1994 legal changes described below were inﬂ u-
enced by the RRP’s research and advocacy (such as the 1996 SADC 
Amnesty, the 1999 Exemption for former Mozambican refugees and the 
 Khosa and  Mahlaule Constitutional Court cases) and much of  the quoted 
5 See J. Crush, D. McDonald, ‘Introduction to Special Issue: Evaluating South African Immigra-
tion Policy After Apartheid’ (2002) 48 Africa Today 1-13; S. Peberdy, ‘Imagining Immigration: Inclusive 
Identities and Exclusive Policies in Post-1994 South Africa’ (2002) 48 Africa Today 14-32, for discussions 
on the historical continuity of  restrictive immigration policy in the old and new South Africa.
6 J. Crush, V. Williams (eds.), The New South Africans? The Immigration Amnesties and their Aftermath 
(Cape Town: Idasa, 1999).
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testimony by former refugees was gathered while evaluating the impact of  
these legal changes. 
 2.  Legal exclusion and social inclusion: 1985 – 1995/96 
 Mozambican migration to South Africa has a long history. The legal 
frameworks that enabled and constrained that migration are well known, 
and will not be discussed here. 7 Sufﬁ ce to say, that the history of  labour 
migration and the presence of  Mozambican migrants in Bushbuckridge 
prior to the mid-1980s were very signiﬁ cant in shaping Mozambican con-
ceptions of  their place in and relationship to South Africa, as well as 
assisting some refugees to integrate quickly by joining long-term resident 
relatives. 
 2.1  Legal framework on arrival 
 Although the civil war in Mozambique started in 1975, the mid-
1980s saw an escalation of  violence in the southern districts of  
Mozambique bordering South Africa. 8 This led to the mass ﬂ ight of  
entire families and communities across the border, numbering hundreds 
of  thousands a year in 1985, 1986 and 1987. By the end of  the civil 
war in 1992, at least 320,000 Mozambican refugees had settled in South 
Africa. 9 
 The apartheid government in power at the time was not party to any of  
the international Conventions or Protocols on refugee rights, and refused 
to provide any protection or assistance to refugees, as required under inter-
national law. 10 As Crush and Williams point out,  ‘ the apartheid govern-
ment was the prime cause of  the ﬂ ight of  over two million people from 
Mozambique to other countries in the region … [and] only the South Afri-
can government sought to keep them out by deporting them, electrifying 
border fences, and restricting movement of  those who made it over the 
fence ’ . 11 However, the national government informally allowed the 
semi-autonomous  ‘ homelands ’ along the border with Mozambique to host 
the refugees. The majority of  the Shangaan-speaking refugees, therefore, 
settled in the Shangaan-speaking  ‘ homeland ’ of  Gazankulu and the 
Swazi-speaking  ‘ homeland ’ of  KaNgwane, while Sotho-speaking 
7 S. E. Katzenellenbogen, South African and Southern Mozambique; Labour, Railways and Trade in the 
Making of  a Relationship (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982); P. Harries, Work, Culture and 
Identity: Migrant Labourers in Mozambique and South Africa, c. 1860-1910 (Portsmouth, London and 
Johannesburg: Heinemann, James Currey and Witwatersrand University Press, 1994).
8 M. Newitt, A History of  Mozambique (London: Hurst and Company, 1995).
9 This number is extrapolated from church food distribution records in rural areas, and includes 
an estimate of  urban-based refugees, as calculated by Chris Dolan.
10 Crush and McDonald, n. 5 above.
11 Crush and Williams, n. 6 above, 2
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Lebowa refused them entry and Kwa-Zulu barely tolerated them. The 
ﬁ eld-work on local adaptation and resistance cited here is largely based in 
the southern portion of  Gazankulu, which today is called Bushbuckridge 
district. 
 The policy of  conﬁ ning the refugees to the homelands was an expres-
sion of  the government’s dual marginalisation of  the refugees and the 
 ‘ homelands ’ , placing both outside the territorial ambit of  national immi-
gration law. As immigration law is always a reﬂ ection of  conceptions of  
citizenship, this also reﬂ ected the racially deﬁ ned citizenship laws and 
practices of  the apartheid regime that excluded South African-born 
Shangaans from the national body politic almost as much as the refugee 
Shangaans. 
 Lack of  national legal recognition led to a range of  local responses, all 
facilitating local integration. First, there are several layers of  irony in the 
fact that the  ‘ homeland ’ governments accepted the apartheid creation of  
ethnic identity-based  ‘ homelands ’ to the extent that they welcomed their 
co-ethnies as brothers and (albeit temporary) guests, rather than as foreign-
ers. 12 The then Chief  Minister of  Gazankulu, Hudson Ntsanwisi, argued 
that Gazankulu’s acceptance of  the Shangaan refugees was directly paral-
lel to the assistance which the apartheid Republic of  South Africa had 
given white Mozambicans ﬂ eeing Mozambican independence in 1975. 13 
In addition, local chiefs could expand their support bases by settling re -
fugees next to their villages. 14 The basic categorisation as kin, while not 
precluding all discrimination or prejudice, did set the stage for a relatively 
inclusive social context. 
 Second, national rejection of  responsibility meant no internationally 
sponsored aid or camps, since international aid organisations, including 
the UNHCR, are dependent on an invitation from the national govern-
ment. Therefore, it was up to local communities, churches and small, local 
NGOs to provide assistance. While this may have increased hardship for 
some in the short-term, international experience shows that locally inte-
grated refugees, especially when there is a welcoming host community, are 
generally better off  than those conﬁ ned to camps. 15 Although settlements 
were established that were exclusively populated by refugees, and many of  
12 South African Shangaans today also readily acknowledge that all South African Shangaan and 
Tsonga-speakers migrated from Mozambique into the Transvaal region in the mid to late 1800s, 
linking all Shangaan-speakers to a relatively recent Mozambican past. This connection was further 
kept alive through extensive labour migration across the border from the early 1900s onward.
13 C. Dolan, The Changing Status of  Mozambicans in South Africa and the impact of  this on repatriation to and 
re-integration in Mozambique (Maputo: Norwegian Refugee Council, 1997) endnote 120.
14 G. Rodgers, When Refugees Don’t Go Home: Post-War Mozambican Settlement Across the Border with South 
Africa, PhD Thesis, Anthropology (  Johannesburg: University of  the Witwatersrand, 2002), 15.
15 M. Smith ‘Warehousing Refugees: A Denial of  Rights, a Waste of  Humanity’, in M. Smith World 
Refugee Survey (Washington D.C., 2004).
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these settlements remain today, these were never institutionally separated 
from South  African settlements. They have been managed through the 
same structures of  chiefs, headmen and community development forums, 
and residents have moved around freely within the  ‘ homeland ’ area. The 
lack of  institutional separation also meant that social and economic inter-
actions between re fugees and hosts could be established immediately, and 
were, in fact, necessary for the refugees to survive. 
 The combination of  homeland government goodwill, especially 
in the case of  Gazankulu, and general social acceptance and interaction 
led to a range of  options for refugee  ‘ naturalisation ’ within the limited 
 ‘ national ’ sphere of  the  ‘ homeland ’ government. This included inter-
marriage with South Africans and the inclusion of  school children in 
school-based identity document application and distribution. Youth and 
children born in South Africa, especially, found it relatively easy to get 
South African documentation at the time. Long-term migrant workers, 
particularly those formally employed in the mines, could also apply for 
identity documents through their employers, passing this status on to fam-
ily members. 
 Finally, it was common for South African families who shared 
surnames with Mozambican families to  de facto adopt refugee neighbours 
and acquaintances by claiming them as relatives and assisting them 
to apply for IDs. Local government ofﬁ cials generally accepted letters 
of  support from traditional leaders and the word of  local South Africans 
without stringent cross-checks. 16 This by no means meant that all refugees 
had easy access to documents; unemployed adults with no prior family 
connections in South Africa, especially, had few avenues for acquiring 
documentation. The majority of  refugees remained vulnerable to exploita-
tion in the labour market and generally faced greater socio-economic dep-
rivation than their South African neighbours. 17 Nonetheless, under the 
 ‘ homeland ’ government, high levels of  social integration generally led to 
matching legal status. This was because avenues to documentation were 
determined by local connections and resources, rather than by distant laws 
and regulations. The following story of  a young Mozambican man is not 
exceptional: 
 I was welcomed at Mr Ndlovu’s family who treated me like his son. I was doing 
everything a man was supposed to do in the family. The following year my family 
came to South Africa and stayed at Gottenburg next to Manyeleti [in the north-
eastern corner of  Bushbuckridge]. Mr Ndlovu was selling chickens and he helped my 
family to get South African IDs, and subsequently a stand next to the new stadium. 
16 Personal communication, Vusi Nkuna, son of  a Chief  in Gazankulu.
17 C. Dolan, S. M. Tollman, et al., ‘The Links Between Legal Status and Environmental Health: 
A Case Study of  Mozambican Refugees and their Hosts in the Mpumalanga (Eastern Transvaal) 
Lowveld, South Africa’ (1997) 2 Health and Human Rights, 62-84.
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He also helped me to continue with my education as a result of  which I completed 
my matric at Eric Nxumalo Secondary School. All these were very easy because 
of  the same surname Ndlovu. 18 
In contrast, outside the territory of  the  ‘ homelands ’ , Mozambican refu-
gees were treated as illegal aliens under the Aliens Control Act (Act 96 of  
1991) and its predecessors, and were actively sought out and deported. 
Crush and McDonald even suggest that the ACA’s draconian deportation 
regime was designed as a  ‘ thinly disguised state assault on forced migrants 
from war-ravaged Mozambique ’ . 19 Given the lack of  employment oppor-
tunities in the homelands, labour migration to the cities was one of  the 
only viable livelihood strategies. In 1992, between 46 percent and 58 per-
cent of  male refugees aged 19 or over were migrant labourers (dependent 
on household composition and settlement type), and a larger proportion 
of  refugees migrated for work (13.1 percent of  total refugee population) 
than locals (10.7 percent). 20 Because of  these rural-urban linkages, the 
vulnerability of  urban refugees directly affected the relatively sheltered 
rural refugees as well. As discussed further below, these urban-based refu-
gees, or rural-urban migrant refugees, were excluded from most of  the 
later  ‘ positive ’ policy initiatives targeted at the rural-based refugees. 
 2.2  1993 Tripartite Agreement 
 The period of  no recognition came to an end with the 1993 Tripartite 
Agreement between the governments of  South Africa and Mozambique 
and the Ofﬁ ce of  the UNHCR. The legal recognition conferred by this 
agreement, however, did not improve the situation of  Mozambican refu-
gees on the ground. 
 The end of  the Mozambican civil war, marked by the 1992 Peace Treaty 
between the armed groups FRELIMO and RENAMO, coincided with 
political change in South Africa. After decades of  isolation from the inter-
national  ‘ community of  states ’ , the South African government had, in 1991, 
signed an agreement with the UNHCR to assist with repatriating South 
African struggle refugees. This opened the door for a 6 September 1993 
Basic Agreement between the UNHCR and the South African government 
in relation to Mozambican refugees, who had suddenly become visible to 
the South African government, followed on 15 September by a Tripartite 
agreement between the UNHCR and the governments of  South Africa 
and Mozambique. This agreement granted group refugee status to 
18 Refugee working in Johannesburg, interviewed in Protea North, 27 Mar. 1995, quoted in 
C. Dolan, n. 16 above.
19 Crush and McDonald, n. 5 above, 2.
20 S. Tollman, K. Herbst, et al., The Agincourt Demographic and Health Study: Phase 1. (  Johannesburg: 
Department of  Community Health, University of  the Witwatersrand, 1993).
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Mozambicans, provided they had arrived between January 1985 and 
December 1992, or had been working as contract labourers in the early 
1980s and become refugees  sur place due to the prevailing security situation 
in Mozambique. 21 The Tripartite Agreement was guided by the 1951 UN 
Convention Relating to the Status of  Refugees and the 1969 OAU Conven-
tion Governing the Speciﬁ c Aspects of  Refugee Problems in Africa (see, 
Article III of  the Tripartite Agreement), but Article IV, Section 11 ( ‘ Treat-
ment ’ ) strongly restricted some of  the basic rights attached to refugee status:
 (c)  The presence of  a refugee shall thereafter be regularised provided that the 
continued presence alone of  such a person shall not establish any claim to 
permanent residence or any similar right in South Africa. 
 (d)  Refugees shall enjoy full legal protection, but shall not have automatic entitle-
ment to social, economic and welfare rights, provided that they shall not be 
treated any less favourably than aliens generally in the same circumstances. 22 
  
 This ﬁ rst ever South African refugee status determination (and the only group 
status determination to date) was certainly not a triumph for refugee rights. 
Instead of  providing any added protection, it directly increased the vulnera-
bility of  the majority of  Mozambican refugees. As the above restrictions 
make clear, the purpose of  granting group refugee status was not to provide 
protection in the host country, but merely to give the UNHCR a mandate to 
organise a voluntary repatriation programme, in effect to facilitate the move-
ment of  refugees out of  the country. 23 This was expressed most clearly by the 
fact that the only documents issued to refugees were registration forms 
for repatriation. No other documents were envisioned, leaving all those who 
did not register to return without any means of  showing their refugee status. 
 Thus the UNHCR colluded with the violation of  the right to free move-
ment through the continued  de facto spatial restriction of  the refugees to the 
rural homeland areas, and the violation of  articles 27 and 28 of  the 1951 
UN Convention which deﬁ ne the right to identity papers or travel 
documents. As Reitzes and Crawhall state, without documents  ‘ [Mozam-
bican refugees] exist in a legal vacuum, may be considered by ofﬁ cials to 
be  “ prohibited persons ” [under the 1991 Aliens Control Act] and, as 
such, are subject to arrest and deportation ’ . 24 Documents are also prereq-
uisites for enjoying other rights, such as the right to seek employment or 
21 UNHCR, Dec. 1993, ‘Guidelines for Refugee Status Determination of  Mozambicans in South 
Africa, Point 5’.
22 Tri-partite Agreement between the Government of  the Republic of  South Africa, the Govern-
ment of  the Republic of  Mozambique and UNHCR for the voluntary repatriation of  Mozambican 
Refugees from RSA, Maputo, 15 Sept. 1993.
23 C. Dolan, ‘Repatriation from South Africa to Mozambique - Undermining Durable Solutions?’ 
in Black and Koser (eds.) The End of  the Refugee Cycle? Refugee Repatriation and Reconstruction (New York, 
Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1999).
24 M. Reitzes, and N. Crawhall, ‘Accessing the SADC Amnesty: The Urban Experience’ in J. Crush 
and V. Williams (eds.), n. 6 above, 37.
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self-employment. 25 Reasons given for refusal of  documentation reﬂ ect the 
prioritisation of  institutional interests over the interests and protection of  
refugees: according to UNHCR ofﬁ cials, issuing documents to all refugees 
would be costly, might compromise the repatriation effort, and would be 
hard to reconcile with the government’s active deportation policy. 26 
 Not only did refugee status not provide protection from deportation, 
deportation levels dramatically increased from 1993. In 1993, 80,926 
Mozambicans were deported, in 1994 the number was 71,279, and in 
1995 and 1996 deportations climbed to 131,689 and 157,425 respec-
tively. 27 In comparison, only 31,589 refugees took part in the ofﬁ cial volun-
tary repatriation programme and UNHCR reported a further 35,471 
 ‘ spontaneous ’ returns by December 1995. 28 Aurelia wa Kabwe-Segatti 
calls the deportation policy  ‘ a novel form of  forced migration  “ in reverse ”  ’ 
and states that this combination of   ‘ voluntary ’ repatriation and  ‘ forced ’ 
repatriation constitutes the  ‘ instrumentalisation of  international law to 
legitimise a coercive and hegemonic approach to the movement of  popula-
tions ’ . 29 Even though South Africa had no domestic refugee legislation and 
had not yet signed the international refugee conventions, by deporting 
Mozambicans before 1996, during the war and while they were recognised 
as refugees, the South African government was guilty of   refoulement , one of  
the central prohibitions of  international refugee law. 30 The ways in which 
the state’s deportation policy impacted on all other legal frameworks 
affecting Mozambican refugees are discussed further below. 
 Finally, rather than facilitate more socio-economic assistance, refugee 
status coincided with a gradual reduction in food aid from local churches, 
which had been offered in small amounts since the mass inﬂ ux in the 
mid-1980s. The UNHCR actively campaigned to reduce the National 
Nutrition and Social Development Programme funding for food for 
Mozambican refugees from R11 million to R4 million, arguing that 
food aid would keep people from wanting to return to Mozambique. 31 
 The irrelevance of  formal refugee status to the daily lives of   Mozambican 
refugees is most strongly illustrated by the fact that virtually none are aware 
25 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of  Refugees, 1951, Arts. 17 and 18.
26 C. Dolan, n. 13 above, 37.
27 C. Dolan, n. 23 above, 98f.
28 UNHCR, Mozambique, repatriation and reintegration of  Mozambican refugees (Maputo: 
UNHCR Mozambique, 1996).
29 A. Wa Kabwe-Segatti, A. (2002). ‘Du Rapatriement Volontaire au Refoulment Dissimule; Les Refugies 
Mozambicains en Afrique du Sud’, 85 Politique Africaine 75-92, at 76.
30 C. Murray, ‘Mozambican Refugees: South Africa’s Responsibility’ (1986) 2 South African Journal on 
Human Rights 154-163. Art. 33 of  the 1951 UN Convention states that ‘no contracting state shall expel 
or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of  territories where his life or freedom 
would be threatened’. South Africa deported 222,840 Mozambicans from 1988-1992, during the 
height of  the civil war. Dolan, n. 13 above, 31.
31 Rodgers, n. 14 above, 12.
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that they had ever been accorded this legal status and what their rights 
under this status might have been. Movement beyond the  ‘ homeland ’ areas 
(which were reincorporated into South Africa proper in 1994) remained 
restricted, as did formal work opportunities and access to any services 
requiring identity documentation, all in contravention of  international 
refugee law. One could say that Mozambican refugees in South Africa had 
the opposite problem so often lamented in the refugee literature  — they 
never had the opportunity to develop a self-image as  ‘ refugees ’ , depend-
ence on aid, or expectations of  entitlement to rights. 32 Rodgers has called 
the legal  ‘ recognition ’ process of  Mozambican refugees  ‘ structuring the 
demise of  a refugee identity ’ . 33 In fact, the very partial refugee identity 
(the right to go home, but no right to protection) imposed by the UNHCR 
during this period was not matched by either the state, which consist-
ently treated Mozambicans as illegal aliens, nor by the Mozambicans 
themselves. 
 2.3  1994 – 1995 Repatriation 
 The voluntary repatriation programme, enabled by the Tripartite Agree-
ment and managed by the UNHCR, lasted from March 1994 to 
December 1995. Even though UNHCR hailed it as a successful interven-
tion, as a formal policy it was highly ineffective. Only thirteen percent of  
the planned 240,000 refugees used this avenue to return to Mozambique. 
The government’s goal of  removing the  ‘ refugee problem ’ by removing 
the refugees failed because of  a series of  false assumptions about the lived 
experience and needs of  the refugees. 34 The refugees, in turn, only used 
the framework provided to them in ways that served their interests. 
 The ﬁ rst false assumption was that going back to Mozambique meant 
leaving South Africa once and for all. In fact, labour migration to South 
Africa from rural southern Mozambique was the historical norm, brieﬂ y 
interrupted by the war, and its resumption was particularly necessary after 
the war to help families reconstruct. Policies designed to minimise and 
prevent cross-border linkages actively discouraged families from re -
turning to Mozambique since Mozambique without South Africa was a 
less viable option than South Africa without Mozambique. The lack of  
32 I mean here that Mozambican refugees did not think of  themselves as refugees in the international 
legal sense, with expectations of  international aid or speciﬁ c legal rights. Their identity as people ﬂ eeing 
war was indeed strong, and limited food aid from local churches did construct them as a speciﬁ c cate-
gory of  people needing assistance more than poor locals, although it was never enough to create 
dependence.
33 G. Rodgers, ‘Structuring the Demise of  a Refugee Identity: the UNHCR’s “Voluntary Repatria-
tion Programme” for Mozambican Refugees in South Africa’, in de Wet and Fox (eds.) Transforming 
Settlements in Southern Africa. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001).
34 Dolan, n. 23 above.
154
34 Tara Polzer
documentation and the experience of  deportation  ‘ further reduced the 
prospects for individual households to repatriate at their own pace. By 
reinforcing the importance of  the international boundary and making 
cross-border movement more difﬁ cult, the UNHCR [and the government 
had] inadvertently raised the risk of  repatriation as return to South Africa 
[became] less and less of  a  “ fall-back ” option for those who do repatri-
ate ’ . 35 The short timeframe and transportation criteria of  the voluntary 
repatriation programme also militated against return by preventing fami-
lies from returning gradually. When UNHCR realised that some refugees 
were using the provided transport several times, they insisted on only trans-
porting entire families with all their goods. Thus families could not send 
ahead scouts and reconstruction workers, or leave some cash earners 
behind. Some families preferred to stay in South African entirely, rather 
than expose themselves to such risk. 
 A related assumption was that greater vulnerability in South Africa 
would motivate the refugees to repatriate. In fact, as shown in Dolan’s 
analysis, vulnerability was rather a  ‘ hold ’ factor, keeping refugees in South 
Africa. As Dolan puts it,  ‘ the more difﬁ cult the South African government 
makes it to come into the country, the less likely those already in it are to 
risk leaving ’ . 36 The original lack of  state engagement and aid to the refu-
gees, and their ensuing relative independence, ironically reduced the state’s 
leverage to create the kind of  total vulnerability that would  ‘ push ’ them 
out. In other countries, reducing aid to refugees is a tried and tested means 
of   ‘ encouraging ’ repatriation. 37 Since there was virtually no aid to with-
draw in this case, and the refugees had already learned to live with high 
levels of  exclusion from the state, there was little pressure that could be 
added. 
 The third reality, not acknowledged in the planning of  the repatriation, 
was that many Mozambicans simply wanted to stay in South Africa. Their 
children were in school and they had access to better health and income 
opportunities. Many had married South Africans. Many were also still 
traumatised by their experiences in the war and did not wish to return to 
places imbued with such horrible memories. 38 Although the levels of  inte-
gration were recognised in UNHCR planning documents for the repatria-
tion, no provision for legal alternatives to repatriation were made. 
35 Dolan, n. 13 above, ii.
36 Dolan, n. 23 above, 99.
37 B. S. Chimni, ‘From Resettlement to Involuntary Repatriation: Towards a Critical History of  
Durable Solutions to Refugee Problems’. New Issues in Refugee Research 2 (1999), 10.
38 N. Johnston and C. Simbine ‘The Usual Victims: The Aliens Control Act and the Voices of  
Mozambicans’ in Crush (ed.) Beyond Control: Immigration and Human Rights in a Democratic South Africa 
(Kingston/Cape Town: Southern African Migration Project/ Institute for Democracy in South 
Africa, 1998).
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 The fourth reality to be ignored was the presence of  around 100,000 
Mozambican refugees in urban areas, either as complete families or as 
migrant household heads of  families based in rural areas. The UNHCR’s 
initial planning ﬁ gures of  240,000 were based exclusively on rural-based 
refugees who had received food aid from churches. An information cam-
paign in urban areas was speciﬁ cally rejected by the UNHCR because of  
 ‘ security considerations ’ . 39 In practice, this excluded a signiﬁ cant propor-
tion of  the refugee population from the opportunity of  repatriation, in -
cluding those in rural areas, since the household decision-makers, who 
were working in the urban areas, were not informed. 
 This is not to say that repatriation as a policy was in itself  anathema to 
most Mozambican refugees. There was widespread appreciation that 
assistance with transport and reconstruction was offered and many stated 
that it was very useful for those who took advantage of  it. 40 However, most 
who remained in South Africa either decided that returning at the time 
and in the manner offered would be against their interests, or that they did 
not wish to return at all. In fact, return to Mozambique is today often 
expressed as a fear and a danger, such as  ‘ are you going to force us to 
return to Mozambique? ’ 41 
 It is clear that repatriation for Mozambican refugees in South Africa 
was far from the  ‘ natural and only ’ option suggested by the phrase  ‘ there’s 
no place like home ’ . 42 It was one option to be weighed up against other 
opportunities, such as those promised by the 1994 elections in South Africa 
(see below). In addition, if  return were so  ‘ natural, ’ South Africa would 
not have needed such a large-scale  ‘ forced repatriation ’ programme in 
the form of  deportation. 
 2.4  Deportation 
 Deportation policy and practice has impacted on the way in which all 
other policies and legal frameworks have been interpreted on the 
ground. It was inextricably linked to the  ‘ voluntary ’ repatriation process, 
to the experience of  the 1994 elections, and it has affected refugees’ 
willingness to come forward for the late 1990s Amnesty and Exemption 
processes. From 1990 – 1997, almost 740,000 Mozambicans were de-
ported, making up over 82 percent of  all deported from South Africa. 43 
Many of  these were former refugees and many individuals were 
deported several times. Even for those who have never been deported 
39 Dolan, n. 13 above, 15.
40 Dolan, n. 13 above.
41 This was the comment of  a middle-aged Mozambican woman when approached for permission 
to hold an interview, Aug. 2004, Bushbuckridge, SA.
42 Dolan, n. 23 above, Rodgers, n. 14 above.
43 Crush and Williams, n. 6 above, 2.
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themselves, such as the majority of  those refugees who remain in rural 
South African villages and do not venture into towns or cities to 
work, deportation remains a central structuring factor in the relationship 
with the state. This is summarised by a women who returned to 
Mozambique: 
 We heard that the war had ended and we were needed to return. But since people 
had left because of  the war, it was difﬁ cult for some to go immediately; they were 
not conﬁ dent. Now the ones who didn’t return are arrested when they are found; 
men and women. If  they ﬁ nd you, even if  you have your box of  tomatoes on your 
head, they take you. We hear that so-and-so has been arrested, even when they are 
doing their work, they get deported, and the children stay. This is what I saw and 
heard. When they arrest us, we ask why we are arrested, and they say that [Minister 
of  Home Affairs] Buthelezi says we should go home because [Mozambican 
President] Chissano needs us now that the war is over, and we should go because 
we bring weapons here. They say our sons bring arms from there to sell here, and 
they are big Tsotsis [criminals], and that there are many Tsotsis because of  
Shangaans. They say that we Shangaans voted for Mandela, and he won the elec-
tions because of  us. We voted for Mandela, most of  us. 44 
As suggested by the above testimony, and many other interviews, Mozam-
bican refugees did not interpret deportation as a national policy by the 
ANC government, but rather as a party-political act of  revenge by 
Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the IFP Minister of  the Department of  Home 
Affairs, against Shangaans who had helped the ANC to power. There-
fore, instead of  seeing the deportation policy as an expression of  a gen-
eral government anti-rights discourse, incongruous with the rhetoric of  
inclusion and human rights coming out of  the post-1994 democratic 
President’s Ofﬁ ce (as it has often been interpreted by academic commen-
tators), 45 it was seen as a personalised political contest in which Shangaans 
(without a distinction based on citizenship) were caught in the cross-ﬁ re. 
 The stated purpose of  the deportation policy is to reduce the number 
of   ‘ illegal aliens ’ in the country. This aim is failing in general, due to the 
high rate of  return for deportees, but it is especially counterproductive in 
the case of  Mozambican refugees. Because of  the dependence of  rural 
Mozambican communities generally on cash income from South Africa, 
and the long-term settlement of  Mozambican refugees in South Africa 
speciﬁ cally, deportation is simply a household cost factor which means that 
men have to work even longer in South Africa before they can consider 
returning to Mozambique.  ‘ Those who have been deported explain that 
44 Interview in Matongomane, Mozambique, 25 Apr. 1996. All interviews quoted from 
Mozambique were carried out by Caetano Simbine under the direction of  Chris Dolan, for the Wits 
Refugee Research Programme.
45 Peberdy, n. 5 above.
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this is what obliges them to come back; they have to collect their money 
and goods, and they generally have family in South Africa who are de -
pendent on them for support, or family in Mozambique who are depen-
dent on them as a cash source’. 46 
 3.  Regularisation: 1994 – 2004 
 The second phase of  legal framework development in relation to 
 Mozambican refugees is characterised by ﬁ ve trends. First is the develop-
ment of  an inclusive political rhetoric under the  ‘ new ’ South Africa, 
which was epitomised initially by the inclusion of  long-term non-citizen 
residents in the right to vote in the 1994 elections. Second is a series of  
amnesties that facilitated permanent resident applications for various cat-
egories of  immigrants, including Mozambican refugees, by exempting 
them from normal application requirements. Third is the progressive 
development of  case law to deﬁ ne socio-economic rights as codiﬁ ed in 
the 1996 South African Constitution that led in 2004 to a Constitutional 
Court case in favour of  the socio-economic rights of  Mozambican refu-
gees. Fourth is a gradual change in the priorities of  most Mozambican 
refugees in South Africa, from potential interest in returning to Mozam-
bique to conviction about the desire to stay, and from fear about whether 
they would be allowed to stay to conﬁ dence in recognition and status. 
The ﬁ fth trend is the continuation of  deportation and discrimination by 
ofﬁ cials, paired with widespread corruption, which have undermined or 
qualiﬁ ed many of  the integration-oriented policies on the ground. 
 Regularisation is a good term for the amnesty and court-based proc-
esses, since they indeed made regular, normal and legal an already exist -
ing reality of  social and economic, and signiﬁ cantly political, integration. 
They also created a new reality by reducing some of  the vulnerabilities of  
Mozambican refugees, thereby enabling them to further increase their 
social and economic integration. This reﬂ exive interaction needs time to 
take effect, meaning that the full impact of  legal status will take several 
years to overcome the legacies of  twenty years of  vulnerability. 
 This period, which coincides with the instalment of  the new democratic 
regime in South Africa, cannot easily be classiﬁ ed as more inclusive or 
more rights-oriented. The government has not been uniﬁ ed or coherent 
in its immigration policies, with a very conservative and restrictive 
perspective coming from the Department of  Home Affairs, the lead 
department in immigration issues. The most signiﬁ cant regularisation 
processes for Mozambican refugees (the 1999 Exemption and the 2004 
Constitutional Court case) were motivated for and largely implemented 
46 Dolan, n. 13 above, 40.
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by non-governmental organisations. 47 Refugees (now  ‘ former ’ ) have felt 
this ambivalence about legal status, and trust in the processes was only 
built slowly. 
 3.1  1994 Elections 
 In contrast to the ineffectuality of  the policies targeted speciﬁ cally at 
Mozambican refugees (such as refugee status and repatriation), South 
Africa’s ﬁ rst democratic election had a great impact on Mozambicans, 
regarding both legal status and identity. 
 The elections provided an opportunity for many adults to acquire South 
African IDs. As described by a refugee in the former KaNgwane  ‘ home-
land ’ in 1995, 
 About half  the adults in this area now have IDs, most of  them purchased just before 
the elections last year. Men are more likely to have purchased than women. In many 
households just one person has one, as a kind of  protection for the whole house -
hold. The central government allowed various political parties to go around from 
village to village getting details and information for the issuing of  IDs. All you had 
to do was join the queue. Mozambicans had to pay R100. The ANC really pushed 
this process. People who were late were only issued with temporary cards. 48 
While this means of  accessing identiﬁ cation documents was probably 
used instrumentally by some, it is equally clear that voting in South Africa 
was imbued with strong political meaning and commitment to the coun-
try for others. It was a means of  matching an existing political and social 
commitment to the country with a formal act of  that commitment 
(voting) and a formal documentation of  that commitment (an ID). A refugee, 
now living in Mozambique after being deported said:  ‘ we voted for 
 Mandela  … He won the elections for our cause. There are many 
Shangaans in South Africa ’ . 49 
 The connection between voting and documentation was a central pro-
mise of  the political parties and the government-to-be. When asked 
about the election promises made to them, a Mozambican man replied: 
 They said that anyone who had been there more than seven years was considered 
South African. Whoever didn’t have an ID could go to them and get some so they 
could vote, a yellow card like they give children at the hospital. They wrote your 
name on it and gave it to you. If  you were there seven or ten years, you were con-
sidered South African. If  you only had four or ﬁ ve, they wouldn’t give you one and 
you could be deported at any moment. If  you had been there ten years, you 
couldn’t be deported, you were considered a resident. 50 
47 The Wits RRP was centrally involved in both processes, along with other research institutions, 
NGOs and legal organisations.
48 Dolan, n. 13 above, 97.
49 Interview in Simbe, Mozambique, 17 Apr. 1996.
50 Interview in Block 7, Mozambique, 25 Apr. 1996.
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 This promise, repeated by many refugees and South African citizens, is 
striking in that it is not based on any legal framework. South Africa’s per-
manent residency application process at the time, as now, had a ﬁ ve-year 
legal residence condition, not seven or ten. While permanent residents 
were allowed to vote in the 1994 elections, and black citizens of  neighbour-
ing countries had formally been allowed to apply for permanent residence 
since 1986, only a small number, and virtually no Mozambicans in 
Bushbuckridge, had been able to do so. 
 Another refugee who had been deported to Mozambique expressed 
the expectations succinctly:  ‘ We were guaranteed that if  we voted, we 
would be South African citizens and wouldn’t have to return here [to 
Mozambique] ’ . 51 The testimony of  another male refugee shows the com-
bination of  hope for rights and acceptance and the extreme disappoint-
ment in  broken promises attached to the elections: 
 I left here because of  the war. I went through the park, and ended up in Bush 
[Bushbuckridge district], in Justicia. We stayed there three years, with those people, 
with no problems. There was no work in the area so I went to Pretoria, where I 
found a job. The police found me and arrested me. When I asked why I was under 
arrest, they said,  ‘ Your President, Chissano, needs you there ’ . I didn’t resist, I went 
along with them. They deported me, and I came back through Ressano [border 
post]. I went to work again, and they arrested me again. I asked why, and they said, 
 ‘ You Mozambicans are not needed here, you cause unemployment and steal our 
women ’ . They deported me again and I returned again. I stayed there a long time, 
until the elections. They told us that those of  us who were there more than ﬁ ve 
years should have IDs and vote and there would be no more problems. We did this. 
They told us that if  we voted, no one would come after us and say we didn’t 
belong. We went along with this. That day, I was arrested again and deported. 
My wife and children are still there. I don’t know how they are or what they are 
eating, or what has become of  my belongings. What hurts the most is that they told 
us that if  we voted we wouldn’t be arrested again. But now I am suffering. 52 
The elections coincided with the voluntary repatriation programme and 
the vastly expanded deportation programme and might therefore be seen 
as sending mixed signals to immigrants. It could be interpreted as a pure 
instrumentalization of  (black) immigrants by political parties for the pur-
pose of  winning the election, without the intent to follow-through with 
an inclusive agenda. This interpretation derives from a perspective con-
cerned with the rights of  immigrants generally, in relation to a  generic 
state. On the other hand, the interpretation given to the elections by rural 
Mozambican refugees is much more personalised and political. They did 
not think of  themselves as foreigners being allowed to participate in a 
nation-building exercise. They saw themselves as Shangaans voting to 
51 Interview in Matongomane, Mozambique, 25 Apr. 1996.
52 Interview in Matongomane, Mozambique, 25 Apr. 1996.
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bring Nelson Mandela to power to improve the situation for themselves 
and for the region. This understanding made the elections and the de-
portation programme perfectly consistent as political actions by different 
political actors in South Africa. 
 The elections, the change of  government, and the new Constitution 
of  1996 also entered into host justiﬁ cations of  the position of  Mozambican 
re fugees in Bushbuckridge. Rodgers notes the importance of  a discourse 
of  history, ancestry and migration to explain the presence and integration 
of   Mozambicans. 53 After 1994, the new inclusive rhetoric of  the govern-
ment, particularly President Mandela, was also invoked as an additional 
legitimising discourse. According to a local Ward Councillor,  ‘ our former 
 President [Mandela] made mention that [all] people who are living here 
 … we are all Africans, so let us live together in peace and harmony. So 
those people [Mozambican refugees] started to realise that they are now 
welcome. They can stay.  … We are all South African, we are all African, 
we are all South African ’ . 54 While this rhetoric did not preclude some con-
tinued local discrimination in practice, the public profession of  acceptance 
and welcome stood in contrast to the national debates on controlling immi-
gration and rising xenophobia that were almost immediate correlates of  
liberation. The national inclusive rhetoric may have partly changed host 
perceptions of  Mozambicans in Bushbuckridge, but it is more likely that it 
was adopted because it reﬂ ected existing local realities. 
 3.2  1996 Cessation Clause and Cabinet Decision 
 In 1996, the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of  Refugees 
and the 1967 OAU Convention Governing Speciﬁ c Aspects of  Refugee 
Problems in Africa were both signed by South Africa. This made it pos-
sible for the Cessation Clause of  the 1951 Convention 55 to be applied to 
Mozambican refugees on 31 December 1996, in an agreement signed by 
the UNHCR and the South African and Mozambican governments. 
Since formal refugee status was largely a chimera on the ground, as dis-
cussed above, its cessation had little practical effect. The cessation clause 
was preceded on 4 December by a South African Cabinet decision to 
grant amnesty to those who had ﬂ ed the civil war in Mozambique and 
wished to settle in South Africa. This decision was made in response to 
a request by the executive committee of  the UNHCR. 56 Although this 
showed awareness of  the permanence of  the Mozambican refugee popu-
lation, and was intended to provide a relatively seamless transition from 
53 Rodgers, n.14 above.
54 Interview with Ward Councillor, Bushbuckridge, SA, 6 Apr. 2004.
55 A person ceases to be a refugee once ‘the circumstances in connection with which he has been 
recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist’ (Art. 1, c 5).
56 D. Lockey, ‘The Objectives of  Amnesty’ in Crush and Williams, n.6 above, 25.
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one legal status to another, in practice it took another three years for the 
regularization process to take place. Therefore, ofﬁ cially, the majority of  
Mozambican refugees became  ‘ illegal aliens ’ overnight, bringing their 
legal status back in line with the treatment they had been receiving by 
the government all along. 
 3.3  Amnesties 
 Not all refugees had to wait for three years, however. Before the cessation 
clause, two amnesties  — the 1995 Miner’s Amnesty and the 1996 SADC 
Amnesty  — gave many Mozambicans in South Africa the opportunity to 
apply for permanent resident status. The third exemption, ﬁ nally imple-
mented in 1999/2000, was speciﬁ cally targeted at Mozambican refugees. 
These three regularisation processes had very different impacts for the 
Mozambican refugee population. 
 South Africa’s immigration amnesties have been criticised for merely 
 ‘ regularising a  de facto situation ’ and thereby  ‘ deﬁ ning the boundaries from 
which [the government] could  “ work to exclude all new undocumented 
migrants ”  ’ . 57 For Mozambican refugees, however, regularisation of  the  de 
facto situation was exactly what was needed. Furthermore, the amnesties 
were interpreted not as exceptional opportunities to be exploited (as sug-
gested by commentators focusing on amnesties as invitations for new 
im migration and fraud), 58 but as long-awaited means of  matching their 
social status with the appropriate legal status. 
 The issue of  legal status has consistently been identiﬁ ed as the crucial 
vulnerability factor among Mozambican refugees. 59 The temporary and 
special legal status of   ‘ refugee ’ was both ineffective, as described above, 
and undesired. Secure and equal status is the concern most often expressed 
by Mozambican refugees and by South African community leaders with 
regard to Mozambican members of  their communities. 60 As this Ward 
Councillor recently requested from the author: 
 You can help us deliver that message to the government: especially our brothers 
and sisters who come from the east [Mozambique] don’t have IDs. When govern-
ment offered to give people IDs some were afraid because they thought the 
57 Peberdy, n. 5 above, 20.
58 J. Handmaker and J. Schneider, ‘The Status “Regularisation” Programme for Former 
 Mozambican Refugees in South Africa’ RULA Working Paper (Johannesburg: School of  Law, University 
of  the Witwatersrand, 2002), 8.
59 Dolan, n. 13 above, Johnston and Simbine, n. 38 above, Reitzes and Crawhall, n.24 above, 
Human Rights Watch, ‘ “Prohibited Persons”: Abuse of  Undocumented Migrants, Asylum-Seekers, 
and Refugees in South Africa’. (New York, Washington, London and Brussels: Human Rights Watch, 
1998).
60 This assertion is based on ﬁ ve years of  community meetings and advice work by the Wits 
 Acornhoek Advice Centre, which assists poor communities in Bushbuckridge with issues of  documen-
tation. Approximately 70% of  the AAC’s clients are former Mozambican refugees. During this period, 
the AAC was afﬁ liated with the Wits Citizenship and Boundaries Initiative.
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government wants to send them back. Can we assist the government to identify 
that need to get IDs? Most of  them they need IDs in order to go and look for a job. 
They are afraid to go outside their village because if  they [police] can get them 
outside in cities like Johannesburg, Nelspruit, Phalaborwa, they will take them 
back to the east, so they are afraid to go and look for a job. So if  that problem can 
be sorted out, their response will be to try to go and look for a job. 61 
The concern for equal status, and not just any status, is discussed further 
below. 
 Today’s almost universal desire for permanent resident and citizenship 
status by Mozambican refugees in Bushbuckridge stands in stark contrast 
with ﬁ ndings in relation to African migrants in South Africa generally, and 
in relation to newer Mozambican migrants speciﬁ cally. A study done in 
1997 shows that only 19 percent of  all African migrants and 14 percent of  
Mozambicans in South Africa would want to become permanent residents 
of  South Africa, and 18 percent and 7 percent respectively would want to 
become citizens of  South Africa. 62 This extreme discrepancy illustrates 
how misleading it is to include Mozambican refugees in general policies 
relating to migration without considering their speciﬁ c background and 
current situation. While the motivation for migration (forced or voluntary) 
is not always the most signiﬁ cant factor in determining later migrant 
choices, in the case of  long-term settlement choices among Mozambicans, 
it seems to be a crucial inﬂ uence. 
 But if  the desire for documentation is so strong among rural-based re -
fugees today, why did so many former refugees not take advantage of  the 
amnesties? Why are there still former refugees without IDs? 63 Part of  the 
answer lies in the design and implementation of  the amnesties and part 
in the changing perceptions and desires of  former refugees. 
 3.3.1  1995 Miner’s Amnesty 
 In October 1995, an amnesty was announced for mine workers who had 
been under contract for at least ten years (since before 1986) and who 
had voted in the 1994 elections. Out of  74,380 Mozambican miners, 
23,806 of  whom were eligible according to the ten-year service criterion, 
only 9,159 applied for the amnesty. 64 Almost all of  the eligible miners 
fulﬁ lled the criteria to be deﬁ ned as refugees, since they either entered 
61 Interview, Bushbuckridge, SA, 6 Apr. 2004.
62 D. A. McDonald, L. Mashile, et al, ‘The Lives and Times of  African Migrants and Immigrants 
in Post-Apartheid South Africa’. 13 SAMP Migration Policy Series (1999), 60.
63 Although there are no reliable statistics, a calculation based on the original estimated refugee 
arrivals and subsequent amnesty ﬁ gures, combined with the experience of  organizations such as the 
Wits AAC, allows us to estimate that c. 40,000 former Mozambican refugees remain without docu-
mentation.
64 Crush and Williams, n.6 above, 5.
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the country between 1985 and 1992 or had arrived earlier and were 
forced to remain in the country as refugees sur place. Nonetheless, their 
response to the amnesty was much more in line with the cautious stance 
adopted by other Mozambican labour migrants, as noted above. In fact, 
91 percent of  Mozambican miners were not interested in taking on South 
African nationality. 65 While it is not possible to discuss the determinants 
in detail here, it is clear that there is a range of  factors  — such as access 
to stable, formal employment  — which affect attitudes toward adopting 
South African nationality. Therefore, in spite of  the ability of  miners to 
use their new permanent resident status to assist family members to doc-
umentation, in terms of  regularising signiﬁ cant numbers of  refugees, this 
amnesty did not have a large impact. 
 3.3.2  1996 SADC Amnesty 
 The next Amnesty, targeted at undocumented migrants from countries 
in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), was much 
more effective at regularising Mozambican refugees in South Africa, 
even though it was not speciﬁ cally designed for them. From 1 July to 30 
November 1996 undocumented migrants from SADC countries could 
apply for permanent resident status if  they could prove that a) they had 
been living in South Africa for at least ﬁ ve years, b) they were engaged 
in productive economic activity in the formal or informal sector and/or 
had a South African partner or spouse or dependent children born or 
living lawfully in South Africa, and c) had not committed a criminal of-
fence. 66 Overall, there were 146,675 Mozambican applicants (72 percent 
of  total applicants), of  which 85,520 were granted permanent resident 
status. 41.7 percent of  Mozambican applications were rejected, mostly 
in the largely urban province Gauteng. 67 
 The SADC Amnesty was not speciﬁ cally targeted at refugees. In fact, it 
made  ‘ no clear distinction between Mozambican refugees and  “ illegal 
immigrants ”  ’ , 68 once again illustrating the conﬂ ation of  categories which 
has characterised government approaches to Mozambican refugees. Some 
of  the eligibility criteria for the amnesty made it particularly difﬁ cult for 
refugees to apply. It is often pointed out that many refugees did not 
have the required documents to prove date of  entry into the country or 
economic activity. 69 On the other hand, 85,000 Mozambican applicants, 
65 F. de Vletter, ‘Labour Migration to South Africa: The lifeblood of  southern Mozambique’ in 
McDonald (ed.) On Borders; Perspectives on International Migration in Southern Africa (Kingston/New York, 
SAMP/St. Martin’s Press: 2000), 67.
66 Crush and Williams, n. 6 above, 3.
67 Ibid, 7.
68 Reitzes and Crawhall, n. 24 above, 37.
69 Johnston, N. ‘Accessing the SADC Amnesty: The Rural Experience’, in Crush and Williams, 
n. 6 above.
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all of  whom necessarily conformed to the deﬁ nition of  refugee agreed 
in the Tripartite Agreements (those who entered the country before 31 
December 1992), did manage to fulﬁ l the requirements. Among other 
things, this supports the assertion that many refugees were economically 
active in ways that were formal enough to be documented. On the other 
hand, the lack of  documentation and the lack of  information concerning 
reasons for rejected applications suggest that many eligible Mozambican 
refugee applicants were rejected. 
 Various administrative issues dogged the application process, limiting 
access in both urban and rural areas, 70 but from the perspective of  Mozam-
bican refugee applicants the most signiﬁ cant barrier was fear. There was a 
widespread perception that the amnesty was a ruse by the Department of  
Home Affairs to identify and deport undocumented immigrants. The ﬁ ve-
month application period meant that those who waited to see what fate 
befell other applicants missed the deadline. In fact, hundreds of  applicants 
attempted to apply after the 30 November deadline. 71 In particular, 
the lack of  clarity on the position of  rejected applicants made many 
Mozambican refugees wary of  giving up their locally protected anonymity 
for an uncertain engagement with the state. This fear and the local reac-
tion of  withdrawal were illustrated by the experience of  researchers in 
Bushbuckridge at the time who were forbidden access to a village by local 
(South African) community leaders with the argument that  ‘ there are no 
Mozambicans here ’ . 72 A ﬁ nal issue was that previous adaptive strategies 
(such as having a fraudulent ID) directly prevented people from taking 
advantage of  this government sanctioned integration option. 73 Therefore, 
the ap plication for documentation was perceived as both an opportunity 
and a risk. 
 The changing conditions and desires of  many refugees regarding return 
or settlement in South Africa affected attitudes towards amnesty. One year 
after the close of  the formal voluntary repatriation programme, fears of  a 
resurgence of  ﬁ ghting in Mozambique had abated, but fear of  land mines 
remained. Information trickling back from returnees was ambivalent. 
While access to land was much better than in South Africa, access to serv-
ices like education and health care, as well as access to wage employment, 
were much worse. 74 In comparison, free primary health care was intro-
duced in rural South Africa in 1996, to which Mozambican refugees had 
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Personal communication, Chris Dolan and Vusi Nkuna, 2004. In fact, the population of  the 
village concerned was 73 % Mozambican, according to a house to house survey done three years 
earlier by the Community Practice Project (now Wits Agincourt Health and Population Unit).
73 Handmaker and Schneider, n.59 above, 22.
74 Dolan, n. 13 above.
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access. As during the 1994 elections, many families negotiated the risks 
and beneﬁ ts by sending only one or two members to apply for IDs. Selec-
tive application was also due to lacking documentation among the old 
and women, in particular, reﬂ ecting their marginal status in the family 
and the economy. 
 3.3.3  1999/2000 Exemption for former Mozambican refugees 
 The August 1999 to February 2000 Exemption for former Mozambican 
refugees was designed and targeted speciﬁ cally at addressing the lack of  
legal status among those former refugees who had not been eligible for 
the SADC Amnesty. This amnesty had an exceptional history and design 
but the themes of  category conﬂ ation, spatially deﬁ ned policies, infor-
malisation of  government responses and fear remain constant. While the 
South African Cabinet agreed to the Exemption in principle in Decem-
ber 1996, the implementation was stalled for years, supposedly because 
of  lack of  funds. A European NGO, AWEPA, agreed to bankroll the 
project, which was designed and implemented with the unprecedented 
participation of  a range of  South African NGOs. The institutional com-
plications arising from this are documented by Johnston and Handmaker 
and Schneider. 75 Another design peculiarity was that applicants were 
given the option to apply for permanent resident status or to register for 
repatriation assistance. While the South African and Mozambican gov-
ernments deemed the repatriation option important, the applicants made 
their desire for South African documents quite clear. At the close of  the 
programme, 150,592 applications for IDs stood in contrast to eighty-
eight repatriation requests. 76 This does not preclude that some refugees 
might still have desired to return to Mozambique, 77 but given an either/
or choice of  documents or assisted return without documents, the former 
was seen as more useful. Overall, 81,969 applications were approved, 
16,772 rejected (mostly in North West Province) and 32,007 remained 
pending at the close of  the process. 
 The contested categories of   ‘ illegal immigrant ’ and  ‘ refugee ’ again 
plagued the implementation of  the Exemption. Most of  the pending cases 
concerned missing proof  of  Mozambican citizenship. 78 The criterion of  
proof  of  Mozambican citizenship was added in order to prevent citizens 
of  other countries (especially Zimbabwe) from applying, that is, illegal 
immigrants. The policy of  not providing documentation along with 
75 N. Johnston, ‘The Point of  No Return: Evaluating the Amnesty for Mozambican Refugees in 
South Africa’. 6 SAMP Migration Policy Brief (2001). Handmaker and Schneider, n. 59 above.
76 Handmaker and Schneider, n. 59 above, 8.
77 N. Johnston, ‘Homeward-bound’ Mail and Guardian. Johannesburg, Oct. 1 to 7, 1999, 42
78 Johnston, n. 76 above, Handmaker and Schneider, n. 59 above.
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refugee status to Mozambicans in 1993 – 1996 had a direct impact on the 
regularisation process, since many legitimate applicants could not prove 
their eligibility. 79 Again, the implementation of  the refugee status, which 
was intended to provide protection, actually contributed to continued 
 vulnerability, even in the face of  legal integration opportunities. Again, 
survival strategies, like identity fraud, limited the ability to integrate 
legally. 
 The element of  spatial limitation to policy and practice which had char-
acterised the  ‘ homeland ’ welcome and the repatriation programme 
remained in place for the 1999 regularisation programme. The criteria for 
exemption eligibility were deﬁ ned according to the government’s original 
deﬁ nition of  a Mozambican refugee, which was explicitly deﬁ ned in exclu-
sive spatial terms:  ‘ Mozambican refugees are citizens of  Mozambique 
who entered South Africa between 1980 and 1992 and live mainly in the 
Gazankulu, KaNgwane and Winterveldt areas (that is, the Northern 
 Province, Mpumalanga and North West.) Some have also settled in the 
northern parts of  Kwazulu Natal ’ . 80 Once again, (former) refugees settled 
in urban areas were excluded, affecting rural areas via urban-based house-
hold heads. 
 Just as with the SADC Amnesty, the position of  rejected applicants was 
uncertain. Here, the informality of  government processes both created 
opportunities for former refugees, and kept them vulnerable. Formally, 
applicants were given a three-month renewable temporary permit, which 
would lapse if  their applications were not approved. Rejected applicants 
were expected to leave the country or lodge a formal appeal one month 
after receiving a written rejection notiﬁ cation. 81 This system was impossi-
ble to implement, as many applicants could not afford to renew permits, 
most did not have postal addresses for the receipt of  written notiﬁ cation, 
and there was little support for the appeals process even if  notiﬁ cation was 
received in time. In practice, the Department of  Home Affairs did not fol-
low up on rejected applications with deportations from the rural villages, 
although they did continue with  ‘ normal ’ deportation practice for those 
who ventured outside the former  ‘ homeland ’ areas without documents. 
Therefore, most rejected applicants remain in their villages today, but as 
legally vulnerable as before. 
 Finally, the fear of  deportation and discrimination associated with being 
Mozambican (especially outside the area of  Bushbuckridge) has under-
mined trust in permanent residence status and the associated identity doc-
ument. Locally, the permanent residence ID is known as a  ‘ Mozambican 
79 Ibid.
80 Department of  Home Affairs, Departmental Circular No. 34 of  1999. Draft Guidelines for the 
Exemption for the Mozambican Refugees in Terms of  Section 28(2) of  the Aliens Control Act, 1991 
from the Provisions of  Section 23(a) of  that Act, 15 July 1999.
81 Johnston, n. 76 above.
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ID ’ and because the ID states  ‘ nationality  — Mozambican ’ it is seen as 
worthless by some and only partially useful by others. As a poor old woman 
with a permanent residence ID complained, after not being registered 
to receive government food parcels (even through permanent residents 
were formally eligible to receive them): 
 For us as Mozambicans we are still discriminated against during food distribution. 
We were told that Mozambican IDs are not eligible to get food parcels. We have 
been in South Africa for a long time. That is the reason I would like to have a 
South African ID and not the Mozambican ID. The Mozambican ID is useless. 
I will just keep it in the house. It is not going to work. 82 
As mentioned above, concern for status is not only associated with the 
formal rights associated with that status (since permanent resident status 
today enables theoretical access to almost all rights and services except 
voting), but rather with the subjective experience of  insecurity and dis-
crimination as an outsider, a non-citizen. The desire for complete inclu-
sion and equality can be seen as an instrumental strategy for greater 
invisibility or a strongly internalised identiﬁ cation with South Africa and 
citizenship. 
 3.4  Khosa and Mahlaule Constitutional Court case 
 By 2000, 176,648 former Mozambican refugees had been granted per-
manent resident status through the various Amnesties and Exemptions. 
Given the unknown number of  persons who received IDs before the 
1994 elections, and those who had naturalised through marriage, adop-
tion, or fraudulent means through the years, the  ‘ case load ’ of  240,000 
Mozambican refugees was largely  ‘ regularised ’ , in the sense of  having 
some kind of  secure legal status. 
 The legal status of  permanent resident, however, still did not reﬂ ect the 
nature of  former Mozambican refugees’ lived social status in Bushbuck-
ridge and other rural border areas. The permanence of  their position and 
the lack of  any special services meant that they were dependent on 
the same mechanisms and strategies as locals to support their livelihoods. 
In the context of  Bushbuckridge’s poverty and marginalisation, with an 
ofﬁ cial unemployment rate of  almost 70 percent and insufﬁ cient land for 
subsistence agriculture, 83 the main survival strategies for locals are labour 
migration to urban areas and government pensions and child support 
grants. The difﬁ culties which former refugees have faced with the former 
because of  xenophobia and deportation have already been discussed. 
 Permanent resident status meant that they were not eligible for grants. 
82 Interview, Bushbuckridge, SA, 7 May 2004.
83 Statistics South Africa, Measuring Rural Poverty. (Pretoria: Statistics South Africa, 2002).
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Combined, this meant that formal legal status was not sufﬁ cient to 
re move blockages in relation to  ‘ normal ’ , that is, locally common, 
liveli hood options. Permanent residents are able to apply for naturalisa-
tion, after ﬁ ve years, but since the regularisation process for former 
Mozambican refugees had already been delayed for ﬁ fteen years after their 
arrival, this posed an unreasonable additional waiting period, especially 
for the elderly. 
 In recognition of  this, in 2003 two legal advocacy organisations used the 
courts to challenge the legitimacy of  government policy on limiting social 
grants to citizens. 84 Two linked cases  —  Khosa & Others v. Minister of  Social 
Development & Others and  Mahlaule & Another v. Minister of  Social Development 
& Others 85  – centred around two groups of  former Mozambican refugees 
from Bushbuckridge, but argued more generally that the restriction of  gov-
ernment social grants, especially old age pensions and child support grants, 
to citizens was unconstitutional. The cases, while directly addressing the 
twenty-year delay in rights for Mozambican refugees in South Africa, were 
also a contribution to a much wider process of  interpreting the inclusive 
elements of  the new South African Constitution, in which South Africa is 
 ‘ for all who live in it ’ . 86 It is one of  several cases where civil society has used 
the courts to challenge the government on its immigration policy. 
 In March 2003, the High Court ruled on the unconstitutionality of  the 
citizenship requirement for government social grants. One year later, the 
Constitutional Court conﬁ rmed this and ruled that permanent residents 
should be treated the same as citizens in relation to grant eligibility. In her 
discussion of  the judgement, the presiding Judge argued that  ‘ the exclusion 
of  all non-citizens who are destitute,  … irrespective of  their immigration 
status, fails to distinguish between those who have become part of  our society 
and have made their homes in South Africa, and those who have not ’ . 87 
 Reactions to the  Khosa and  Mahlaule cases were very different nationally 
and locally in Bushbuckridge. While media attention to the cases was 
largely negative, focussing on costs to the tax-payer, fraudulent applicants 
and incentives to new immigration, South Africans and Mozambicans in 
Bushbuckridge alike welcomed the decision. Local leaders were very active 
in spreading information about grant application processes and local gov-
ernment ofﬁ cials were supportive in organising speciﬁ c grant registration 
campaigns. In Bushbuckridge, the injection of  new social grants was seen 
84 The case was brought by the Wits Acornhoek Advice Centre and argued through the courts 
by the Legal Resources Centre, Pretoria.
85 Khosa & Others v. Minister of  Social Development and Others [2003] CCT 12/03 and Mahlaule & Another 
v. Minister of  Social Development and Others [2003] CCT 13/03.
86 Constitution of  the Republic of  South Africa, Act 108 of  1996, Epilogue.
87 Judge Mokgoro’s Judgement in the cases Khosa & Others v. Minister of  Social Development and 
Others [2003] CCT 12/03 and Mahlaule & Another v. Minister of  Social Development and Others [2003] CCT 
13/03, 58, http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/1344.PDF.
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as an overall gain for the community, rather than as a competition over 
scarce resources. 
 As of  late 2004, the remaining question concerning the legal status of  
former Mozambican refugees is whether most of  those who now have per-
manent resident status, including access to grants, will choose to naturalise 
in the coming years, or whether they will retain permanent resident status. 
This will probably depend on how much actual, rather than legal, dis-
crimination remains attached to non-citizen status. 
 4.  Conclusions 
 Over the past twenty years, therefore, Mozambican refugees in South 
Africa have gone from a position of  illegality to a large measure of  legal 
recognition and rights, to the point of  full legal integration as South 
African citizens. This paper has argued that this transformation has been 
only partly due to legal mechanisms targeted speciﬁ cally at Mozambican 
refugees, and that such mechanisms have more often than not been 
counterproductive in achieving their policy intentions. Understanding 
Mozambicans’ changing status consequently requires an analysis 
from below, taking into account not only the word of  the law but its local 
practices, the interpretations of  those affected by the law, and their agency 
in responding to it. While this perspective can be applied to all legal 
change, and is certainly not new to critical and feminist traditions of  legal 
scholarship, it is particularly relevant for the study of  migration and refu-
gee-related law. While refugees and migrants are the objects of  national 
law, they are excluded from the formal mechanisms of  inﬂ uencing that 
law, such as voting representatives into the national legislature. When 
there is a disjuncture between the state’s policies and laws (such as crim-
inalising undocumented Mozambican refugees) and the interests and de-
sires of  migrants (for citizenship and full integration), there are rarely 
formal political or legal means for migrants themselves to negotiate a 
change in the law to more closely match their interests. NGOs speaking 
on immigrants’ behalf  through courts or advocacy efforts are fragile and 
themselves unaccountable mechanisms for such negotiation. 
 There are many well-known implications of  this fundamental political 
and legal imbalance for refugees and migrants that are beyond the scope 
of  this paper. One, which is illustrated by the case study of  Mozambican 
refugees in South Africa, however, is that where formal law clashes with 
migrant needs and local interests, migrants may be able to negotiate posi-
tive outcomes locally even where they cannot inﬂ uence policy nationally. 
This is not to say that migrants can evade or subvert unfavourable laws 
easily or with impunity. The case study shows how some policies, such as 
the repatriation programme, can be easily avoided, while others, such as 
the long-term lack of  documentation, have both social and economic 
170
50 Tara Polzer
effects which are difﬁ cult for migrants to overcome through their own local 
efforts. Whether successful or not, the local mechanisms used to respond 
to unfavourable laws, from chieﬂ y and neighbourly assistance in creating 
a new identity to bribing Home Affairs ofﬁ cials, should be understood as 
means of  interacting with the state in the absence of  other political or legal 
avenues and should, as such, be taken seriously by legal and political 
science scholars. 
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Abstract 
 
This article explores spatialised identity construction as part of the process of 
refugee and migrant integration. It uses an empirical case study – of villages in a 
rural border area of South Africa – to argue that identity groups can be constructed 
in relation to micro-spaces within a single village, refer to identity characteristics 
which are largely independent of cross-border mobility or territorial origin, and be 
negotiated through micro-mobilities within different segments of a ‘local’ space. This 
stands in contrast to debates opposing sedentary ‘roots’ or transnational or transient 
‘routes’ as identity forming spaces. Establishing the relevant spatial aspects of 
identity construction is an empirical matter, rather than an ideological one.  
 
Keywords: space, identity, refugee, integration, South Africa 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This article explores spatialised identity construction as part of the process of 
refugee integration. It uses an empirical case study – of villages in a rural border area 
of South Africa – to make several connected arguments. Firstly, the spatiality of 
interactions between refugees and hosts is crucial to understanding the integration 
process. Indeed the construction of who is included in the identities ‘refugee’ and 
‘host’ has fundamentally spatial elements. Second, the spatial element of 
refugee/migrant/host identity construction is not limited to contrasting ideas about 
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sedentary ‘roots’ or transnational or transient ‘routes’, as the academic debate is 
sometimes essentialized (Cresswell, 2002; Kibreab, 1999; Massey, 2004; Sassen, 
1991). Identity groups – in this case ‘Mozambicans’ and ‘South Africans’ – can be 
constructed in relation to micro-spaces within a single village, refer to identity 
characteristics which are largely independent of cross-border mobility or territorial 
origin, and be negotiated through micro-mobilities within different segments of a 
‘local’ space. This illustrates, thirdly, the necessity of establishing the relevant spatial 
aspects of identity construction as an empirical matter, rather than an ideological 
one.  
 
Finally, the empirical project involves three elements: how physical space is 
divided in relation to identity groupings and what this means for access to material 
resources; how spaces and identity groups are discursively constructed in relation to 
each other; and how individuals and groups continually negotiate and contest these 
discursive constructions of space and identity, including through everyday and 
strategic claims to, uses of and trajectories across spaces.  
 
I present a case study of three villages in Bushbuckridge, a border district of 
South Africa abutting Mozambique. In these villages, people who fled the 
Mozambican civil war in the mid-1980s have lived alongside co-ethnic Shangaan-
speaking South Africans for over twenty-five years. There are seeming ambivalences 
and contradictions concerning the relationship between group identification and 
space in these villages. A key contradiction is between material spatialised difference 
and the discursive elision of difference. On the one hand, many villages in the area 
have sections which are infrastructurally and socially distinct from the ‘main’ village. 
These sections are generally referred to as ‘Mozambican’ neighborhoods, illustrating 
a recognition and labeling of difference.1  On the surface, therefore, spatially-defined 
and national origin-defined identity divisions in the village seem to map easily onto 
each other. On the other hand, less than half of Mozambican-born village residents 
1 While the ‘Mozambican’ village section is given a label in local discourse, the contrasting dominant 
space, what I am calling the ‘main’ or ‘core’ village section, is usually referred to using the name of the 
overall village. This reflects a common practice by dominant identity groups, who take the 
characteristics of their own spaces for granted (e.g. as ‘South African’), therefore not needing an 
identifying label (Doane, 1997). The lack of labelling therefore reflects part of the process of dominant 
identity construction, but does not mean that this construction is uncontested.  
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actually live in the ‘Mozambican’ neighborhoods. Significantly, there is a strong 
discourse of unity across national and spatial boundaries. People of Mozambican 
birth both practice and narrate a strong emplacement in South Africa generally and 
their villages specifically, and both Mozambican- and South African-born residents 
recognize and validate their racial, cultural and linguistic commonality (Polzer, 2004). 
Evidence for these contradictions is presented in detail in the paper below. 
 
To understand these contradictions, I argue that rather than there being a 
‘natural’ unity between nationality of origin and place of residence within a village, 
there are complex, socially constructed local concepts of ‘Mozambicanness’ and 
‘South Africanness,’ and that these concepts adhere largely to the social 
characteristics of the respective spaces, and not necessarily to an individual’s place 
of birth. Rather than group identity being the basis for spatial relegation, the 
spatially defined field continually reconstitutes relational group identities – where 
we live (and do not live) defines and reflects who we are (and who we are not). 
Furthermore, the spatially defined social markers of difference and commonality in 
these villages do not directly reference migration history or nationality. These 
markers, I argue, refer to, reflect and reaffirm three constituent elements of the 
nature of the ‘good community’: legibility to and incorporation into the state (Scott, 
1998), the tensions between tradition and modernity, and questions of social class 
and hierarchy (see discussion in Sections 6, 7 and 8). Since these social markers are 
acquired practices and relationships rather than observable differences in terms of 
race, physiognomy, language or culture, individuals who move out of the socially 
defined space also leave behind them, to a large extent, the social characteristics 
and the identity allocated to that space. The status of a social minority, in this sense, 
adheres to the locality rather than to the individual, who can change status through 
a physical move in space. Significantly, both residents of the ‘Mozambican’ and ‘core’ 
village sections agree on the relevance of these dimensions of the ‘good community’ 
even though they at times disagree on the values attached to specific practices 
within each dimension (e.g. whether it is ‘good’ to be modern or traditional). 
 
Social identity is therefore navigated and negotiated at two levels: by 
residents of ‘peripheral’ areas through moving into ‘core’ social spaces and 
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identities, and between ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ residents regarding the social 
meanings of their respective spaces. These negotiation processes mean that the 
social nature of spatial divisions in these villages illuminates identity construction 
among all residents of these villages, not just identity among the Mozambican-born 
or among residents of the ‘Mozambican neighborhood.’ The spatialized ‘migrant 
integration’ process becomes a process of ongoing collective identity negotiation 
which also impacts on and incorporates the identity construction of ‘hosts’.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: after presenting various 
theoretical approaches to the spatiality of migrant integration, I briefly outline my 
methodology. I then describe the history and context of spatial divisions and 
migration in my case study. I show how spatial divisions within villages, specifically 
the division between ‘main’ village sections and ‘Mozambican’ sections, are 
correlated with material differences of resource access, including spatialised 
resources such as physical infrastructure but also non-spatially fixed resources such 
as identity documents and education. This then brings me to a discussion of the 
social construction of spaces in the villages and how these are associated with the 
constructed characteristics of ‘being Mozambican’ or ‘being South African’. In the 
process, I look at different individual and collective strategies adopted by village 
residents to negotiate, uphold and/or break through the spatialised social 
boundaries within the village. 
 
2. Spatial Integration and Identity Formation  
In analyzing migrant and refugee integration in a particular locality, I draw on 
conceptions of space as “actively produced by and productive of social relations and 
discourses” (White, 2002:74) in the tradition of Lefebvre (1991). Rather than being 
assumed, the specific relationship between group identification and space must be 
described on a case by case basis, with attention to context-specific, historical and 
continually negotiated processes through which meanings are ascribed to spaces by 
the multiple actors in that space. Furthermore, just as identity groups are today 
generally understood to be constructed relationally (rather than being historically 
immutable or natural social artifacts tied to objective differences or similarities) 
(Anderson, 1991; Barth, 1969; Cohen, 2000; Eriksen, 1993; Gupta & Ferguson, 1997), 
175
so the meanings of space must also be seen as relational (Massey, 2004). Finally, 
relationality does not necessarily mean binary contrast. As Massey puts it, places are 
“not so much bounded areas as open and porous networks of social relations…their 
‘identities’ are constructed through the specificity of their interaction with other 
places rather than counterposition to them.” (Massey 1994: 121). 
 
Authors in geography and anthropology have presented the conception of 
relational and negotiated space and identity as a ‘middle way’ between an 
essentialised isomorphism of identity and space (e.g. you are who you are because of 
where you come from or where you ‘belong’) and a ‘postmodern’ wholesale 
rejection of the relationship between place and identity (e.g. there is a ‘generalised 
condition of homelessness’ [Said, 1979: 18] or ‘we are all refugees’ [Warner, 1992, 
quoted in Kibreab, 1999:385]).  
 
The geographer Tim Cresswell (2002) opposes a ‘sedentary metaphysics’ 
(Malkki, 1992) with a ‘nomadic metaphysics’ in debates on the relevance of place in 
identity construction, and argues for a “new focus on place [which] simultaneously 
[brings] into question both a sedentary metaphysics of roots and authenticity and a 
nomadic metaphysics of hypermobile identity. Places and boundaries do matter – 
just not in the ways we once thought.” (Cresswell, 2002:20). The middle road, in 
Cresswell’s view, is a perspective where “places are never complete, finished or 
bounded but are always becoming – in process.” He suggests Soja’s “trialectics of 
spatiality” as a useful corrective, where everyday practices constitute a “Thirdspace” 
in addition to the more commonly debated binary oppositions between material, 
mappable “Firstspace” and representational, imagined “Secondspace.” (Soja 1989, 
1996 as cited in Cresswell, 2002:20f). Cresswell acknowledges, however, that apart 
from saying that it is practiced and lived, “it is far from clear what Thirdspace actually 
is” (ibid:21) and how one might empirically operationalise its study. 
 
Another leading geographer, Doreen Massey (2004), sets up a related 
opposition between theorizations of place and space, where place is portrayed as 
evoking “an atmosphere of earthiness, authenticity and meaning” while space is 
“understood as somehow abstract” (Massey, 2004:7). For Massey, the “ ‘lived reality 
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of our daily lives’ ” (which she places in ‘scare-quotes’) is part of the sedentarised 
dominant conception of the place, rather than a corrective to that sedentarism. She 
suggests that a recognition of “‘place’ as a site of negotiation” beyond the binary of 
local and global is “a first move away from the universalising/ essentialising 
propositions implicit in some of the evocations of the meaningfulness of place.” 
(Massey, 2004:7). Even though she applies her approach of negotiated place to the 
case of London, her discussion remains largely conceptual rather than empirical.   
 
These geographers use conceptions of identity formation to reflect on and 
shift binary debates on space/place. In contrast, Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson 
(2001), coming from an anthropological perspective, seek to challenge simple 
conceptions of either “primordial” or “strategic” identity by discussing “the specific 
relationship between place making and identity.” They, and other authors in their 
edited volume, “emphasize that identity neither ‘grows out’ of rooted communities 
nor is a thing that can be possessed or owned by individual or collective social actors. 
It is, instead, a mobile, often unstable relation of difference”, and that “identity and 
alterity are therefore produced simultaneously in the formation of ‘locality.’” (Gupta 
and Ferguson, 2001: 13). They furthermore “draw attention to the crucial role played 
by resistance” in showing how “identities are not ‘freely’ chosen but overdetermined 
by structural location” and how “their durability and stability are not to be taken for 
granted but open to contestation and reformulation.” (Gupta and Ferguson, 2001: 
17f).   
 
Within the fields of refugee and migration studies, debates on the 
relationships between space and identity also tend to either reify or categorically 
deny links between space and identity. Malkki’s (1992) critique of “refugee studies” 
as contributing to constructing refugees (and indeed ‘locals’) as “sedentarised” 
objects is routinely referenced, while authors like Kibreab (1999) have fought back 
by stating that “territory still remains the major repository of rights and 
membership” (Kibreab, 1999:387). Many accounts of refugee integration simply 
ignore spatial aspects of identity formation and focus on characteristics of migrant 
individuals and groups which are seen to inhere in the body or the person – such as 
race, religion, language, culture, education level, skill level, etc. These characteristics 
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are assumed to move with those bodies no matter where in the host space they find 
themselves (see Mestheneos & Ioannidi, 2002; Franz, 2003; Hieronymi, 2005; Jasso 
& Rosenzweig, 1995; and discussions of acculturation and assimilation theory in Alba 
& Nee, 1997). Alternatively, the spatial segregation of migrants from hosts is 
understood simply as an indicator of missing social and economic integration. As 
Baily and Míguez describe the debate in Latin American migration studies, there is a 
tendency to “identify spatial segregation with the concept of Cultural Pluralism and 
the absence of … spatial segregation with the Melting Pot theory” (2003:82), without 
further consideration of whether actual interactions between segregated spaces or 
within unsegregated spaces reflect pluralistic or assimilationist identity formations.  
In this understanding, the space in which migrants and hosts find themselves has no 
social value in itself apart from as a location for potential interactions between 
individuals and groups. 
 
 Another common assumption in accounts of migrant and refugee 
integration is that it is possible to tell who is part of minority and majority groups 
before studying how these groups then interact in space. The temptation to simply 
divide village residents into ‘refugee’ and ‘host’ or ‘Mozambican’ and ‘South African’ 
is great, and one to which I have succumbed at times (Polzer, 2004; see also 
Golooba-Mutebi, 2004 and Rodgers, 2002). A constructed and negotiated approach 
to spatialised identity, however, requires that all personal and group characteristics, 
including place of birth or family origin, be considered as only potentially relevant 
relational identity factors, rather than as a priori structuring factors (Bakewell, 2008; 
Robins & Aksoy, 2001). Attention to representations of identity and space as well as 
to everyday practices of negotiation means treating the factors chosen to structure 
group and space identity as internal rather than external to the relational processes 
being analyzed. Where group identification is claimed or allocated in the description 
of space – such as calling an area the ‘Mozambican’ neighborhood – this labeling 
process is part of the social interaction to be studied, rather than an objective social 
reality to be taken at face value. 
 
This brings me to a few notes on methodology. As noted above, an empirical 
position on the social construction of space requires finding ways of capturing the 
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materiality of space, its representations, and the negotiations of both through 
everyday practices. An analysis of space is facilitated by visual abstractions such as 
maps and mapping. Comparing material and discursive characteristics of space 
requires quantitative measurements that can be disaggregated by location as well as 
narratives from people in those spaces and about those spaces. Finally, a focus on 
negotiation, e.g. a process orientation, requires information over a period of time, or 
a means of collecting information about change over time. Figure 1 provides an 
overview of the different methods I employed to collect information on each of 
these elements.  
 
Figure 1 
Methods 
 
1. Household survey: 3 villages, 68 households, 567 individuals (purposive 
sampling) 
2. Repeated individual interviews: 3 villages, 57 individuals (from same households 
as household survey), 50/50 SA/Mozambique-born 
3. Mapping of movements and social connections in the village: 82 individuals (from 
same households as household survey) 
4. Repeated key informant interviews with village leaders: headmen, community 
development forum chairmen, Community Development Forum members, ward 
councilors, teachers, etc. 
5. Observation and informal interactions: village meetings, informal visits and 
conversations 
6. Census data from the Agincourt Health and Socio-Demographic Surveillance 
System, Medical Research Council Unit in the School of Public Health, University 
of the Witwatersrand: 1992-2004 data, annual census of 21 villages, 11,000 
households and 70,000 individuals per annum.  
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Apart from the Agincourt Health and Socio-Demographic Surveillance System 
census data (further referred to as Agincourt data),2 I collected all other data myself 
between March 2002 and October 2006, during which time I was resident in 
Bushbuckridge District as a researcher with the Refugee Research Programme (now 
part of the African Centre for Migration and Society) at the University of the 
Witwatersrand.  
 
3. History and Context of Village ‘Community’ and Space in Bushbuckridge 
 
Figure 2  
Location of Case Study Villages and Agincourt Health and Socio-Demographic 
Surveillance System Site3 
 
2 For background information on this census see Tollman, Herbst, Garenne, Gear, & Kahn (1999). The 
Agincourt census site covers only one of the three villages in which my own research took place - 
Justicia (see Figure 2). However, the basic spatial and social structure of the villages in the 
demographic surveillance site is similar enough to warrant using this large-scale data source as a 
means of understanding the same intra-village spatial dynamics observed in my case study villages. 
3 Stars represent my case study villages. Adapted from Collinson et al (2006:637)  
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 The social meaning of space in the villages of Bushbuckridge is a product of a 
specific history of shifting national politics, labor migration and forced migration, and 
rural engagements with the state. The local politics of spatialised identity group 
construction within villages cannot be understood without this larger canvas.  
 
From 1972 until 1994, today’s district of Bushbuckridge was part of 
Gazankulu ‘homeland’ for Tsonga/Shangaan-speakers within the context of South 
Africa’s Apartheid political system. The homelands were created by the white 
minority government between the 1940s and 1970s to concentrate South Africa’s 
black population onto marginal land and create ethnic enclaves and labor reserves 
(Thompson, 1995). All villages in Bushbuckridge are therefore relatively recent 
creations of forced removals and dispossessions. Such recent forced villageisation 
means that, in contrast to the common image of rural communities, South African 
village residents do not have long-established claims to the particular space occupied 
by their current villages.  
 
The eastern border area of South Africa has also experienced several waves 
of migration from Mozambique and by Mozambicans since the early 1800s. Large-
scale labor migration from southern Mozambique to South African mines and farms 
was common from the late 1800s into the mid-1980s (Katzenellenbogen, 1982), 
linking with early 1800s movements of Shangaan/Tsonga-speakers who had already 
settled in what was to become South Africa from the eastern seaboard which is now 
Mozambique (Ritchken, 1995). When mine-employment of Mozambicans dropped 
dramatically in the mid-1980s (Davies & Head, 1995), many retrenched miners, often 
married to South African women, settled in Gazankulu (Rodgers, 2002). In fact, one 
of my case study villages – Clare A – was established in 1958 by a Mozambican 
miner, whose son is now the chairman of the village’s elected Community 
Development Forum. When the Mozambican civil war’s excesses in southern 
Mozambique pushed tens of thousands of largely Shangaan-speaking people across 
the border from 1985 (Anderson, 1992), they found a combination of recently 
displaced, forcibly villageised South African co-ethnic ‘hosts’ and kinship connections 
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through settled Mozambican labor migrants (Golooba-Mutebi, 2004; Polzer, 2004, 
2007; Ritchken, 1995; Rodgers, 2002).   
 
Two quotes illustrate a common scenario in the mid-1980s. A young woman 
from Mozambique in Clare village recounts: “When we came here, we came through 
the bushes. Our parents were still in Mozambique. We, the children, were the first 
ones to come here, before our parents. When we came here, we were staying at the 
hospital [in Acornhoek town]. We stayed there until we found our relatives. The 
people [we stayed with] in Kwinya Mahembe just had the same surname. We stayed 
there and they took care of us. At Mkhuhlu we stayed at my father’s younger wife’s 
family. She was South African. Even when we were there in Mozambique, our 
younger mother would send us things.”4 An older woman, also in Clare, remembers: 
“When we ran away from the shooting [in Mozambique], I was planning to stay at 
Bushbuckridge, because my children were there. I came to Clare because my 
daughter and her husband were here.”5  
 
This phased migration history had a direct impact on the spatial patterns of 
villages and the distribution of different groups of people in these spaces. A 
significant number of the civil war refugees were taken in by relatives and ‘people 
with the same surname’ (Dolan, 1997) and so were immediately integrated into the 
existing village structures. However, the numbers of refugees soon became too large 
to be hosted by existing families. The South African government provided neither 
legal recognition nor humanitarian assistance, viewing the refugees as illegal 
immigrants, but allowed the homeland governments to shelter them (Polzer, 2007). 
By 1989, the Gazankulu Department of Health and Welfare estimated that 32,000 
refugees had been added to the homeland’s population, admitting that this was 
probably a significant undercount (Gazankulu Department of Health and Welfare, 
1989-90). Homeland and village leaders agreed from 1985 onward to allocate land 
adjoining existing villages to the refugees (Gazankulu Legislative Assembly, 1985). 
These new areas still fell under the existing local governance system of village 
headmen (ndunas) and chiefs, although most ‘Mozambican’ settlements had their 
4 Interview with GM, Clare, 26/5/2005 
5 Interview with E, Clare, 31/5/2005 
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own nduna who reported to the overall village nduna. My case study village Justicia 
B was created in this way in 1987 next to the established Justicia village (now known 
as Justicia A), and continues to exclusively house people of first and second-
generation Mozambican heritage. A ‘Mozambican’ section of Clare A was also 
established around the same time.  
 
After the end of the Mozambican civil war in 1992 and the transition of South 
Africa to majority rule in 1994, over 80% of people who had come from Mozambique 
and settled in the border areas remained in South Africa rather than returning to 
Mozambique (Dolan, 1999). A slow process of legal status regularization started in 
1995 with a series of amnesties and legal regularization programmes (Crush & 
Williams, 1999), adding to a variety of informal social-network-based methods 
through which Mozambicans attained South African identity documents (IDs) (Polzer, 
2007). Today, over 80% of those who remained in Bushbuckridge either have South 
African permanent residence or citizenship status (Polzer, 2007).  
 
Historical shifts in the involvement of the central state, through identity 
documentation and land demarcation, were a further key shaper of village space. At 
the same time as Mozambicans were gaining legal status in the mid-1990s, South 
African-born residents of Bushbuckridge were also registering for IDs, which (in the 
form of ‘passes’) had previously been denied to black South Africans or which had 
been resisted as mechanisms of Apartheid state control (Greenberg, 1987:43). With 
the change of regime, however, IDs enabled the new right to vote and access to the 
expanding governmental social welfare net. In parallel, the state became involved in 
processes of demarcating and allocating land in the villages (previously land 
allocation was exclusively managed by local chiefs), along with the state’s increasing 
role in providing infrastructure like piped water and electricity to rural areas. An ID 
was required to access these new land parcels (known as ‘stands’) and services. 
Formal land allocation was therefore generally not extended into the peripheral 
‘Mozambican’ village sections established in the mid 1980s. My case study village 
Thangine on the outskirts of Acornhoek town was established in 1990 as a grid of 
formally demarcated stands, while other villages expanded and rearranged stands 
later in the 1990s and early 2000s around widened roads and electricity poles. 
183
Thangine and Clare received electricity in the early 2000s, bypassing the 
‘Mozambican’ sections, while Justicia B still had no electricity in 2006 (although the 
‘main’ sister village Justicia A was electrified in 1997).  
 
While the influence of the national state tended to create exclusionary 
pressures for the Mozambican-born, local governance systems remained largely 
inclusive. When after 1996 the ‘traditional’ governance system of ndunas and chiefs 
was augmented by a system of Community Development Forums and ward 
councilors, as the lowest level of elected local government, these structures covered, 
in practice, all residents of the villages, independent of nationality, legal status, or 
residential area. 
 
By 2002, at the start of my field work, it was therefore generally understood 
by all local actors that ‘the Mozambicans’ were in Bushbuckridge to stay, mostly had 
identity documents, and were permanently settled in the villages. While many things 
had therefore changed since their arrival as destitute and illegal newcomers twenty-
five years earlier, the spatial organization of most villages in the eastern half of 
Bushbuckridge still reflected the historical division between the ‘main’ village and a 
‘Mozambican’ peripheral neighborhood. These settlements were still clearly 
identifiable through a less structured settlement pattern (i.e. no straight roads or 
paths between houses), denser settlement, a predominance of traditional buildings 
(round mud huts with thatched roof rather than square breeze block houses with tin 
roofs) and less municipal infrastructure such as piped water or electricity.  
 
4. Divided Space and Material Difference  
 
The rest of this paper will discuss how this continued spatial division of 
villages relates to the construction and negotiation of social difference and similarity 
within the villages. The first step in understanding the spatial construction and 
negotiation of identity groupings is to look at the material differences between 
people living in the spatially segregated areas versus those in ‘main’ village sections.  
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As noted in the introduction, the correlation of national origin and spatial 
segregation is not actually very high in the district. GIS data by the Agincourt Health 
and Socio-Demographic Surveillance System shows that less than half (42%) of all 
households headed by people either born in Mozambique or born to two 
Mozambican parents live in neighborhoods where all adjacent households are also 
headed by Mozambicans.6 49 percent live in mixed neighborhoods where at least 
one adjacent household is South African-headed, while 9% live entirely surrounded 
by South African households. Yet it is the spatially segregated neighborhoods, I 
argue, and not the spatially integrated individuals and households, which define the 
social meaning of what is called ‘Mozambican.’ Concomitantly, the residents of the 
‘main’ village sections are not necessarily only or predominantly of South African 
origin, yet these areas are used by villagers to describe the nature of ‘South 
Africanness.’  
 
The Agincourt census data allows us to look at broad village-level differences 
in physical infrastructure. Four ‘Mozambican’ settlements in the census area are so 
large and distant from their respective ‘main’ villages that they are counted as 
separate villages in the census. In all four, over 75% of their populations are 
Mozambican-born (marked in grey in Table 1). I have created two infrastructure 
indicators which aggregate measures such as the percentage of households with 
access to electricity for lighting; households with access to piped water through a tap 
in house, yard or road; and numbers of clinics and schools in the village. The 
‘Mozambican’ villages are significantly worse off in terms of these kinds of physical 
infrastructure compared with the other villages. 
 
6 These percentages are calculated from 2003 data on 11649 households. Each household, coded by 
the place of birth of the household head, is marked by GIS and the ‘neighborhood’ measure is 
calculated by the percentage of immediately abutting households with either Mozambican or South 
African-born household heads. Thanks goes to Benjamin Clark for developing this measure.  
185
Table 1 
Infrastructure at Village Level 
Comparing ‘Mozambican villages’ with mixed villages 
Agincourt Data (2003), N = 11649 Households 
 
V illage
%  of 
'R efugee ' 
H ouseho lds  
in  V illage
E lec tric ity %  o f 
househo lds
W atertap  %  o f 
househo lds
C lin ic  in  
v illage
H igh 
S choo ls  
P rim ary 
S choo ls
P re-
schoo ls
In fras truc ture  
Ind ica tor 
C um ula tive
In fras truc ture  
Ind ica tor B as ic
A g incourt 14% 89 43 1 3 2 3 10 5
C roquetlaw n 20% 91 82 0 1 2 1 6 5
C unn ingm ore  A 16% 86 97 1 2 3 2 10 6
C unn ingm ore  B 7% 95 100 0 2 2 2 8 5
H unting ton 28% 82 92 0 0 1 2 5 4
Ireagh A 26% 84 99 0 1 1 2 6 5
Ireagh B 38% 86 100 0 1 1 1 5 5
Justic ia  A 49% 86 99 1 1 2 2 7 6
K ildare  A 16% 94 100 1 2 2 2 8 6
K ildare  B 55% 93 100 0 1 2 1 6 5
L illyda le  A 36% 85 100 1 1 3 3 9 6
N ew ington  B 9% 95 55 0 1 1 1 4 4
N ew ington  C 4% 95 41 0 0 1 1 3 3
S om erset A 48% 0 99 0 1 2 1 5 4
X anth ia 4% 90 58 1 1 2 1 5 5
K haya Lam i 6% 84 68 0 0 0 1 2 3
L illyda le  B 79% 1 100 0 1 1 1 4 4
R holane 99% 1 99 0 0 0 0 1 1
K ildare  C 97% 3 100 0 0 0 0 1 1
Justic ia  B 98% 1 99 0 0 0 0 1 1
S om erset B 89% 31 100 0 0 0 0 1 1  
 
The effect can be seen even more powerfully if disaggregated by 
‘neighborhood’ within villages. Even where ‘Mozambican’ areas are not large enough 
to be considered separate villages, the more ‘Mozambican’ your neighborhood, the 
worse your infrastructure access, with purely Mozambican neighborhoods 
significantly the worst off (Table 2). 
 
Table 2 
Percentage of Households with Infrastructure Access per Neighborhood Type 
Agincourt Data (2003) 
 
100% SA 
n’hood 
51-99% SA 
n’hood 
50-99% Moz 
n’hood 
100% Moz 
n’hood 
Total HH with data 
on utilities access 
Electricity 92.4% 80.6% 61.0% 27.6% N= 10505 HH 
Water taps 
indoors or yard 12% 9% 5% 3% N= 10492 HH 
Total HH in 
N’hood type N=5710  N=2235  N=1163  N=1397  
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If we compare the significance of the spatial dimension with other possible 
explanations, such as discrimination by place of origin, or lack of eligibility for state 
resources because of not having an ID, we can see how powerful the effect of living 
in a purely Mozambican neighborhood is on infrastructure access. While 52% of 
Mozambican-headed households and 63% of households without an ID do not have 
access to electricity, fully 72% of households in Mozambican neighborhoods lack 
electricity access. Table 3 gives a regression which disaggregates the relative 
influence of each factor on electricity access, since living in a Mozambican 
neighborhood, being born in Mozambique and not having an ID are correlated. The 
regression shows that while all three factors are statistically significant and the place 
of birth is more significant than whether the household head has an ID, the 
neighborhood variable, e.g. location of residence within the village, remains the 
strongest explanatory variable for whether a household has electricity or not.  
 
Table 3 
Relative Risk Factors in Household Electricity Access, logistic regression  
Agincourt data (2003) 
Independent variables Odds ratio 
100% Mozambican neighborhood -1.733 *** 
Mozambican-born household head -1.448 *** 
Household head without ID - 0.764 *** 
*** significant at the 0.01 level 
 
These findings clearly show that there is a strong correlation between spatial 
and physical resource differentiation, and that the spatial factor is independent of 
and stronger than individual factors such as national origin or documentation status. 
In addition to spatially-bound physical resources, there are other essential resources 
which are not spatially-tied, levels of access to which are nonetheless strongly 
correlated with residence in ‘Mozambican’ neighborhoods. These include child 
mortality, education and identity documentation.7  
7 There is no significant difference in terms of participation in the labour force, as c. 71% of adults in 
all neighborhood types were not currently working in 2004, and no difference in gender composition 
by neighborhood type. 
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 Hargreaves’ analysis of child mortality rates within the Agincourt census site 
shows that the strongest effect on child (1-5 years old) mortality came from living in 
a ‘Mozambican’ settlement rather than from other factors such as nationality of the 
mother, health care utilization or other measured household or maternal 
characteristics (Hargreaves, Collinson, Kahn, Clark, & Tollman, 2004). Child survival is 
therefore not directly tied to physical characteristics of a space, such as the 
availability of public health care, nor is it reducible to individual characteristics of 
mothers in that space, such as nationality, but is still strongly correlated with residing 
in that space (see also Sampson et al, 2002 and Kaplan, 1996 on neighborhood 
health effects). Another non-spatialised resource which is highly correlated with 
neighborhood is education level (Table 4). For both the total adult population 
(including all South African-born and Mozambican-born persons over the age of 17) 
and the Mozambican-born adult population, neighborhood is strongly correlated 
with whether a person is likely to have completed the high-school leaving ‘matric’ 
diploma or have no formal education at all.  
Table 4 
Education level of adults (over 17) by Neighborhood 
Agincourt data (2004) 
N=71258 (Moz-born N=17997) 
All Residents 
(Moz-born 
residents) 
100% SA 
neighborhood 
51-99% SA 
neighborhood 
50-99% Moz 
neighborhood 
100% Moz 
neighborhood 
Completed 
Matric 12% (5%) 9% (5%) 6% (4%) 3% (3%) 
No formal 
education 18% (36%) 24% (40%) 36% (43%) 48% (49%) 
 
Finally, people of Mozambican origin living in an entirely Mozambican 
neighborhood are much less likely to have any kind of South African identity 
document, including a citizenship ID, permanent resident ID or birth certificate 
(21%), than those living in mixed neighborhoods (14.8% for largely Mozambican 
neighborhoods, 14.5% for largely South African neighborhoods, and 11.3% for 
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entirely South African neighborhoods).8 The data also shows that while the effect of 
living in different levels of mixed settlements (e.g. anything less than complete 
ghettos) is relatively low, there is a significant jump in documentationlessness with 
residence in a completely ‘Mozambican’ neighborhood. The role of identity 
documents as a key to material resources but also as a symbolic resource is 
discussed further below. 
 
In summary we can therefore say that the residents of spatially separate 
‘Mozambican’ neighborhoods not only have access to less physical infrastructure, 
but their children are less healthy, and they are less educated and less likely to have 
South African identity documents than residents (including Mozambican-born 
residents) of other village sections. The correlate is that Mozambican-born people 
with an ID and education tend to live in the central village section. Many analyses 
stop here, and conclude that such discrepancies are due to discrimination by local 
South African residents or by the state (Johnston, 1999; De Jongh, 1994). Yet these 
objective spatialised differences in material resources do not map clearly or easily 
onto identity group construction or service eligibility criteria for services such as IDs.  
The following sections discuss how local social constructions of identity groups 
explain, incorporate or obfuscate these objective differences in resource access in 
different spaces within a village, and how residents both within and outside the 
‘Mozambican’ village sections negotiate both a relationship with these spaces and 
the meanings of those spaces.  
 
 
5. Constructing and Negotiating Spatialised Identities  
 
As noted in the introduction, on the one hand the differences between the 
materially distinct village sections are recognized and labeled by calling the 
peripheral areas ‘Mozambican’, but on the other hand the distinctions are elided by 
protestations of social unity. After giving evidence of this discursive tension, I argue 
that it can be understood as reflecting efforts by residents of both ‘Mozambican’ and 
8 This is based on 2005 Agincourt data of 10567 Mozambican-headed households. 
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‘core’ village sections to relate their own group identities to an idealized ‘good 
community’, to locate that ‘good community’ in their respective spaces, and to 
define the ‘goodness’ of these spaces relationally, either against the neighboring 
‘other’ space or, in some cases, through selective linkage with some of the 
characteristics of the ‘other’ space.  
 
The first notable characteristic of discourses around the spatial division of 
these case study villages is the continuous tension between, on the one hand, an 
every-day awareness of and reference to the presence of ‘Mozambican’ 
neighborhoods, and on the other hand, a strong narrative avoidance of mentioning 
or validating the social difference inherent in the divided space. Various interactions 
during the research process illustrated the reluctance by both South African and 
Mozambican-born residents to point out explicitly that some areas are populated by 
Mozambicans. When I first started working with research assistants in Clare, they 
were unwilling to point out the part of their hand-drawn maps which was the 
‘Mozambican’ neighborhood, although it was clearly visible when driving through 
the village and from the shape of the map. Hargreaves documented a similar 
reluctance during a participatory village typology exercise in 2000 with experienced 
local field workers of the Agincourt census site. When asked to describe census 
villages with similar characteristics, field workers mentioned that ‘refugee villages’ 
were places where “a person from a South African village wouldn’t choose to go …. 
No, it just wouldn’t happen.”(Hargreaves, 2000:22). However, when it came to 
developing formal groupings of villages for a report, both teams of field workers 
independently grouped the five villages which had over 70% Mozambican 
populations along with other villages according to criteria like ‘under-development’ 
or ‘tradition.’ Only when Hargreaves intervened to construct a final typology which 
reflected both locally perceived differences and village characteristics arising from 
analysis of Agincourt census data, were the five villages grouped as “refugee 
settlements.” It seems a significant indicator of narrative conventions that the local 
field workers did not immediately group them as such themselves, but seemed to 
agree that they should rather be grouped along with other poor villages. 
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Maria,9 an old Mozambican-born woman whose homestead is in the 
‘Mozambican’ neighborhood of Clare, expressed the tension and ambivalence 
between recognizing different ‘groups’ and not wanting to validate these 
differences:  
Tara:  In general what would you say about the relationship between 
this part of the village and the old part of the village?  
Maria: We are together. Just like when you have a child at home. Your 
child is maybe not behaving well at home. You tell him that he is 
not behaving well, but you cannot say: you are not my child. 
They are supporting us until we feel free to be here. When we 
started to be here, it was great. We can’t say there is no unity 
between us. There is unity. Even when we have a meeting, we 
are together. If there is a problem in our group, we go to tell 
them, to help the other group. Even the other group, they like to 
know about the relationship in our group. If we don’t know what 
we are going to do, we go there for help. When we go there, we 
tell them, do this and this and this, it will be OK. I say we are 
together with them. There is a relationship between us. We are 
not separated. If they didn’t like us, they would be doing things 
separately for our group, but because they like us, we get 
anything from those people. We even get water from those 
people. There is no problem.  
Tara:  What about electricity? In other parts of the village there is 
electricity.  
Esther: About electricity, it is different because we did not build our 
houses at the same time. Some people built their houses and 
have electricity; others don’t have electricity because they built 
their houses late. There is no-one who is discriminating against 
us.10 
 
9 All names are pseudonyms.  
10 Interview in Clare, 10 May 2005 
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The CDF Chairman of Clare village, whose Mozambican miner father established 
Clare village, describes his own approach to labeling:  
 
Where there is a child born here, as long as we know your parents are 
from Mozambique, automatically you are called Mozambican. They 
don’t like that but the most despised name to be called is mapoti. They 
don’t like that stuff. … At school [when I was a teacher] I discouraged 
that, and at school we don’t call the students Mozambicans. … It is only 
when you are going to their place (in the village) you say, I’m going to 
Mozambique, but when we are in the middle of people or in the church 
you don’t say that. We don’t speak in such terms of Mozambicans; it is 
only when you want to get into their place.11 
 
The prohibition on and avoidance of validating difference clearly does not 
mean there is no generally recognized social boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’, or 
that there is a boundary but both sides are of equal value; the discourse is 
constructed around a boundary between mutually recognized groups of unequal 
status. Furthermore, the status is primarily attached to the fact of residing in a 
‘Mozambican’ enclave rather than to being of Mozambican origin per se.  
 
In addition to the fact of a social boundary tied to spatial divisions, and a clear 
tension concerning the validation of that boundary, there are three ways in which 
the space of the ‘Mozambican’ and ‘core’ neighborhoods are imagined which serve 
to illustrate and confirm the nature of the ‘good community’. These are narratives 
about legibility to and incorporation into the state (Scott, 1998) versus sociability, 
the relation to tradition and modernity, and questions of social class and hierarchy. 
Each of these narratives is interpreted and practiced differently by people from the 
perspective of the village ‘core’ and from within the ‘Mozambican’ enclave. This 
brings us back to Massey’s point about how spatial “’identities’ are constructed 
through the specificity of their interaction with other places rather than 
counterposition to them,” (Massey 1994: 121) and to Soja’s lived and practiced 
11 Interview in Clare, 21 April 2004 
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“Thirdspace”. The forms of negotiation from within the ‘Mozambican’ neighborhood 
include individual ‘exit’ through permanent movement from the ‘periphery’ to the 
‘core’, individual circular movement between the two spaces, and collective claims 
about the nature of a ‘good community’ which challenge ‘core’ value judgments 
about the ‘periphery.’ These strategies are most evident in relation to the narrative 
of legibility, which I discuss more extensively, but are also used to adopt and contest 
claims regarding modernity/tradition and status. 
 
6. Legibility versus Sociability 
 
In his seminal work Seeing like a State, Scott argues that one of the key 
characteristics of the modern state is the ability to legibilise populations and 
territories by simplifying and standardizing the measurement and documentation of 
people and spaces (Scott, 1998). The South African state, to a greater extent than 
most African states, has ‘captured’ both population and territory through the nearly 
ubiquitous presence of ID documents and formally demarcated land parcels 
(‘stands’). While the processes through which these are allocated do not always 
conform to the precepts of a bureaucratic legal system (Polzer, 2007), nonetheless 
the value of ‘being formalized’ has become entrenched in the rural leadership as well 
as, to some extent, in the general population. This is not least because of the real 
material benefits and services available from the state for people with IDs and 
formal stands (such as social grants and electricity), but goes beyond a rational 
minimum logic of exchange to a broader value judgment about people and spaces.  
 
A conversation with a young Mozambican-born man in Clare illustrates the 
power of the ID in gaining basic respect.  He told me that South Africans “look down 
on people from Mozambique.” 
 
Tara: Now if someone has an ID, if you were born in Mozambique or 
your parents were born there, but you have a South African ID, do 
people treat you badly if they find out that you were born in 
Mozambique?  
C: I don’t think so.  
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Tara: so if you have an ID, it’s fine?  
C: if you have an ID, yes.12 
 
There are two forms of illegibility in ‘Mozambican’ neighborhoods which make 
it difficult for leaders of the village core to engage with and value them: firstly, the 
illegibility of persons in a space, and secondly the illegibility of the physical space 
itself. The common narrative is that people were moved into the ‘Mozambican’ 
neighborhoods because they did not have ID documents, e.g. were not legible as 
people. This narrative is reflected in the explanation given by the CDF Chairman of 
Clare about why Mozambicans were settled in a separate area when they first 
arrived.  
 
When they came, they were given a special section (of the village) … 
especially those who did not have ID books and were not paying a 
tribute to the tribal authority. Because they believed that in no time 
they would be going back to Mozambique they built in their own 
place. So now we are mixed with them, but not that much. We are 
especially mixed with those who have ID books. Then … we believed 
they would be getting back home soon. Seemingly whenever a 
refugee comes to rural areas they are given special treatment, 
except in urban areas where you can’t find that. They are just mixed 
there but in rural places they are given a place because you find that 
when they came there were no vacant stands around. In other 
words they couldn't mix with others so they had to be given a 
special place. They were many, per week you would find that 100 
people arrived. Sometimes the children came alone and for 
identification sake, because they were getting food from the Red 
Cross, they were supposed to be placed where they could be easily 
managed.13  
 
The nduna of Justicia was equally explicit:  
12 Interview in Clare, 31 May 2005 
13 Interview in Clare, 21 April 2004 
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 The problem at the time [in 1987] was that then people did not have an 
ID. You have to pay for a stand. Now we have new stands in the place 
where the Mozambicans were living. We are not grouping those people 
there because they are from Mozambique. They were living there 
because they don’t have IDs.14  
 
The CDF Chairman of Justicia, when asked about this story, however, gave a 
different account about local social governance structures rather than abstract 
documentation:  
 
The issue of IDs was not central by then. [Mozambicans] were 
clustered according to… xibonda, that is under the guidance of the 
headman. Because we did not know them, they did this by 
themselves to decide who is going to lead them. Then, because 
some were living over there and some on that side there had to be 
someone who was looking and knowing their affairs. So it was not 
because of IDs because back then they could not be expected to 
have IDs. There were no IDs then.15  
 
Today’s narrative about IDs as a reason for spatial segregation is therefore 
more a reflection of current identity boundaries than of historical fact. It is a 
powerful narrative which not only rewrites the past but is used to justify differences 
of infrastructure access and public services in the present. For example, a lack of 
electrification of ‘Mozambican’ neighborhoods is explained by the technical 
requirements of payment meters which are keyed to a specific ID number, even 
though other means of paying for electricity also exist.  
 
The second mantra used to explain the lack of infrastructure in ‘Mozambican 
neighborhoods’ relates to the illegibility of the space itself. The physical space is 
triply illegible in that it is a) often not marked on municipal or service provider maps 
14 Interview in Justicia, 27 March 2006 
15 Interview in Justicia, 27 March 2006 
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(such as the national electricity provider Eskom’s maps); b) not divided into formal 
stands, so that residents do not pay stand-tax to the chiefs and so are not included in 
the chief’s maps; and c) so densely and organically settled that services requiring 
thoroughfares and straight lines cannot fit. These forms of illegibility do pose real 
technical problems in providing services, but they are also used as an excuse not to 
provide water and electricity. Furthermore, prefiguring the discussion on tradition 
and modernity below, the physical illegibility confirms the ‘backwardness’ of the 
space and its (and its inhabitants’) inability to modernize.  
 
It is significant that official village and councilor narratives to explain the lack of 
services in ‘Mozambican’ village sections are always about such technical issues as 
maps and straight roads, and never that Mozambicans have no rights to services due 
to their foreign nationality. This stands in contrast to the dominant discourses about 
nationality and access to public services in South Africa, which are often xenophobic 
(Crush, 2000; Landau, 2004; Misago et al, 2010), and illustrates the importance of 
carefully analyzing local logics of relational identity formation, e.g. what is relevant 
about being ‘South African’ versus being ‘Mozambican’, in a specific context and not 
assuming that there is a ‘natural’ line of division between groups on the basis of 
nationality or any other characteristic.  
 
Examples of the spatial legibilisation discourse abound. The late 1990s water 
scheme implemented in Justicia A was not extended to Justicia B, according to the 
CDF Chairman, because the area “was informal so there were no places to put a 
trench. If you want to put the trench, sometimes you have to go through someone’s 
hut, so it was not possible.” Similarly, concerning Justicia A’s electrification in 1997, 
“it is unfortunate now that the population has exploded and those people will again 
not be energized because of that informal settlement. You know, the regulations are 
that it is not possible. Sometimes they would have to plant a pole in someone’s 
house so to move it would be an extra cost.”16 In Clare A, when the village was 
electrified in 1999, the original settlement of Mozambicans was not included. When 
asked why this section was not electrified, the CDF Chairman explained that Eskom 
16 Interview in Justicia, 24 March 2006 
196
was not given a map for that section “because it is far away”,17 although the area is 
only separated from the ‘core’ village by about 500 meters.  
 
How do residents of the ‘Mozambican’ neighborhoods respond to and 
negotiate this discourse of illegibility? As noted above, there are three options: make 
a permanent physical move from one (illegible) space to another (legible) space, 
thereby accepting or even embodying the concomitant shift in identity; engage in 
circular movement between the spaces, through everyday practices recognizing but 
not necessarily validating the values attached to them; or challenge the discourses 
which invalidate the ‘Mozambican’ spaces as lesser because they are illegible, and 
putting forward alternative indicators of a ‘good community.’  
  
Many young people, especially those who acquire an ID, decide to leave the 
neighborhood and move to a formal stand in the ‘core’ villages, either because they 
accept the value judgments that legible people and legible spaces are ‘better’ and so 
seek to ‘improve’ themselves by moving, or because they instrumentally seek better 
access to existing services such as electricity, water, schools, etc. This is discussed 
further in the section on status, below. The second strategy for negotiating 
spatialised identity divisions is to make use of the dominant space, and its resources, 
without necessarily moving into it fully. A mapping exercise tracing respondents’ 
movements and social connections within the village (summarized in Table 5) shows 
generally low levels of interaction between village sections (see also Golooba-
Mutebi, 2004), but significantly higher interaction from the ‘Mozambican’ to the 
‘core’ section than the other way around. 
 
 
17 Interview in Clare, 21 April 2004 
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Table 5 
Levels of functional and social interaction across village sections, 
Movement and Social Connections Mapping Exercise (2005)18 
 
 Where household is located in village 
 ‘Mozambican' section ‘Core' section 
Within own section 32% 59% 
Across sections 46% 15% 
Outside village 21% 26% 
 N=28 N=46 
 
Residents of the village core rarely even passed through the ‘Mozambican’ 
village sections (see Agincourt field worker comment above that South Africans 
would “never” go to a Mozambican village), while ‘Mozambican’ neighborhood 
residents more regularly transited the ‘core’ on their way to use public infrastructure 
such as water taps, shops, schools or churches. Those ‘core’ residents who did visit 
the ‘Mozambican’ neighborhood were all of Mozambican heritage themselves, 
having previously settled in the core, or were tied to Mozambicans by marriage. 
Other core residents of Mozambican heritage, however, did not visit the 
‘Mozambican’ section any more often than their South African neighbors. While for 
residents of the ‘Mozambican’ section the village ‘core’ is therefore a relatively 
known and accessible space, the ‘Mozambican’ neighborhood remains largely 
unknown and closed off in the perception of South African ‘core’ residents, 
completing the image of spatial illegibility. This strategy by ‘Mozambican’ section 
residents is obviously facilitated by the convention against explicitly discriminating or 
mentioning difference, as outlined above. Superior knowledge of the dominant 
group’s space is a common strategy through which marginalized groups maintain 
some, however limited, room for maneuver (Scott, 1990). 
 
18 The movement and social connections mapping exercise was conducted with a total of 82 
individuals in 41 households. However, only 74 individuals are analysed here, since 4 households (8 
persons) were located in a new, small, ‘mixed’ section of Clare village where almost all interviewed 
residents had all their interactions and movements outside the village and so cannot be analysed in 
terms of intra-village spatial dynamics. 
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Finally, the third strategy for negotiating spatialised identities is to contest the 
relevance or value of ascribed characteristics such as legibility. Residents of the 
‘Mozambican’ neighborhoods generally wish for better water and electricity services 
and often recognize the technical difficulties of installing these in a dense 
settlement. However, they draw different conclusions from leaders of the ‘core’ 
village about whether personal and spatial illegibility constitute the key 
characteristics of a ‘good community.’ Village leaders, in keeping with their 
legibilisation focus and the belief that more legible ways of living are necessarily 
better, have offered ‘Mozambican’ neighborhood residents opportunities to move 
out of their existing areas and take up newly demarcated stands in other parts of the 
village. In both Clare and Justicia, new village sections have been established in order 
to reduce crowding in the original Mozambican sections and to enable easier 
infrastructure provision. In both cases, mainly young people moved into the new 
areas. Older residents preferred to remain and to lobby the village leadership to find 
ways of bringing services to them. This collective response suggests that residents of 
the ‘Mozambican’ neighborhoods do not merely see themselves in terms of a lack – 
of legibility, of services, or of connection to the village ‘core’ – but also in terms of a 
positive sociality which they do not want to break up by dispersing out of their 
shared space. Golooba-Mutebi describes the high levels of mutual support and 
assistance in the ‘Mozambican’ neighborhood he studied, contrasting it with high 
levels of mistrust among South African residents of the same village (2004). This 
sociality is independent of personal or spatial legibility and links to ideas of ‘cultural’ 
(rather than bureaucratic and documentation-based) tradition and modernity. 
 
7. Modernity versus Tradition 
 
A similar discrepancy of perception concerns the value judgment attached to 
‘Mozambican’ neighborhoods in terms of the dichotomy modernity versus tradition. 
There is general agreement among all village residents on the characteristics of 
‘Mozambicans’ living in the enclaves. This includes characteristics mentioned above 
like less formal education and lack of ID documents, but also that Mozambicans ‘like 
to plough’ (cultivate fields to support themselves) while South Africans prefer 
working for wages, that Mozambicans have more children, dress more 
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conservatively, are more likely to respect the ancestors, drum through the night, and 
have stronger muti (traditional medicine). Such sentiments were captured in 
responses to an open-ended question in my survey, and come out strongly in 
informal conversations where the same phrases about ploughing, money, education 
and muti are regularly repeated.  
 
The disagreement lies in the valuation of tradition versus modernity. As 
Golooba-Mutebi and Rodgers also discuss, many Mozambicans in the segregated 
neighborhoods value the connection and identification with tradition and disapprove 
of the modern South African ways, which are perceived to include disrespecting 
elders and ancestors, violent jealousies and spreading illnesses (Golooba-Mutebi, 
2004; Rodgers, 2002). Traditionalism can be seen not only as backwardness but also 
as authenticity. Furthermore, there are South Africans who also value and respect 
tradition as authenticity, especially since it is seen as a shared ‘Shangaan’ tradition. 
This dimension of identity construction therefore illustrates how spatialised divisions 
do not need to reflect dichotomous oppositions of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ community but 
may be more ambivalent, even as the division itself is maintained (Massey 1994: 
121).  
 
These stereotypes are reflected in space. In all three villages, the 
‘Mozambican’ section is the farthest from the road and the closest to the fields and 
communal wilds. Yet the value of the space is different for each group. While the 
residents of the ‘core’ village see the ‘Mozambican’ section as being on the 
periphery and far from amenities, at least some of the residents of the Mozambican 
section see themselves well-placed close to their fields, or the fields they work in for 
the South African owners, and to the communal areas for collecting medicinal and 
edible wild herbs and roots.  
 
8. Status 
 
Finally, village neighborhoods in Bushbuckridge, as elsewhere around the 
world, reflect images of socio-economic class and status. The image of spatially-
defined poverty, furthermore, is strengthened by the spatially frozen memory of the 
200
destitute state in which Mozambicans arrived in the villages in the 1980s. In spite of 
the many Mozambican-born people with IDs, education and jobs living among South 
Africans in the village ‘core’, ‘Mozambicanness’ as an identity descriptor remains 
associated with a subordinate class which is tied to space. The CDF Chairman of Clare 
(whose own father was Mozambican) expresses the class consciousness explicitly:  
 
You know those people, the Mozambicans, if you try to move [into their 
neighborhood] with them, it will seem you are not wise enough. When 
we can class ourselves, like in America, we belong to the first class and 
they belong to the second class, ja like that. I can’t remember any one 
from South Africa who has ever done that [gone to live in the 
Mozambican section of the village].19  
 
In reverse, young people, particularly young men who complete an education 
and have a job, often opt to express their status gain by moving out of the 
‘Mozambican’ neighborhood in which they grew up, and by implication, divest 
themselves of the second class status. This was the case with three young men with 
whom I worked during my research, one in each of the case study villages. In 
Thangine, Mozambican-born Amos had been living with a South African family who 
shared his surname while he completed his secondary education, and when he got a 
job he immediately started building a house on a vacant stand in the middle of the 
village rather than close to his birth-family on the ‘Mozambican’ side of the village. In 
Clare, my research assistant Denis worked as a photographer, so he soon moved out 
of his mother’s homestead in the ‘Mozambican’ section to stay with his South 
African photography business partner, although he continued to regularly visit and 
assist his mother and siblings. Finally, in Justicia, Phinius wanted to start a small 
business fixing cell phones with the money he had earned from the research, but he 
felt he first had to move out of Justicia B into Justicia A or neighboring mixed Lillydale 
before such a business would be viable.  
 
19 Interview in Clare, 21 April 2004 
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9. Conclusion 
 
This case study of divided villages in the border region of South Africa shows 
how a spatial analysis can add a crucial dimension to understanding migrant-host 
relationships and the integration process, specifically how both ‘migrant’ and ‘host’ 
group identities can be constructed in relation to each other and in relation to the 
spaces they respectively (are seen to) occupy. Without considering and carefully 
deconstructing the ways in which ideas of ‘being Mozambican’, ‘being South African’ 
and the ‘good community’ more generally are tied to and negotiated in relation to 
spatial divisions in the village, it would be difficult to understand the simultaneous 
far-reaching social, spatial and discursive integration between people of 
Mozambican and South African origin, and the maintenance of narratives about 
distinct identities and spaces. 
 
Such an analysis of relational identity construction associated with distinct 
spaces must be empirical and not assume the relevance or valuation of potential 
boundary markers such as nationality or migration history. While this case confirms 
that “places and boundaries do matter” (Cresswell, 2002:20) to identity construction, 
including the identities of people who have moved across national borders, it shows 
how identity boundaries may in fact be constructed around issues such as legibility 
to the state, tradition/modernity and status, without any direct reference to national 
origin or migration history. Furthermore, the relevant spaces for identity 
construction may not be the space of origin versus the new space of settlement, or 
an interaction between a ‘global’ and a ‘local’, but may be divisions within the micro-
spaces of the ‘local.’ This applies in a rural African village and not only in 
cosmopolitan cities or modern spaces of transit (Soguk & Whitehall, 1999). Finally, 
documenting the ways in which identity and space are linked is far from claiming any 
essential or natural link between the two. All of the (personal and spatial) identity 
boundary markers described here are inherently changeable and negotiable: 
legibility is conferred by the state and may be acquired from one day to the next, 
tradition and modernity are shifting ascribed values, and status is relative. While 
there are clearly contexts where migrant individuals carry status and identity 
markers with them through space – due to differences of race, physiognomy, 
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language or visible cultural behavior in relation to the dominant group in the new 
space – one cannot assume that there will always be such visible markers or what 
social meaning these markers will have. 
 
Understanding the integration of migrants therefore also means 
understanding how social marginality is invested into a specific space, and the extent 
to which individuals can move out of that space and therefore move out of social 
marginality. The social value of such spaces is, however, rarely uncontested, and so it 
is important to document not only the ways in which individuals negotiate their 
identities and status by shifting in space, but also how individuals and groups 
negotiate to shift the status meanings attributed to their space.  
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Conclusion 
 
If refugee integration is a process of political negotiation, our ways of 
understanding it relate to how we understand other similar processes of political 
engagement and negotiation for legitimacy and rights. The case study of 
Mozambicans and South Africans in Bushbuckridge can be related to several often 
distinct debates on negotiated group interactions, depending on who is taken as 
the ‘other’. The first is minority politics, as on their arrival in South Africa, 
Mozambican refugees (at least potentially) constituted a minority group in relation 
to South African citizens overall, due to their Mozambican nationality, experience of 
displacement and non-citizenship in South Africa. The negotiated relationship was 
therefore between a ‘minority’ and ‘mainstream’ society. The second debate can be 
called ‘weapons of the weak’ since the refugees were also marginal, poor residents 
of a distant but also interventionist state, a position shared in many (although not 
all) ways with their South African neighbours. Here, the relevant relationship is 
marginal groups in relation to powerful institutions like the state. Third is debates 
on nation-building, since this particularly significant form of relationship between 
populations and a state was in flux for all residents of Bushbuckridge, given its 
trajectory from an Apartheid ‘homeland’ to a part of the unified, democratic South 
Africa after 1994. The relevant relationship here is between populations and the 
projects of a ‘national’ political elite. Finally, theoretical approaches to identity 
group formation generally are relevant to understanding the subtle boundary 
dynamics between ‘Mozambicans’ and ‘South Africans’ in the context of the local 
district and village, not least because they are all ‘Shangaan.’ In each of these four 
spheres of political negotiation, Mozambican-born residents of Bushbuckridge 
stand in a different position of in- or outsider: as a (potential) ‘minority’; as included 
within a broader marginal group of the rural poor; as either part of the nationalized 
population or its quintessential outsider; as one of two opposing identity groups. 
Showing the links between a case of ‘refugee integration’ and these different 
theoretical debates, I emphasise again my central contention that refugee 
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integration must be understood empirically, contextually, and as a process of 
political engagement, with no prior assumptions about the nature of the 
relationship between refugees and hosts or refugees and the state, and indeed 
without assuming that the refugees constitute a significantly bounded group at all 
or where these boundaries lie. 
 
1. Minority Politics 
 
This section on minority politics will be short because one of the striking, but not 
necessarily surprising, findings concerning Mozambican integration strategies in 
Bushbuckridge was that they did not constitute themselves as a political minority 
and did not use collective ‘minority’ identification and legitimation strategies to 
access resources and legitimacy. I will therefore only briefly outline why this was to 
be expected, given the context. 
For a group to engage in ‘minority politics’ several conditions must be in place. First, 
the polity (and usually the wider society) must self-identify as being divided into a 
majority and (usually several) minorities, and must explicitly value (even if only 
rhetorically) the presence and rights of minorities. Second, there must be actual (or 
at least potential) spaces, or political opportunity structures (Ireland 1994; 
Martiniello 2005; Polzer and Segatti forthcoming), for groups identifying themselves 
as ‘minorities’ to engage with the state and/or with political decision-making 
bodies. Third, the group in question must recognise itself as a group and have 
enough internal coherence and organisation to put forward a leadership and a 
collective programme. Whether or not these leaders and this programme are 
actually representative of the larger group, they must be minimally recognised as 
such by majority institutions. Finally, minority politics rely on increasing the public 
visibility of a group as a strategy for claiming access to rights (whether the same 
rights as the majority or different ones), so this strategy must be considered (the 
most) effective means of gaining rights above other possible strategies (such as 
remaining invisible). None of these conditions were or are in place with regard to 
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Mozambicans in Bushbuckridge. More broadly, they are rarely in place for refugee 
or migrant groups anywhere, and not in South Africa specifically. 
In the current international system of mutually exclusive nation-states, especially in 
democratic states, non-citizen residents (migrants and refugees) are excluded from 
most formal means of influencing (negotiating) the making of law and policy, 
including laws and policies which directly relate to and impact on them. In virtually 
all democratic countries, only citizens vote for representatives to the legislature of 
the country and in all forms of government there are very rarely non-citizens in 
either elected or appointed high government positions. This exclusion from formal 
avenues of negotiation is compounded for people who are not even recognised by 
the state (e.g. undocumented migrants), since they cannot begin to interact with 
formal bureaucratic channels unless there has been a prior political decision to 
enable recognition. There are organised movements of undocumented migrants in 
some countries, especially in Europe, but their abilities to have lasting political 
impacts are limited (Guiraudon 2001; Rodríguez 2004).  
Many countries have strong lobby groups representing previous migrant groups, 
but who are now naturalised and seen as ethnic ‘minorities’. South Africa does not 
have established naturalised migrant communities which politically constitute 
themselves as ‘minorities’.1 Black immigrants from the region, many of whom 
settled and naturalised in South Africa, were long forced to be politically invisible 
under the apartheid regime (both as national groupings and as a collective migrant 
voice), and South Africa’s post-apartheid brand of nationalism has mitigated against 
a politically productive claim of minority status (Landau 2005). This is partly 
because South Africa, with its eleven officially recognised languages (as proxies for 
‘ethnic groups’), does not have a political culture of ‘minority politics’ for lack of a 
clear ‘majority’ culture.2 Migrant concerns are generally represented by NGOs 
(almost invariably not staffed by the people for whom they speak), which seek to 
influence government policy and practice relating to migration, asylum and refugee 
1 A possible exception is the Chinese South African community. 
2 Although Afrikaans-speakers are increasingly attempting to build a ‘minority’ discourse as a means 
of ‘protecting minority rights’ in the face of a racially defined majority. 
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law. From time to time there are specific ‘windows of opportunity’ for migrant 
groups to constitute themselves (across the highly fragmented terrain of 
nationality, class, legal status and levels of transience or permanence) and to speak 
to newly established public fora looking for representative ‘migrants’ to engage 
with, such as in the wake of the widespread civic violence against foreigners in May 
2008 (Polzer and Segatti forthcoming). Such opportunities however are mostly 
short-lived and limited to urban spaces and previously politicised migrant 
individuals and small groups.  
In the case of Mozambican refugees arriving in South Africa in the 1980s, none of 
the criteria for ‘minority politics’ applied or emerged later. The Apartheid 
government did not provide any space for formal engagement with (black) groups, 
least of all with people they considered illegal aliens and probable ‘communists’ 
and ‘terrorists’. The Gazankulu ‘homeland’ government, as discussed in Histories, 
recognised the Mozambicans not as a minority but as a part of their own ethnic 
majority (e.g. Tsonga/Shangaan-speaking people). The refugees were mostly 
peasants without strong previous collective political organisation (apart from 
through village headmen and chiefs), and those with urban backgrounds and 
previous experience of labour migration to the more politicised mining and 
manufacturing areas of South Africa (where ‘Shangaans’ were often derided for 
being docile and strike-breakers, so anything but a self-conscious political group) 
generally had little contact with the peasants who settled in the rural border areas. 
Especially for urban-based refugees, invisibility was of paramount importance to 
prevent arrest and deportation. This imperative remained in place with the 
transition to post-Apartheid democracy from the early 1990s, when large-scale 
deportation of Mozambicans continued and in fact increased (see Changing Legal 
Frameworks). The political atmosphere was one of needing to overcome the ethnic 
divisions among Blacks fostered by Apartheid and on emphasising the rectification 
of past inequalities and injustices among citizens (primarily based on race and 
gender). There was no space in these discourses for either ethnically-based or 
refugee/migration based groupings to benefit from collective visibility. Changing 
Legal Frameworks and Histories set out the policy shifts post-1994 and responses to 
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them by Mozambican-born residents of Bushbuckridge, but even the specifically 
targeted 1999 Amnesty for ‘former Mozambican refugees’ did not result from or in 
a collective ‘minority’ identity.  
The actual forms of political negotiation engaged in by Mozambican refugees in 
Bushbuckridge relied on small, individualised, informal and largely invisible 
contestations of ‘the rules’ of the state. “Where everyday resistance most strikingly 
departs from other forms of resistance is in its implicit disavowal of public and 
symbolic goals. Where institutionalized politics is formal, overt, concerned with 
systematic, de jure change, everyday resistance is informal, often covert, and 
concerned largely with immediate, de facto gains.” (Scott 1985:33). This brings me 
to the next section which discusses a theoretical approach much more appropriate 
to understanding the actual negotiating strategies employed by Mozambicans and 
indeed all residents of Bushbuckridge in relation to the state. 
 
2. Weapons of the Weak? 
 
A key form of relationship negotiation explored throughout my study is the 
interactions between Bushbuckridge residents and the state. In Negotiating Rights I 
make the general point that the role of the state in refugee integration processes 
needs to be established empirically based on people’s interactions with and 
interpretations of the actions of a state’s local representatives, and not on the basis 
of abstract ideas about policy positions, or national or international laws. These 
local negotiations are particularly discussed in Changing Legal Frameworks in 
relation to the acquisition of identity documents, but also in Invisible Integration 
with regard to uptake of a government legalisation amnesty, and in Space with 
regard to the connections between identity documents and the formal demarcation 
of land. Finally, in Histories, I discuss the changing strategies used by Bushbuckridge 
residents through different time periods to engage with different iterations of the 
state. 
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These discussion relate to a theoretical field in the social sciences which looks at 
how less powerful groups, including the poor, the rural, migrants, refugees, etc. 
interact with a state and state-like institutions (for example the institutions 
managing a refugee camp) that seek to control them. I find James Scott’s approach, 
famously entitled ‘weapons of the weak’, particularly useful. Scott describes these 
strategies as “the ordinary weapons of relatively powerless groups: foot dragging, 
dissimulation, desertion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, 
arson, sabotage, and so on.” (Scott 1985:xvi) One could add falsifying one’s name 
and place of birth or pretending to be someone’s relative in order to acquire 
citizenship documents. Scott’s terms are all value laden with distinctly negative 
connotations, as the state or challenged institutions would see them (even though 
his actual discussion of these processes is very far from normatively attached to 
institutional value systems). If we take the perspective of the sub-altern, however, 
they become rational and relatively effective (given the limitations of the power 
imbalance) means of resisting externally imposed norms and material demands 
which are not seen as being in the interests of those affected. 
There are at least two reasons why describing such strategies requires careful 
consideration for an academic studying refugee integration: they heighten an 
awareness of the choice of perspective(s), whether institutional and/or ‘popular’; 
and they create ethical questions around ‘revealing’ locally functional but 
nonetheless informal and sometimes illegal practices. 
The choice of perspective refers back to my discussion in the introduction (and in 
Negotiating Rights) concerning adoption or independence of policy categories and 
concepts when studying refugee integration. One of the effects of refugee studies’ 
dependence on policy categories and priorities is that the field rarely engages 
critically with resistance to such categories or processes. The way in which Kibreab 
frames the question in his paper on ‘Refugee Deceit and Trickery in Institutionalised 
Settings’ (Kibreab 2004) is revealing. He notes that 
Within refugee communities, an act of cheating committed in pursuit 
of self-interest disregarding the interest of a relative, a neighbour or a 
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villager is considered to be disgraceful and inappropriate behaviour. 
The same act when committed against faceless entities such as 
governments, UNHCR and NGOs may often be considered heroic. The 
central question [is]: why do refugees behave under two different 
moral systems with different actors and how should this problem be 
solved? (Kibreab 2004:1) 
By presenting the issue as moral, calling strategies of misrepresentation towards an 
institution ‘cheating’, and seeing it as a problem to be solved, Kibreab takes the 
necessity and legitimacy of the institutionalised setting for granted. He cites 
examples of extreme measures taken by institutions to manage ‘difficult 
populations’ (such as “the use of enclosures into which refugees are herded in 
order to be counted (cited in Hyndman 2000: 130)”(Kibreab 2004:2)) simply as 
evidence that ‘cheating’ is widespread, rather than as evidence that there is 
something problematic with the institutional setting. Although Barbara Harrell-
Bond, the doyenne of Refugee Studies and in many ways a key representative (and 
shaper) of the field’s approach and self-conception, responds to Kibreab in the 
same edition of the Journal of Refugee Studies with a short piece entitled 
“Weapons of the Weak” (at least suggesting a knowledge of this literature), she 
does not actually use Scott’s less normative approach to engage with and 
substantively critique Kibreab’s article. 
To return to Kaiser’s quote also used in the introduction, “refugee groups have no 
choice but to assert themselves and respond to their new environments. Such a 
response is made not only in terms of their legal, material and subsistence statuses, 
but also in relation to their individual and collective subjectivities, identities and all 
aspects of their existential experience.” (Kaiser 2008:376, emphasis added) Scott 
gives us important non-normative tools for looking empirically at the individual and 
collective subjectivities relating to legal (and other institutional) statuses, and for 
thinking about the subtle and sometimes not too subtle ways in which refugees 
‘assert themselves and respond to’ the institutional environment which attempts to 
impose such statuses. 
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Such an analysis is not only important for gaining a complete picture from the 
‘popular’/ people’s/refugee perspective, but it is also necessary for understanding 
why institutional programmes and policies or ‘certain schemes to improve the 
human condition’, have failed, as Scott taglines his 1998 book. Scott uses the 
metaphor of a coral reef, made up of millions of tiny polyps which nonetheless may 
sink the largest ship, to emphasise how the ‘ship of state’ may run aground on such 
forms of resistance (Scott 1985:xvii). This is another instance, with Bakewell (2008) 
and Jacobsen & Landau (2003), where research which does not start from a policy 
category position results in findings which are crucial for a real understanding of 
what kinds of interventions might actually work to ‘improve the human condition.’ 
Particularly interesting to me are the processes of resistance to state attempts to 
‘legibilise’ populations, using another of Scott’s useful concepts (Scott 1998). 
Processes of bureaucratic legibilisation have been discussed widely in the literature 
on refugees in camps or affected by large-scale relief and assistance programmes, 
usually as part of the literature on labelling (Harrell-Bond 1986; Zetter 1991; Van 
Damme 1995) rather than in reference to Scott’s work per se, but this perspective 
has rarely been applied to the longer-term process of migrant integration. 
Legibilisation, according to Scott, is the process through which the state seeks to 
make populations (and territory) bureaucratically manageable by capturing them 
through unified measurements, standardised systems, statistics, etc. Scott argues 
that bureaucratic standardisation, even as it makes service provision possible, 
simultaneously undermines locally specific, socially appropriate and flexible 
mechanisms for meeting social needs. This is not least the case because it reduces 
multiple and flexible ways of categorising people into fewer, simplified (and often 
dichotomised) categories. In the eyes of the state, you are either a citizen or you 
are not. You only have one surname, and only one place of birth. Scott argues that 
bureaucratic legibilisation is always resisted in some way by captured populations 
because it challenges the interests of local actors in retaining control over 
populations and because it is inevitably connected with extractive demands by the 
state (taxes, trade control, movement control, production control, etc.). I would 
add, coming from the perspective of negotiated outsider integration, that 
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bureaucratic legibilisation is resisted because it reduces people’s flexibility in 
strategically and situationally defining/negotiating their individual and collective 
identities, precisely by using several surnames and claiming different places of birth 
and therefore different loci of belonging. 
The modes of negotiaton for legal status which I describe in Changing Legal 
Frameworks parallel Scott’s comparison of formal and informal strategies for 
achieving the same ends in relation to powerful and institutionalised interests (in 
his case, in relation to peasant agriculture in Malaysia). Scott compares squatting 
with land invasion, military desertion to mutiny, pilfering of grain rather than open 
attack on grain stores aimed at redistribution of property (Scott 1985:32), while I 
compare the small-scale, individual strategies for getting IDs (name changes, 
‘adoption’ by neighbours, using election registration drives) with participating in 
organized programmes of legal change or indeed trying to initiate legal changes. In 
both cases, the ‘everyday forms of resistance’ are more effective than the formal, 
open forms of engagement. Secondly, the informal processes simultaneously 
depend on and reinforce “a supportive subculture” among the marginal, given “the 
knowledge that the risk to any single resister is generally reduced to the extent that 
the whole community is involved” (Scott 1985:35). In a situation like 
Bushbuckridge, where the resistance demands collusion between sub-groups 
among the marginal (e.g. ‘Mozambicans’ and ‘South Africans’), the process of 
resistance itself, and not just the documentary outcome, becomes a means (and 
indicator) of integration. 
Scott’s analysis of the common elements of the ‘weapons of the weak’ shows why 
they are so prevalent and also so difficult for institutions to control. “They require 
little or no coordination or planning; they make use of implicit understanding and 
informal networks; they often represent a form of individual self-help; they typically 
avoid any direct, symbolic confrontation with authority” (Scott 1985:xvi). 
Furthermore, even though the scale and prevalence of participation in such forms 
of resistance make it “plausible to speak of a social movement… this is a social 
movement with no formal organization, no formal leaders, no manifestoes, no 
dues, no name and no banner. By virtue of their institutional invisibility, activities 
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on anything less than a massive scale are, if they are noticed at all, rarely accorded 
any social significance.”(Scott 1985:35) Finally, “It is only rarely that the 
perpetrators of such petty acts seek to call attention to themselves. Their safety lies 
in their anonymity. It is also extremely rare that officials of the state wish to 
publicize the insubordination. To do so would be to admit their policy is unpopular 
[or inappropriate], and, above all, to expose the tenuousness of their authority in 
the countryside – neither of which the sovereign state finds in its interest.” (ibid). I 
have quoted Scott at length here because his words very closely describe the 
nature of many interactions between Bushbuckridge residents (of Mozambican as 
well as South African birth) with the state, particularly around the acquisition of 
identity documents. This is by no means unique to Bushbuckridge, of course, but 
also reflects the various ways in which refugees in other self-settled (often border) 
contexts access documentation (Bakewell 2000; Hovil 2002; Bakewell 2007). 
The same characteristics that make such strategies effective, also explain their 
relative invisibility in the literature and show how difficult they are to study, even 
when explicitly on the lookout for them. The particular characteristic that they 
embarrass the state, however, also has ethical implications for those researchers 
who do ‘uncover’ such strategies and who do make them ‘visible’. As I have written 
elsewhere, an element of ‘weapons of the weak’ is “the ways in which the 
vulnerable work to stay invisible to the ‘powers that be’ by hiding and obscuring 
identities and activities that the state or other powerful institutions prohibit. 
Invisibility is therefore a survival resource for many displaced, including, for 
example, many urban refugees in Africa or ‘failed asylum seekers’ in Europe… 
Academics who lift this veil in the name of illuminating ‘creative livelihood 
strategies’ or ‘flexible identities’ may inadvertently be alerting powerful states, the 
UN, or NGOs to the ways in which their rules are circumvented, and thereby reduce 
the space for life-saving creativity and flexibility in remaining invisible.” (Polzer and 
Hammond 2008:418) In the case of the Mozambican-born in Bushbuckridge, the 
ethical dangers of ‘exposing’ creative identity negotiation strategies is relatively 
low, as this border area and this group of migrants is (no longer) particularly 
politicised or on the state’s or broader public’s investigative radar. At the local level, 
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these practices are well known and normatively accepted. Most local leaders and 
local government officials are in various ways complicit, making their description 
neither revelatory nor indicting. This relatively benign political situation may 
however change in future and so the decision to write such an account remains a 
judgement call for any author.  
Moving on from my consideration of the petty (but collectively momentous) actions 
of the marginal to undermine and evade institutional strictures (and the ethical 
implications of revealing these actions), a key part of understanding responses to 
legibilisation attempts is what meanings people attach to the categories and 
instruments of control imposed by the state. A brief commentary on the meanings 
of identity documents closes this section and links with the next section on nation-
building.  
Given the centrality of identity documents (including passports, residence permits, 
refugee permits, asylum permits, etc.) in the lives of migrants, and the sometimes 
life and death (or life and deportation) scenarios which depend on whether one 
holds a particular piece of paper or not, there is a surprising dearth of critical and 
interpretative scholarship on identity documents in migration and refugee studies, 
e.g. writing which goes beyond the administrative hurdles people face in accessing 
papers. In Changing Legal Frameworks I trace the processes through which 
Mozambicans accessed identity documents, but I also note how their decisions of 
when and how to access documents, and in which names, reflect ideas about 
political allegiance, family relations and bases for entitlements to services which are 
irrelevant or run counter to the state’s understanding of its documentation. In my 
case, virtually none of my respondents perceived their identity documents, no 
matter how procured, in purely strategic terms; there was always some level of 
identity claim and emotive significance attached to the object and its symbolic 
referent. The few pieces of existing scholarship on this issue also engage with the 
distinctions between symbolic and strategic meanings (Bakewell 2007; Takabvirwa 
2009), and, in their variation of findings (not least related to the differences of 
state-population contacts in different contexts such as rural borderlands or cities), 
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emphasise once again the need for careful empirical study of all aspects of 
negotiated integration. 
In Bakewell’s discussion of how borderland residents of the Zambia-Angola border 
feel about their documentation, “a very striking contrast was observed between the 
perspectives of the state and those of individuals on the use and meaning of 
papers. The former tended to see these papers as symbols of nationality and 
residence that people should feel privileged to hold. While some of the villagers 
took a similar view, others focused on the function of identify papers  – what 
difference having (or not having) a set of papers makes to what you can do or not 
do.” (Bakewell 2007:1)  
In contrast, moving beyond the mostly strategic, Takabvirwa’s study of 
Zimbabweans in Johannesburg takes a “view of documentation not only as a factor 
in access to services, but as a means of access to ways of being, and as an 
instrument of state control. It examines the relationship between identity 
documents and identity itself…In asking to whom identification documents actually 
belong and how this ownership is understood, claimed, and negotiated by migrants, 
the question arises: who determines the boundaries of belonging and the extent 
and nature of their fluidity? Ultimately, to whom does the state belong?” 
(Takabvirwa 2009:8) This evocative question brings us to the next section of this 
conclusion, which looks at how my study, and questions of migrant and refugee 
integration generally, speak to the larger literature on nation-building and national 
identity formation.  
 
3. Nation-building, National Identity Formation and Immigration 
 
The question of how migration relates to national identity and the nature of nations 
is particularly topical in the early 2010s. Global political and economic shifts have 
re-energised debates on immigrant integration and national authenticity in many 
European host countries. Yet how does this question play out in a southern, multi-
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cultural context such as South Africa? Moreover, how are migration/refugee 
integration and nation linked in a context where the question of national 
authenticity is still very much up for grabs? Finally, how is ‘national identity’ lived in 
a peripheral border area with a cross-border ethnic group, especially when on one 
side of the border this ethnic group includes both refugees and citizens? 
Nation-building processes are inherently about establishing a boundary between 
insiders and outsiders and about managing relationships among a country’s diverse 
groups of insiders. Theories of nation-building which follow a Barthian perspective 
posit that the boundary between in- and outsiders is in fact a necessary 
prerequisite for the creation of a shared identity and therefore the management of 
internal diversity. In most cases, the relevant ‘Other’ for boundary construction is 
nations outside the respective territory. Immigrants also may constitute an ‘Other 
within’, therefore playing an important, if often under-acknowledged, part in the 
definition of national identities (Triandafyllidou 2001). This section therefore looks 
at the ways in which the presence of Mozambican refugees fits in with the 
processes of nation-building in Bushbuckridge, and how this relates to what 
theories of nation-building and immigration would have us expect. 
As with my overall approach to refugee integration, my contribution to the nation-
building discussion is less about what conditions or structures facilitate or hinder it, 
but rather what actors and processes, e.g. what relationships, are involved. Most 
analyses of nation-building processes, including in post-colonies, focus on global, 
inter-’national’ or national structural imperatives and elite-driven processes, and do 
not document the specificities of local versions of national identity. My 
Bushbuckridge case study suggests that what is called ‘national identity’, and its 
boundaries, cannot be taken for granted for all residents of a national territory but 
are made up of a multitude of localised interpretations and invocations of the 
‘national.’ Furthermore, reference to the ‘national’, including standardized images 
of ‘national’ identity adopted wholesale from elite or media representations (as is 
the case in Bushbuckridge), can be used by local leaders and residents to justify and 
solidify local notions of in and outsiders at the periphery (for example, to include 
Mozambican Shangaans as insiders on the basis of race, history and ethnicity), even 
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if these notions are counter to how the boundaries would be drawn by leaders and 
residents in the national centre (to exclude them on the basis of citizenship). Just as 
‘top-down’ accounts of ethnic identity formation have recently been revised to 
include more ‘complex’ considerations of popular interpretations and initiatives 
(Niehaus 2002; see also Histories in this collection), so I believe this study supports 
the need for accounts of national identity formation to pay greater attention to the 
variety of popular perspectives (Chipkin 2007). 
After a brief review of theories of national identity formation, including valuable 
localised perspectives from border areas, I discuss how debates on South African 
national identity formation, notably regarding to the position of ‘foreigners’ in the 
South African polity, have been waged and how these have been reflected in 
Bushbuckridge. This description of local forms of identity formation based on 
‘nationality’ links in with the final section of this conclusion about broader debates 
on identity group formation. 
Benedict Anderson’s classic analysis of the construction of national identities as 
“imagined communities [which are] inherently limited” presents grand elite-driven 
narratives of historical change in territorialisation; religion; language; capitalism; 
print technology; conceptions of time; etc. as the foundation for an eventual, more 
or less global, shift from segmented societies to those based on a ‘unified’ ‘national’ 
identity (Anderson 1991). Other theorists propose similarly broad historical trends 
and technologies, such as industrialisation and modernisation, as the basis for the 
spread of nationalism (Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). Smith looks at 
national identity as a cultural phenomenon with key characteristics (“language, 
sentiments, symbolism”) (Smith 1991:vii), rather than key processes. As good 
historians, these authors document the details of these transformations in specific 
times and places, and to some extent how different ‘nations’ established 
themselves at different times. However, they do not dwell on the variations from 
one local place to another or on the ways in which the populations ‘receiving’ elite 
national ideologies interpreted them (apart from stating that they took them 
seriously enough to die for them in large numbers). 
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A widely held (tautological) take on African nationalisms is that the “people came to 
be defined and produced in and through the politics and culture of nationalist 
struggle”, e.g. struggles against a colonial ‘Other’ (Chipkin 2007:2). This does not 
allow for much consideration for different forms of struggle or indeed other 
relationships within the ‘national’ territories and imaginations, apart from the 
oppressive coloniser. Anderson does discuss how anti- and post-colonial 
nationalisms had a different genealogy, and but not necessarily structurally 
different materialisations, from “that of the dynastic states of nineteenth-century 
Europe” (Anderson 1991:163). He again generalizes about how the colonial state’s 
(elite) technologies (census, map and museum) helped to shape these specific 
(elite) post-colonial nationalisms (Anderson 1991:163ff). Chipkin notes that “critical 
studies on African nationalism” are not part of the general growth in academic 
concern with nation and nationalism since Anderson and Smith’s late 1980s/early 
1990s classics (Chipkin 2007:1).  
Some (political) anthropological work on African (and other) borderlands and the 
interpretations of national identity in such frontier spaces is a useful corrective to 
such generalising approaches. In border contexts, which are recognised to “often 
have a critical impact on the formation of nations” (Wilson and Donnan 1998:3), we 
are reminded “that nations and states, and their institutions, are composed of 
people who cannot or should not be reduced to the images which are constructed 
by the state, the media or of any other groups who wish to represent them.” 
(Wilson and Donnan 1998:4) Borderland researchers acknowledge that there is 
great variation among border communities, including in their relationships with 
their respective states and national imaginings (Nugent and Asiwaju 1996; Wilson 
and Donnan 1998). As one of many existing attempts at classification, Wilson and 
Donnan identify three types of border populations, depending on their ethnic 
identities: “(i) those who share ethnic ties across the border as well as with those 
residing at their own state’s geographical core; (ii) those who are differentiated by 
cross-border ethnic bonds from other residents of their state; and (iii) those who 
are members of the national majority in their state, and have no ethnic ties across 
the state’s borders.” (Wilson and Donnan 1998:14) 
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Bushbuckridge would fit more or less into category two, as Shangaan-speakers in 
South Africa are generally considered marginal and sometimes equated with being 
foreign due to their association with Mozambique (see Histories). A problem with 
such classifications, however, is that they rarely assist in predicting (national) 
identity outcomes based on such group configurations. Options for category two 
could include cross-border identifications up to secessionist politicization or, at the 
other end of the spectrum, a particularly strong identification with the core and 
rejection of cross-border links in order to forestall core discrimination. Such 
classifications are therefore not really contributions to (causal, predictive) theory. In 
terms of empirical academic studies (in contrast to attempts at generalising theory), 
descriptions of borderlands where ethnic groups span the state border tend to 
focus on the fragmentary, hybrid and/or strategically variable nature of 
borderlander national identities (Bakewell 1999; Vila 2000; Connor 2003; Bakewell 
2007). 
This story of hybridities does not apply in Bushbuckridge. What needs explaining is 
the clear identification with only one nation (in this case, South Africa), by both 
Mozambican- and South African-born residents. Similar identity outcomes in a co-
ethnic border zone, albeit with a different historical background, are documented 
by Hann & Beller-Hann in north-east Turkey (1998). In their case, as in mine, while 
cross-border links are acknowledged, the borderland populations’ imagined value 
systems and futures are clearly tied to only the one nation. Furthermore, as I 
discuss in Space, the idea of modernity versus tradition is a significant line 
constituting national difference. Beyond such case studies, however, there is as yet 
no clear theoretical framework from border studies which would tie different 
borderland constellations to national identity outcomes. 
Moving from the broader literature to the South African case, the nation-building 
process in South Africa has in many ways been a classic example of Renan’s quip 
that “the essence of a nation is that… everyone has forgotten many things.” (Renan 
1990) This is especially the case because the first part of his criterion for a nation, 
that “all the individuals have many things in common”, is less true, or at least that 
part of South Africa’s post-1994 national narrative is the need to build a nation in 
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spite of its various populations being seen to have very little in common. Given this 
starting point, the focus of South African nation-building discourses is on melding a 
unified whole across internal boundaries, e.g. the divisions among South Africans, 
with a particular obsession with racial divisions (vis Government of South Africa 
2011). The national motto is ‘United in our diversity.’  
The external boundaries of South African national identity are relatively rarely 
explicitly debated. They are, however, reflected in and constituted by discourses 
and practices of xenophobia and xenophobic violence (Landau 2005). I have argued 
elsewhere that the internal logic of the South African nation-building discourse has 
defined the external boundaries in a way which has made black non-citizens the 
outsiders and has led not only to their exclusion but to their victimisation (Polzer 
2005). This is because of the two vehicles which have been especially powerful in 
constructing a unifying South African national identity: the evocation of a shared 
history of struggle and the entitlements of citizenship.3 These broad criteria of 
inclusion, which embrace cultural diversity and respect for human rights and are 
embedded in a highly inclusive Constitution which sets out rights for ‘everyone’ and 
not only for citizens, have the potential to include respect for refugee and 
immigrant rights and to include those neighbouring peoples who share languages, 
cultures and histories with South Africans. However, this potential has only been 
realised to a very limited extent in the national context. 
The national historical identification process with the ‘struggle’ has focused almost 
exclusively on internal reconciliation, with little popular acknowledgement of the 
role of neighbouring states in the liberation struggle and the regional damage 
caused by apartheid destabilisation (Polzer 2005; Chipkin 2007). Secondly, the 
entitlement of citizens (especially ‘previously disadvantaged’ black citizens) to the 
material resources of the state, such as through public housing, social welfare 
grants, and employment (Polzer 2005), has translated into a sense of competition 
for state resources (e.g. ‘service delivery’) and jobs. What elevates this sense to a 
3 Other national issues, such as land redistribution, have not been related to immigration, although 
competition between locals and refugees/immigrants for land has been a central problem in other 
countries. 
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component of the nation building discourse is that such resource related 
xenophobic sentiments are high among South Africans of all classes and race-
groups (Crush 2000; Mattes, Taylor et al. 2000; Harris 2001; Landau, Ramjathan-
Keogh et al. 2005; Crush, McDonald et al. 2008; Misago, Monson et al. 2010) and 
not only or even mainly among the poor where actual competition may to some 
extent exist.  
Given this literature on nation-building, African nationalism, borderland national 
identities and South African national identity in the making, what would one expect 
to find in Bushbuckridge? Unemployment is extremely high and there is a high 
dependence on social welfare grants, so one might expect citizens to make strong 
resource competition arguments against the inclusion of ‘foreigners’. Secondly, the 
‘local’ Shangaan are a small and disregarded minority in relation to South Africa’s 
core polity while Shangaan in southern Mozambique are much more politically 
dominant. The image of the ‘Shangaan’ as backward and foreign has in fact been 
part of a kind of intergenerational South African national awareness through 
popular children’s books (like Jock of the Bushveld), and when African foreigners 
were violently evicted from informal settlements around the country in May 2008, 
the rhetoric used included targeting ‘Shangaans’. South African Shangaan-speakers 
are therefore dangerously implicated in this violent process of national boundary 
demarcation. As noted above, one might therefore expect South African Shangaan-
speakers to either reject the nation which belittles them and seek to relate to the 
neighbouring nation in which they are stronger, or else to reject and draw 
boundaries against the ‘foreign’ Shangaan-speakers which could be seen as 
undermining their claim to authentic South Africanness. A third option predicted by 
the literature would be for both South African- and Mozambican-born borderland 
residents to hold a hybrid strategic identification with both the cross-border 
Shangaan ethnicity and the materially useful South African nation. A final option, 
taking us back to the most general and spatially undifferentiated theory on nation-
building, would be for residents of the borderland to simply reflect the same 
national identity characteristics and boundary markers as all other South Africans 
(although this would still require an explanation of how the Mozambican-born 
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come to accept and be accepted into this nation). 
In fact, none of these are the case, even though on the surface it might seem that 
the final option of unified nationalism is closest. This suggests that we have not yet 
gone beyond empirically describing individual cases towards a more generalisable 
theory of national identity formation which can capture the experiences and 
interpretations of marginal border groups and integrating migrants/refugees. To 
bring in some of my empirical material which has not yet been published, my 
surveys showed that both South African- and Mozambican-born residents 
expressed a remarkable similarity of highly standardised indicators (e.g. collective 
national identity markers) about ‘what makes South African different from other 
countries.’ These included freedom, peace, being a rich country, being known 
internationally, being a rainbow nation, etc. When asked to name the most 
important South Africans today and in the past (a shared sense of history), almost 
all named the same names (Presidents Mandela and Mbeki, Trevor Manuel, Chris 
Hani, Oliver Tambo, Winnie Mandikizela Mandela, Steve Biko, etc.). Such 
standardisation is not obvious, given Bushbuckridge’s remoteness and the 
possibility of naming key Shangaan/Tsonga figures rather than key national (largely 
ANC) figures. It confirms, also, the strength of identification with the dual themes of 
liberation struggle (ANC leaders) and ‘service delivery’ (Trevor Manuel was the high 
profile Minister of Finance at the time). 
Traditional indicators of national identification also reflect a strong sense of 
attachment to the South African nation. 52 out of 57 respondents said they would 
verbally defend South Africa publically and eleven would also defend South Africa 
with their lives (including five Mozambican-born and six South African-born). 
Almost all Mozambican-born respondents said they wanted to be buried in South 
Africa and for their children to stay in South Africa. In both groups there was strong 
support for the maintenance of a border between the two countries, with two-
thirds of Mozambican-born and three-quarters of South African-born for the 
border. Arguments by those against the border were all about the wish for generic 
freedom of movement and social interaction (“No, we must have peace as we are in 
the earth, must interact with people outside South Africa”), rather than specifying a 
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desire to move within a particular ethnically defined territorial cross-border area. 
Both South African- and Mozambican-born respondents also used the same 
arguments for the border, primarily “because you will know where one country 
ends and the other country starts” (mutually exclusive territories), “so that every 
leader of a particular country can control his people shown by the borders they the 
people belong to him” (mutually exclusive populations), and “to reduce crime and 
disloyalty of the people who pass through” (distrust of the Other). Finally, only nine 
out of 57 respondents believed that dual citizenship should be allowed (six of these 
were Mozambican-born). The statements made against dual citizenship are actually 
the strongest indicator for how deeply an exclusive national identity, rather than a 
hybrid, strategic or transnational one, has become entrenched in these villages of 
Bushbuckridge – without significant distinction between those born in the area and 
those born across the border. Here is a selection of statements repeated by many 
respondents with only slight variations: 
- It is impossible because you are one person 
- It is impossible to live in two countries 
- One person cannot serve two kings 
- You cannot build two houses at the same time 
- You won't be buried in two countries 
- It's like a woman, she can't have two husbands 
- Because we want to make sure where they belong 
Another common theme was that people with two citizenships would be able to 
commit crime in one country and then escape to the other. Overall, these 
statements reflect a deep suspicion of dual loyalties. Of course the arguments are 
factually arbitrary, as shown by the responses for dual citizenship, some of which 
directly contradict the (gendered) naturalisation of the nay-saying value systems: 
“Men can marry two wives, that means you can stay in two countries at the same 
time.” Many people, especially in communities like Bushbuckridge with high levels 
of circular labour migration, do build two houses at the same time. And historically, 
as noted in Histories, loyalty to a specific Chief or King was not absolute in the 
lowveld area. The strength and naturalising tone of national identification (as 
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expressed through the rejection of dual citizenship) is therefore a rather curious 
and unexpected finding in this specific location, although national identities are of 
course generally naturalised (Anderson 1991). In Space, Histories and Changing 
Legal Frameworks, I have also described more narrative examples of how ‘South 
Africanness’ is claimed and proclaimed by Mozambican- and South African-born 
residents of Bushbuckridge. 
Where national identification in Bushbuckridge diverges from the logic of much 
(although certainly not all, since there are clearly also variations in the rest) of the 
country, is not in the content or strength of national identity, but in the 
theoretically much more significant question of boundary construction. This is the 
aspect of national identity formation I have covered in most detail in the 
chapters/papers which make up this thesis. Whereas the rest of the country uses 
the content of national identity to draw a line excluding most foreign-born Africans 
from legitimate membership in the society and therefore from access to public 
goods, I argue in Histories, Changing Legal Frameworks and Space that the 
Mozambican-born in Bushbuckridge were clearly included as legitimate members 
(Polzer 2004). This is because the national imaginaries were augmented with other 
– local – values, primarily to do with tradition and modernity. This has also led to 
different imaginary timelines for the constitution of ‘insiders’: the new ‘South 
African’ nationalism is seen to relate explicitly to a post-1994 black-ruled era, while 
the local discourse of tradition and modernity as a boundary of ‘national’ belonging 
has a longer genealogy which does not see 1994 as a necessary historical break. In 
the context of Bushbuckridge, therefore, it is not clear that there is an external 
‘Other’ informing the development of a national identity. If not, then where are we 
left in terms of theories which posit the necessity of such an ‘Other’ for the 
formation of any identity? 
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4. Identity Group and Boundary Construction 
 
This conclusion thus culminates in a discussion of theories of identity group 
construction, the most basic ingredient of an approach to integration centred on 
negotiated relationships. Although Neumann’s comment relates to integration in 
the context of international relations and nationalism, it applies to other levels of 
group integration as well: “The lineation of an “in-group” must necessarily entail its 
demarcation from a number of “out-groups,” and that demarcation is an active and 
ongoing part of identity formation. The creation of social boundaries is not a 
consequence of integration; rather it is one of its necessary a priori ingredients.” 
(Neumann 1999:4 referring to Durkheim 1964:115-22, emphasis in original)  
If integration is about the processes of moving from being an outsider to being an 
insider, then the definition of what constitutes insider- and outsiderness, and 
especially the character of the boundary between them, determines to a large 
extent whether and how an individual or group can cross the boundary. Outsider 
integration processes therefore are a manifestation of the nature of group identity 
per se, as well as a manifestation of the character of any particular set of groups. It 
is, one could say, the quintessential form of ‘cross-boundary transaction’ (Cohen 
2000:1). Second, given the multiplicity of ways in which any group can decide to 
identify itself (e.g. as Shangaan, South African, African, black, traditional, rural, 
oppressed, indigenous, etc.), negotiated integration of ‘newcomers’ poses the 
question of which aspects of group identity are triggered (if one thinks of the 
process as somehow ‘automatic’) or mobilised (if it is conceived of as more 
strategic). Crucially, thirdly, my argument is that, in addition to manifesting existing 
group characteristics, the processes involved in integration include actively creating 
and rearranging the politically relevant and identitive aspects of in- and out-groups 
and the boundaries by thematising and sometimes changing these more or less 
explicitly. Finally, my case study, I believe, requires us to think about “the limits of 
self/other perspectives, as well as about ways to soften the reifying tendencies of 
applying self/other perspectives.” (Neumann 1999:xiv). Thinking about group 
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identity formation processes from a perspective of ‘integration’ therefore 
simultaneously reflects, selects, changes and challenges the binary oppositional 
nature of relational identity construction.  
The reflection of existing group characteristics and boundaries through 
confrontation with the Other is well established in both the general literature on 
(ethnic and national) group identity construction (Barth 1969; Cohen 1985; Eriksen 
1993; Said 1995; Neumann 1999; Cohen 2000:1) and in those elements of the 
literature on migrant integration which critically evaluate, rather than take for 
granted, the (changing) nature of the host society (Zolberg and Long 1999). Moving 
beyond that simple notion, however, there is less clarity in the literature. 
Specifically, in relation to the selection of which identity characteristics become 
politically relevant in the face of the Other, and are therefore used to construct a 
boundary (and indeed to define whether newcomers are Other or Us), there are 
few satisfactory general accounts.   
A ‘segmented’ conception of ethnic identity, in which closeness and distance 
between different groups is established in layers moving outwards, like an onion 
(Eriksen 1993:25 ff) is a well-established idea in anthropology. Thus, an individual 
can see themselves as a member of different groupings at different levels of 
aggregating (of a clan, an ethnic group, a regional group, a nationality, etc.), each 
higher level incorporating the Others of the preceding level. Such an account, 
however, tends to assume that kinship, language, nation and religion are 
paramount identity boundary markers, that they stand in some hierarchy, and that 
(at least in a particular place and time) the order of hierarchical element remains 
stable (as in the metaphor of the onion with stable layers). One problem with such 
understandings of layered identity circles is that they suggest a naturalness or 
inevitability about the identity markers and their ordering. According to this logic, 
one would expect Shangaan-speaking Mozambicans (and Ndebele-speaking 
Zimbabweans) to be considered more part of ‘us’ among (black) South Africans 
than French-speaking Congolese or white European immigrants. This is indeed 
often the case in relation to Congolese and other African immigrants from beyond 
the Southern African region, but white immigrants are excluded from the dominant 
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xenophobic discourses of both black and white South Africans (REF) while 
Shangaans, as already mentioned, were included in the targets of violence against 
foreigners in May 2008. Second, the image of concentric layers does not help us 
understand the historical incorporation of ‘Shangaans’ as second class South 
Africans, therefore both within and continually on the border of the ‘national’ 
group. The discussion of ‘segmented assimilation’ below addresses this to some 
extent. Finally, the concept of identity layers does not help explain examples such 
as Bushbuckridge (which is certainly not unique) where shared ethnic identity is 
used to incorporate newcomers into a national identity without ethnicity either 
preceding or superseding that national identity.  
As an alternative to layered ‘segments’, authors such as Eriksen note that 
boundaries may vary contextually, structuring who it is permissible to play soccer 
with, to vote for, or to marry (1993:26). This is useful as an injunction to be 
conscious of the exact contexts and interactions in which newcomer integration 
occurs. Since I did not use an ethnographic methodology, I was not able to record 
all the subtleties of interpersonal interactions and therefore situational boundary 
constructions between (and among) South African and Mozambican-born village 
residents, and I have not yet been able to publish an analysis of the situational 
questions I asked in my questionnaires regarding levels of inter-group trust and 
interactions. I have alluded to some of the contextual detail my methods did reveal 
in Space. I have also described situations in which Mozambican-born residents of 
Bushbuckridge were able to use links from one context (such as mutually 
supportive family and clan/surname links) to negotiate boundary crossing in other 
contexts (such as acquiring identity documents from the state). Beyond the 
importance of the empirical and situational study of boundary processes, and a 
clear definition of the scope of the empirical time, space and relational context 
being studied, the contextual approach to identity boundary construction still 
provides little clarity on how certain characteristics become boundary markers and 
not others. 
Concerning the ‘how’ of identity characteristics definition, my focus on negotiation 
illustrates the importance of studying the process of identity boundary construction 
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and not only the outcomes. Thinking about identity group construction processes 
from the perspective of integration therefore means looking at how identity 
boundaries are actively changed by people participating in the integration 
negotiation process. The first step in this is identifying how each ‘side’ of the 
boundary understands the nature of the boundary. As Cohen points out, “the 
cultural differences which discriminate people on either side of a boundary are not 
just matters of degree or relativity (powerful/powerless; central/peripheral; 
authentic/ inauthentic…) but of kind: each party sees different issues as being at 
stake, or the terms in which they perceive them may be incongruent and 
incommensurate.” (2000:2) Even if the boundaries are defined in commensurate 
ways, the multiple characteristics which define or potentially define the boundary 
may be debated. My case study suggests some generic forms of boundary changing 
through negotiation: newcomers appealing to established residents to value 
particular identity characteristics over others (e.g. ethnicity over nationality, 
traditional values over legal status, etc.), for example. I have not been able to 
consistently analyse my findings (and those of others) according to this question, 
but it would constitute a valuable avenue for future work.  
Finally, most interesting to me are the implications from my case study which relate 
to literature which moves beyond what one might call a ‘pie-graph’ metaphorical 
model: a social ‘universe’ within which there are mutually exclusive in and out-
groups (usually two, but sometimes more) with a simple, straight boundary ‘line’ in 
between. What are the implications of challenging the binomial oppositional 
identity group construction model? This model has been challenged in several 
ways, although mostly with reference to ‘Northern’ contexts in which racial or 
ethnic ‘minorities’ and immigrants who are seen as “bearers of an alien culture” 
(Zolberg and Long 1999:8) engage with a dominant ‘majority’ society which is 
largely taken for granted. I will briefly look at how three approaches (‘defining 
boundaries’, ‘segmented assimilation’ and ‘racial-ethnic self-schema frameworks’) 
might be relevant to my southern, co-racial, co-ethnic but nonetheless multiple-
identity-group-hosting context.  
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Firstly, there is a recent literature on the nature of social boundaries which 
emphasises that “boundaries are not all alike and that boundary-related change 
cannot be conceptualized in terms of a single set of processes.” (Alba 2005:21). 
Zolberg and Long (1999) distinguish three types of process: boundary crossing, 
blurring, and shifting. They are distinguished by different levels of change in the 
structure of the dominant ‘host’ society character. Boundary crossing by individuals 
“leaves the distinction between insiders and outsiders unaffected” (Zolberg and 
Long 1999:8) as only the individual immigrants change their attributes to match the 
majority identity markers (such as language or religion). Boundary blurring and 
boundary shifting, in contrast, affect the structure of the host society by changing 
both the members and the characteristics of membership of the dominant in-
group. Blurring is based on the “tolerance of multiple memberships and an 
overlapping of collective identities hitherto thought to be separate and mutually 
exclusive.” Boundary shifting occurs when the in-group boundary is “relocated” 
either to include or exclude new sets of members (Zolberg and Long 1999:9). While 
Zolberg and Long suggest a hierarchy of boundary changes, with boundary shifts 
the most significant structural change for the host society, I would argue that 
boundary blurring is actually a more significant qualitative change in the nature of 
the boundary itself (rather than in the composition of population groups 
constructed by a boundary), and therefore in the nature of society in general. 
Boundary blurring enables a much wider range of identity and relationship 
negotiations, including those which reduce or deny the salience of boundaries 
entirely. Alba also emphasises this in his distinction between ‘bright’ and ‘blurry’ 
boundaries, where ‘blurry’ boundaries involve “zones of self-presentation and 
social representation that allow for ambiguous locations with respect to the 
boundary.” (Alba 2005:22)  
The second and third perspectives which challenge ‘pie-graph’ group identity 
conceptions also partially transcend the dichotomy of in and outgroup, even as they 
simultaneously reify them. These ‘segmented assimilation’ (Portes and Zhou 1993; 
Portes and MacLeod 1996; Portes and Rumbaut 2001) and ‘racial-ethnic self-
schema frameworks’ (Altschul, Oyserman et al. 2008) literatures from social 
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psychology and sociology traditions respectively look at “racial-ethnic identity in 
terms of both relationship to one’s in-group and perceived relationships between 
the in-group and broader society”, with particular focus on the relationship 
between the strength of group identity and ‘assimilation trajectories’ for second 
generation ‘minority’ immigrants to developed countries (Altschul, Oyserman et al. 
2008:303). 
These approaches reify group boundaries by having all the problematic 
‘communitarian’ assumptions about unchanging, homogenous and unreflected 
‘mainstream norms’ and majority identities noted in my introductory chapter, e.g. 
only minorities have racial-ethnic identities which need explaining and which are 
therefore a priori bounded from the ‘majority’.  On the other hand, the ‘segmented 
assimilation’ approach posits an interesting triumvirate of “racial-ethnic identity 
patterns” - “thin”, “bicultural” and “thick” - which (implicitly) proposes three-
dimensional variance in boundary salience: strength, exclusivity and 
positive/negative valuation of boundary crossing. In the case of “thin” identity, 
“youth following this assimilation trajectory identify less with their culture of origin 
and more with being simply American4, resulting in decreased in-group focus”, 
while “bicultural” “selective assimilation” involves “maintenance of a strong in-
group identity… in combination with aspiration to succeed in broader society.” 
(Altschul, Oyserman et al. 2008:303) Finally, “thick” identities are largely in-ward 
focussed, as a “reactive” response to ‘mainstream’ discrimination. The three 
dimensions of boundary salience therefore vary independently of each other: weak, 
strong, strong; exclusive out, straddling in/out, exclusive in; positive, positive, 
negative. This goes far beyond the simple dichotomies of in/out, boundary 
maintenance/crossing. Altschul et al interestingly call these patterns “identity 
content”, thereby elevating boundary salience to the theoretically operative factor 
when assessing the impact of “identity” on social outcomes such as educational 
success (2008:304). 
The ‘racial-ethnic self-schema frameworks’ literature also seeks to identify patterns 
in youths’ “orientations to their racial-ethnic groups and to broader society” which 
4 The idea of ‘simply American’ is not problematised. 
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can explain outcomes such as academic achievement. In repeated quantitative 
studies, including youth from different racial-ethnic groups in different countries 
and contexts, four different ‘types’ of “racial-ethnic self-schema (RES)” were 
identified and correlated with consistent relative educational achievement 
outcomes (Oyserman, Kemmelmeier et al. 2003). The same three-dimensional 
variation in boundary salience (strength, exclusivity and value) applies to these 
schemata. Aschematic RES do not see “racial-ethnic group membership as a self-
defining characteristic” (e.g. where the boundary is subjectively erased), while In-
group, Dual and Minority RES recognise their in-group membership and the in/out-
group boundary but see out-group engagement as respectively undesirable, 
desirable/beneficial and desirable/ difficult. It is significant that the aschematic 
group, e.g. those who did not work with a relatively clear set of own and other 
group identity characteristics and boundaries in mind, were actually at greatest risk 
of low academic outcomes when living in “inhospitable contexts” such as poor 
predominantly ‘minority’ neighbourhoods. They were followed by In-group types, 
while both Dual and Minority types had better achievements (Altschul, Oyserman 
et al. 2008:306). This seems to suggest that a combination of boundary 
consciousness and the simultaneous will to actively overcome/manipulate the 
boundary are necessary ingredients for positive social outcomes. The personal 
process of actively negotiating one’s ‘integration’ with a dominant group is 
therefore shown to be an integral element of ‘identity’ itself.  
How can such insights be applied beyond the contexts (and assumptions) of 
‘minority/majority assimilation’ and how they might speak to the wider migrant and 
refugee integration literature? Firstly, the psychological element of individual 
patterns of self-conception as a starting point for the engagement with others 
(significantly, including other individuals within one’s own ‘in-group’ and with the 
‘out-group’) brings in the individual as a relevant level of analysis. This level of 
analysis is usually ignored in literature on migrant and refugee integration. 
Especially in cases where integration is a dispersed process using variations on 
‘weapons of the weak’ to engage both with members of a (similarly marginal) 
society and with a powerful state, individual decisions rather than collective and 
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organised actions (e.g. elite boundary-making) is a key level of action. Secondly, it 
puts the emphasis on the interactions between predispositions and choices, where 
choices (rather than structures) are often underestimated in the migrant and 
refugee integration literature. Thirdly, and crucially, it introduces the need to think 
of interactions with identity group boundaries as multi-dimensional, at least along 
the dimensions of strength of boundary salience, exclusivity of identification with 
one group or the other or both, and value of identification with either or both 
groups. In a more balanced context than ‘majority/minority’, the attitudes, choices 
and salience judgements regarding boundary interactions must be established for 
both or all groups and not only for one group supposedly adapting itself to another 
group. Finally, one should not think of pre-integration group characteristics, 
integration processes and integration outcomes as separate things. Integration 
outcomes (like academic outcomes in the “racial-ethnic self-schema” studies) can 
be related directly to the predisposition and choice of (individuals in) a group to 
engage in integrative boundary negotiations.  
 
5. Concluding the Conclusion 
 
Connecting migrant and refugee integration accounts to these broader theoretical 
debates on weapons of the weak, national identity formation and identity group 
construction illustrate the value of thinking about integration as negotiation and 
local politics. In the Introduction I listed seven correlates of this political negotiation 
approach. I return to these here as a conclusion, having addressed each one in 
various ways in the introduction, through the articles in the body of the thesis and 
in this conclusion. This list also reflects reasons for why a negotiation approach to 
integration is analytically preferable other perspectives. 
1. Local integration is a form of local politics rather than an institutionalizable 
intervention for an exceptional category of people. The fallacies and blinkers 
of a policy-oriented and institutionalised approach have been discussed in 
detail in the introduction, Negotiating Rights, Invisible Integration (with 
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regard to policy-oriented categorisation), and in Changing Legal 
Frameworks. 
2. Local integration is negotiated by refugees, and these negotiations are 
based on a range of legitimacy claims and forms of exchange. A key theme 
of all the articles which make up this thesis, this point is particularly linked 
with broader accounts of how marginal people negotiate with more 
powerful forces, whether in society or in the form of institutions like the 
state, as noted in this conclusion. Processes of negotiation, however, as 
discussed in Negotiating Rights, are not limited to assumptions of 
marginality but can also be used to understand and compare the full 
spectrum of newcomer power positions, including how more powerful 
migrants and refugees (such as high profile political exiles or highly skilled 
migrants) relate with and integrate into host societies. Furthermore, 
integration is essentially the negotiation of identity group boundaries, 
connecting with the extensive literature on this issue. 
3. Local integration of refugees is enabled by hosts for a variety of reasons 
rather than mainly for reasons related to the idea of “refugee protection”. 
As in the previous point, a perspective looking at the negotiation of identity 
group boundaries includes seeing hosts as equally affected by shifting group 
boundaries. It places the reception of refugees into a broader context of 
relational group definition which makes the boundary relevance and nature 
of their respective ‘refugeeness’ and ‘hostness’ an empirical rather than a 
normative question. It also enables seeing hosts as potentially similarly 
vulnerable to newcomers and as engaged with similar processes of 
(unequal) negotiation with institutions such as the state. This is emphasised 
in Changing Legal Frameworks and Histories as well as the Introduction’s 
background section on the Bushbuckridge case study. It also requires us to 
take seriously related identity producing processes such as national identity 
formation in which hosts and newcomers are equally embroiled, as noted in 
this conclusion. 
4. Local integration needs to be understood as an ongoing and shifting process 
rather than a linear process or a final state of being. Understanding 
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integration processes both benefits from and contributes to debates on the 
nature of relational identity group boundary negotiation, as I have argued in 
this conclusion and as I have illustrated particularly in Histories and Space. 
Combining critical empirical approaches to integration and identity group 
construction enable us to move beyond static binary oppositions 
(refugee/host; insider/outsider; us/other) to describing the processes for 
not only the crossing of boundaries but the negotiation of relevant 
boundary characteristics and indeed the relevance of the boundary itself.  
5. Today’s processes of refugee integration should be analysed using a 
framework that allows for comparisons and links across historical periods, 
rather than taking the current international legal and institutional refugee 
protection regime for granted as a primary influence on integration 
processes and outcomes. This point, made in Negotiating Integration and 
developed in Histories and illustrated in Changing Legal Frameworks, is an 
element of my broader point concerning the integration of ‘integration’ into 
broader comparative frameworks – comparing processes over time, 
comparing potential newcomer trajectories (from isolation to assimilation), 
and comparing actors (from the completely powerless to the powerful).  
6. Refugee integration processes can only be understood by abandoning rather 
than reifying the category of ‘refugee’ as an a priori conceptual and 
methodological construct. Invisible Integration especially focuses on how 
the incorporation of institutional and even social categorisations can make 
integrated refugees invisible, thereby cutting short our understanding of the 
full range of possible inter-group engagements and individual trajectories. 
All through the articles of this thesis, the concept of refugee is of limited 
utility in describing the strategic options and choices of people in 
Bushbuckridge in the quest for legitimacy and basic resource access. 
7. Local integration, fundamentally, is an empirical process. Normative claims 
about the desirability of different forms of society (communitarian, 
cosmopolitan, etc.) may be endogenous to the political negotiations of the 
process but should not be taken as an analytical starting point for describing 
and understanding the process. This concluding point reflects the necessary 
239
‘how’ of studying processes as set out in points 1 to 6, e.g. with an open, 
contextual, comparative approach that does not impose categories or 
relationships.    
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